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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
CULTURAL POLITICS OF COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION IN THE
BUFFER ZONE OF CHITWAN NATIONAL PARK, NEPAL.
by
Yogesh Dongol
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Roderick Neumann, Major Professor
The dissertation research examines the socio-economic and political effects of
community-based conservation initiatives within the Bagmara buffer zone community
forests of Chitwan National Park, Nepal. In particular, the study investigates the role of
buffer zones creation in structuring the way rural property rights have been defined,
negotiated, and contested, in reinforcing or reducing patterns of ethnic dominance and
exclusion, and in influencing how cultural identities are constituted and renegotiated.
Using a political ecology framework with a specific focus on theoretical concepts of
environmentality and territorialization, I conducted 12 months ethnographic and
quantitative survey field research in the buffer zone communities of Chitwan National
Park. I focused on documenting socioeconomic conditions and livelihood practices, and
interpreting the meanings of residents’ lived experiences. In addition, I critically
examined state and non-state conservation and development practices to understand how
they work to produce identities, livelihoods, and landscapes in the park’s buffer zone.
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The ethnographic study documented diverse impacts of community-based
conservation initiatives. One of the major effects is the distribution of costs and benefits,
specifically elite capture of community forest and tourism benefits. Second is the existing
conflict and potential conflict over the control of access, benefits, and territory based on
social and cultural identities. Third is the reproduction of caste, ethnic, and class
hierarchies. Fourth is the militarization of communities in and around the buffer zone and
community forest. Fifth is the production of environmental and non-environmental
subjects such as illegals and poachers. Finally, the sixth is the commodification of
conservation spaces and subsequent ecological impacts. The research concludes that the
discursive representation of humans and non-humans and the discourses and practices of
economic development and biodiversity conservation produced and reproduced a number
of negative social, political, and ecological consequences in the buffer zone of CNP. This
dissertation concluded that the conservation and development practices are territorial
projects to govern people and nature.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Diverse forms of community-based conservation (CBC) projects have proliferated
over the past three decades, effectively reorganizing land and resource access in
thousands of rural communities worldwide (Brosius et al. 2005; Zimmerer 2006; Déry
and Vanhooren 2011). Political ecologists have argued that territorialized CBCs such as
buffer zones and community forests are structured by thinking that privileges the interests
of the central state and private capital over those of local land users (Brockington et al.
2008; Peluso and Lund 2011; Büscher et al. 2012; Fairhead et al. 2012). Moreover, it is
widely recognized that CBC efforts to control resource and land use and access by
restructuring property regimes are often entangled with broader political struggles over
national, ethnic, indigenous, gender, or caste identities (e.g. Brosius 1997; Li 2002;
Peluso and Lund 2011; Yberra 2012). While the critique of CBCs has gained significant
traction within political ecology, research into the specific social and political effects in
place is inchoate and inconclusive (Neumann 2015). Questions of how and to what effect
CBCs intersect with identity politics surrounding territorial claims and land rights are
central, but unsettled. At one extreme, research has identified the displacement of
indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities as a chief outcome (Brockington and Igoe 2006;
Ojeda 2012). At the other extreme, some studies credited the introduction of CBCs with
strengthening local community land rights and indigenous peoples' territorial claims
(Lunstrum 2008; Gardner 2016).
Under what conditions do CBCs displace property and territorial claims or
strengthen them? How are CBCs implicated in subject making and to what political-
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ecological effects? Under what conditions is state territorial sovereignty being weakened
or strengthened? The answers to such fundamental questions remain both debatable and
increasingly urgent. Globally, conservation territory coverage has increased in the past
three decades from less than 4 percent to 15.4 percent of total land. CBCs now account
for 40 percent of this coverage (WCPA 2015; Pimm et al. 2015). This expansion has
altered states' sovereignty claims and placed uncounted thousands of rural communities
under new forms of institutional and regulatory authority (Brosius et al. 2005; Zimmerer
2006; Lemos and Agrawal 2006). What CBC expansion means for identity politics,
subject making, property regimes, state making, and structural inequalities requires
deeper investigation in particular places and historical moments.
The dissertation addresses these critical knowledge gaps through an ethnographic
study of communities in Nepal's Chitwan National Park (CNP) buffer zone. Nepal is a
particularly important case because of the state's strong commitment to biodiversity
conservation within a context of a highly diverse citizenry riven by severe socioeconomic
inequalities. State conservation territory coverage has grown from 0 to 23 percent of the
total land base since 1974, including 13 new buffer zones. In the meantime, Nepal has
experienced an armed Maoist insurgency in the countryside, numerous ethnically based
struggles over land rights and national identity, and an emergent indigenous rights
movement asserting territorial claims (Hangen 2007; Campbell 2007; Lawati and Hangen
2013; Jana 2007; Anaya 2009; Stevens 2014; NEFIN 2015). With attention to these
dynamic and periodically violent political-ecological conditions in Nepal, this
dissertation probe three key questions about CBCs. 1) What effects do CBC initiatives
have on socioeconomic inequalities and vice versa? 2) How are CBC initiatives
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implicated in state making and subject-making? 3) What effects do CBC initiatives have
on rural property relations and indigenous territorial claims?
I conceptualize the research through an engagement with work encompassed
within the field of political ecology (Peet and Watts 2004; Neumann 2005; Robbins
2011). Prominent lines of investigation in this literature include the relationship among
representations of nature and people, the construction of scientific knowledge, contested
property rights, and subject formation within conservation (Escobar 1998; Bryant 2001;
Neumann 2004; Peet and Watts 2004; Peluso and Lund 2011). Yet the lack of politics in
the political ecological analysis has surfaced time and again (Peet and Watts 1993;
Paulson et al. 2003; Walker 2006). The study attempts to address this concern by
focusing on the multiscalar analysis of power relations operating among individuals and
institutions (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003; Campbell 2007). More importantly, this study
emphasizes the ways modern forms of government work by controlling and producing
spaces and governable subjects (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Peluso and Vandergeest
2001; Neumann 2004; Foucault 2009). In addition, focusing on the emancipatory
potential of new political ecology, Peet and Watts (2004) also have emphasized the
importance of practical political engagement with new social movements, civil
organizations and institutions and cultural mobilization and practices. Moore (2005) in
particular has demonstrated the importance of everyday social and cultural practices in
struggle over land and resources. This study extends such concern by analyzing the ways
peoples of indigenous ethnicities negotiate and contest conservation practices and
territories across multiple spatial scales and multiple levels of government.
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The theoretical framework that informs this study integrates two important fields
of inquiry within political ecology. The concept of environmentality highlights
power/knowledge in the constitution and reproduction of environmental subjects in
conservation policies and projects (Agrawal 2005). Territorialization investigates the
constitution and reproduction of modern subjectivities such as nationality, race, gender
and ethnicity through the scientific and legal framing, ordering, and identification of the
spaces of nature (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Neumann 2005; Peluso and Lund 2011).

1.1. Becoming a political ecologist
For my masters in Environmental Science in Tribhuvan University, Nepal, I
started research related to community-based conservation in Bacchauli village at the end
of 2006. The research was guided by “physical science”. My research, which was a part
of a project of the Resources Himalaya Foundation, never questioned how power in
diverse forms mediates the relationship between nature and society. Our1 recruitment of
respondents was based on the stratified random sampling technique. The stratification
was based on landholdings, settlements, and population of respondents. We used to go
and interview a respondent who was “randomly” selected from our lucky draw. We
would find another respondent who has a similar landholding and from the same
settlement when we could not find a selected respondent or if she or he was busy. We did
random sampling if that counts as a random sample. During questionnaire interviews, we
used to get frustrated when someone took more than 20-30 minutes and we never

1

Our indicates the group of MSC students (11 in number) doing similar research in different buffer zone
villages of CNP in 2006.
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collected more than what is needed in the questionnaire. We were just interested in
getting a straight answer. For instance, how do you rank the performance of a current
buffer zone community forest leader, please rank from 1, 2, 3, 4 - values indicate a rank
from the best to worst. We rarely interacted with local people to try to get more
information, although some students were more active. More importantly, we never
questioned the power relations, scientific knowledge, or understanding of conservation
and development, and we never sought to understand the role of historical, social,
economic, political and cultural contexts in shaping community-based conservation and
outcomes. Although we were doing research at a time of major political struggle between
the King, political parties, and the Maoist party, we never asked the role of such contexts
in shaping conservation and development activities in the buffer zone.
After completing my masters, as environmental science related jobs were limited
and getting a job was difficult, I along with a few friends started to volunteer at the
Environmental Graduates of Himalaya (EGH). We established the organization with the
help of the late Pralad Yonzon. It was a sort of sister organization of the Resources
Himalaya Foundation. Dr. Yonzon was my masters advisor. Besides formal programs
and activities to learn new things, lunch breaks were an interesting time in the Resources
Himalaya Foundation. As I was one of the few regular participants, Dr. Yonzon used to
tell us his experiences and stories about diverse social and political contexts shaping
biodiversity conservation in Nepal. He was a wildlife biologist trained in the USA, but
he did both core wildlife biology and conservation biology research for more than three
decades in Nepal and South Asia.
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Practical knowledge about how power in different forms can influence and has
influenced ecology, wildlife, science, conservation, and development used to be the topic
of discussion (It was not really a discussion, we used to listen most of the time). He used
to tell us that we should “strive for good science”. He also used to say us "sir haru ho
knowledge is power hai". I used to understand his message as, “if you have
good knowledge of something, for instance of wildlife biology, that is your power.” In
other words, no other people can undermine you when it comes to wildlife biology if you
have a good knowledge of the topic. Now I think that his messages and suggestions to us
were more than “the knowledge is power”, but power/knowledge (Foucault 1980). His
message was more political. That is, what he meant was not only to see scientific data,
facts, and knowledge as complete truth but to question the validity of scientific findings
and knowledge. He was fighting against the ways large national and international
conservation organizations and government departments distorted scientific data and
produced scientific facts to serve their narrow interests. Although people talk about
science and science in conservation, the decisions, priorities and what counts as
knowledge are mostly based on donors’ money and the narrow interest
of government people and political leaders and the King. For instance, he told a story
about how the 50,000 population of tigers became a scientific fact. The “scientific fact”
was just a spontaneous response of a renowned bird expert Salim Ali to someone’s
curiosity about the total population of tigers. In another instance, he was also very critical
of the ways DNPWC, WWF and NTNC’s claim of the increase of adult tiger populations
from 91 to 125 in the 2010 Tiger census within a single year and a population of 29 cubs.
He found no satisfactory explanation of the increase through wildlife biology as Nepal’s
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breeding tiger population had an average of 2.8 cubs (sub adults). He was not ready to
accept that the increase was based on “more camera traps” used than previous census. He
linked donor money and influence to the increase of the population. He also related this
with Nepal’s 2009 commitment to the Global Tiger Initiatives and WWF initiatives to
save the tiger from “the brink of extinction” and “doubling the tiger population” by 2022,
the Tx2 initiatives. The Global Tiger Initiative is the World Bank funded wild tiger
saving initiatives of many international conservation organizations. After hearing about
WWF efforts to double the tiger population by the end of 2022 (Tx2) project, he told us,
“Look how stupid they are, they assume a tiger as a sack of cement which can be
manufactured and produced as much as they want.” Carey L Biron in Himal South Asia
also wrote a similar piece after a conversation with Dr. Yonzon in 2010 (Biron 20102;
Biron 20123).
But after a few frustrating years of unemployment, I decided to apply for graduate
school in the US. Only classmates who had “aaphno-manche4” got a job and engaged in
some form of a job. People who had aaphno-manche were not limited to certain ethnic
groups but those who received jobs were primarily Bahun-Chetri and few Newar (most
students were Bahun-Chetri and Newar). I do not mean that all my Bahun-Chetri friends
and all Newar or any other ethnic group got a job. All guys with whom I used to hang out
and often meet for “chia” (tea) after completing my masters were Bahun-Chetri and a

2

Biron, Carey L. 2010, Common Sense and the Tiger. Himal SouthAsian. Accessed on June 18, 2017

3

Biron, Carey L. 2012, Common Sense and the Tiger. Wildlife Times.
https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/w_times_feb_2011.pdf. Accessed on June 8, 2018
4

Refers to social and political connection or social network
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few Newar friends. Most Bahun-Chetri friends who did not get a stable job and with who
I used to hang out later either came to the US or some other European countries.

1.2. Study site, research methods, and positionality
As I have mentioned in the previous section, my interest in the subject and the
sites are primarily guided by my interest and the familiarity of the field. My current
dissertation research, however, builds on my previous studies but draws on a new range
of social theory in order to ask a different set of questions. Through the fellowship from
Resources Himalaya Foundation in Nepal, I completed my first MS degree research in
the buffer zone of Bacchauli VDC in 2007. I interviewed 71 household heads to study the
relationship between buffer zone conservation programs and local dependency on forest
resources (Dongol 2007). For my second MA degree at Florida International University, I
studied the policy gaps in the implementation of the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Wild Flora and Fauna in the CNP buffer zone communities. For that project,
I interviewed key personnel from government agencies and non-governmental
organizations and local conservation leaders from the buffer zones (Dongol and Heinen
2012).

1.2.1. Study area
My study site is located in the Chitwan District of Nepal. It is part of the buffer
zone of CNP and lies in the eastern sector. That is, it borders the Bharandabar corridor
(Tikauli forest) in the west and is separated by the CNP northern border, which is the
Rapti river. The eastern and northern sides are the parts of Janakauli BZCF and Chitrasen
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BZCF. The Government of Nepal declared this area and other villages as part of
Ratnanagar Municipality on December 2014. The site is now ward 17 and ward 18 of the
municipality. Based on past administrative jurisdiction, it includes four wards of
Bacchauli VDC and a part of the Ratnanagar Municipality. The four administrative wards
of former VDC or two wards of the municipality are divided into nine settlements or tols.
Each of the nine settlements of the site vary among each other. For instance, Sauraha,
Odra, Malpur have high tourism activities (high to low in order). They are the main hub
of tourism where most hotels and restaurants are located. Land value is extremely high in
this area. These areas still have many Tharu populations, but hill migrants—mostly
Bahun, Chetri and some Newars—have dominated the majority of restaurant, hotel and
tourism related businesses. A few members of the Tharu population are gradually
participating in tourism businesses from these settlements. These three settlements have
high Tharu, Bahun and Chetri populations. Other major ethnic groups there are Tamang,
Bote, Majhi and Musahar people. Majhi-Mushara is also categorized and treated as
“untouchable caste”. Bodreni, Laukhani and Bagmara have few tourism activities. These
settlements are located by the side of Bagmara BZCF and Khorser buffer zone forest.
These settlements have a high percentage of Tamang population. They also have Tharu,
Derai, Kumal, Magar, Bahun and Chetri population. Sisuwar, Mainaha and Paderiya have
very little or negligible tourism activities; they are far from both the center of tourism and
CF. The majority of the population are Tharu and other ethnic groups also reside in these
areas.

9

Figure 1.1. Map showing the location of study site (with four wards of former Bacchauli
VDC of Chitwan) (Map by Yogesh Dongol)

In addition to human settlements, built-up areas, and agricultural lands, a forested
area, which is popularly known as the Bagmara buffer zone community forest (Bagmara
BZCF), covers 215 ha of the land area. The geographical area or boundaries of the study
site were based on the users of Bagmara BZCF. All community forest users are
distributed in the two wards of the municipality. The Bagmara forest, which was under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Forest (DOF), was formally established as a
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community forest around 1984. The “land mafia” and local elites tried to capture major
sections of the forest around 1986. The court case of the ownership of the forest land
continued until after a series of conflicts between the “land mafia” and the local Tharu
population. It is also the first community forest of the Tarai region (plains) of Nepal. As
the name suggests, Bagmara was the most popular hunting site of rulers. Bag-mara means
the place where Bag (tiger) heads and hides were dried after the hunting and killing of
tigers by rulers. Although the local indigenous Tharu populations have resided and
farmed inside the community forest in the past, it was relatively intact until the
systematic resettlement of the hill population and involuntary migration after 1950s. It
was mostly initiated by the USAID and the Nepal government. The Tharu place was
declared as the forest by Nepal government’s 1969 survey as the land was “nonagricultural land” during the survey. The forest gradually degraded as the forest became
the only source of forest resources after the enclosure and restriction of access inside the
national park forest. Later the community forest received financial and technical help
from national and international conservation and development organizations such as
KMTNC (NTNC), WWF and the Biodiversity Conservation Network (BCN). The forest
area was mostly "chur" (an open and unused area) until KMTNC and BCN started their
first conservation and development project in the early 1990s. The forest rebounded after
the establishment of the community forest.
After the declaration of the buffer zone in Nepal, the Government of Nepal
(DNPWC) handed over the community forest as a Bagmara buffer zone community forest
to the local buffer zone community forest users committee—a local authority—in 2002.
Bagmara BZCF has forest users numbering 1017 households and a total population of

11

5163. It is the most active, rich and nature conservation oriented buffer zone user group
of Bacchauli village. The Bagmara BZCF is one of the 50 user groups of the Migrakunja
buffer zone users committee (Migrakunja BZUC). Nineteen percent of residents are high
caste hill migrants (Bahun and Chetri), 76 percent are advisai-janajati population and
about five percent are "untouchables". The indigenous Tharu population is 52 percent of
the total population. Indigenous peoples include Tharu, Tamang, Bote, Derai, Majhi and
Musahar peoples. Although it has a proportionately large indigenous population, the hill
migrants dominate all community forest institutions and initiatives; however, the current
Bagmara BZCF has 52 percent representation of advisai-janajati people including the
president of the Tharu people.

1.2.2. Research design and methods
My dissertation employs a mixed methods design that integrates ethnographic and
quantitative methods of data collection and analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Creswell
and Clark 2011). A mixed methods approach is required to address the complexities of
the interactions of CBC practices and policies with state making, property regimes,
subject making, identity politics, and socioeconomic inequalities. Specifically, I
conducted participant observation, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and document
analysis to investigate meanings and lived experiences of buffer zone residents,
especially related to their senses of cultural identity and political agency. Published and
unpublished documents and records are collected and analyzed to understand the ways
knowledge and discourses of nature conservation and cultural identity are historically
constructed and represented (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Bernard 2011). Quantitative
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methods of data collection and statistical analysis provide documentation of the dynamics
of socioeconomic conditions, social stratification, and livelihood strategies for buffer
zone residents.
I knew Gokarna dai5 from the Resources Himalaya Foundation. He worked on a
wildlife and social survey project conducted by the Resources Himalaya Foundation in
different occasions. He is a tour guide and bird expert by profession, and in his initial
days, he worked in Sauraha hotels. Sauraha is considered as a “tourist place”. As I knew
about him before, I contacted him and met him in Kathmandu. He assured me that he
would find a room for me and helped to connect me with local people. In the second
week of August, I traveled from Kathmandu to Chitwan on my motorcycle through
Mugling to Narayanghat route. I was so mad with the condition of the road that I cursed
the politicians and Nepali economic experts during the whole trip. The government has
been trying to renovate and extend the road for the past three years and the slow progress
has not only added to the hardship of commuters but the impact of the bad road condition
is devastating to Sauraha tourism because most national and foreign tourists travel on this
road.
During my travels, although I was wearing black half-pants, a blue jacket, and a
black backpack, I was totally white because of the dust all over my body. I stopped at
Gaida Chowk and after staying few minutes I called Gokarna dai to see if he knows of
any hotel. He gave me information about a hotel in Sauraha. I later went outside Sauraha
just to visit the main happening area and to have a dinner. I came back to the hotel at 8:30

5
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pm. I decided to eat dinner the next day in the same hotel because the road at night is
completely dark with no streetlights (and the possibility of an encounter with wild
animals). After eating dinner, the next day in the hotel, I met with a son of the hotel
owner. Since he was also in the hotel business and the hotel association of Sauraha, I took
an opportunity to ask about Sauraha tourism. He was open to talking with me because of
his connection with Gokarna dai. They were both from the same Maoist party and he
thought that I was also affiliated with the same party. We talked about an hour mainly
about the Sauraha tourism, which became the stepping-stone or a framework to
understand the tourism industry of Sauraha as I continued my research throughout the
year. Actually, the informal conservation with him became one of the most important
talks about tourism in Sauraha.
In the third day, Gokarna dai also came to Sauraha. He helped me find a room in
Sauraha in his friend's house. He also helped me connect with many other local people.
Some of them were Bagmara BZCF committee members and some were local leaders. I
later found that all but two guys were affiliated with the Maoist party. Actually, the house
I rented also belonged to a staunch Maoist party supporter, Sanichara Mahato
(Sanichara dai). Two other adjoining houses also belonged to Maoist supporters and both
house members were committee members of Bagmara BZCF. I had a few important talks
with them but I did not get good support from them later. Gokarna dai also introduced me
to Thagu dai, who is the current president of the Bird Education Society (BES). BES is
the only functioning and most active organization in the Sauraha area. BES was
established by bird experts and local nature guides. Thagu dai shared information about
nature guide and tourism, and his pasal (snack shop) became a place to eat. I also had an
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opportunity to reconnect with Rupendra dai, who worked for NTNC (KMTNC)
during the 1990s and worked closely with the Resources Himalaya Foundation in the
past. His relationship with some local hotel owners became valuable. He also helped me
to locate a detailed study of the buffer zone residents conducted during the early 1990s.
In the later days, I stopped going with Gokarna dai because I thought that his affiliation
with the Maoist party will limit my connections with other people, and some people
started to think that I was also affiliated with the Maoist party.
I conducted twelve months of fieldwork in Nepal from June, 2016 to May, 2017.
During the first phase, I primarily focused on getting permission from DNPWC to
conduct my research in the buffer zone of CNP. I submitted my application and a
proposal to get a permission which took about a week to get the permission. At the same
time, I tried to make connections with DNPWC staffs. As one of my friends used to work
as a head of South Asian Wildlife Enforcement Network (SAWEN) secretariat, which
was located inside the DNPWC building, I used to visit him frequently to get familiar
with what is going on within DNPWC. As the library of DNPWC and Department of
Forest (DOF) was also located in the same place, I visited the place frequently.
In the second phase of my search, I resided in Sauraha, a village in the buffer zone
of CNP where I rented a room. I participated in public activities and meetings, such as
community clean-up programs, conservation rallies, tol-bhela (area/settlement
gatherings), general assemblies of Bagmara BZCF and the Bird Education Society (BES).
I also became a life member of BES and regularly visited and met with BES leaders. I
attended a few sessions of the conservation week in Sauraha held during the first week of
a new year. I attended seminars conducted by the NTNC on different occasion especially
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in the training of new nature guides, tiger conservation, and forest fire awareness sessions
in the conservation week. I also participated in a meeting organized by the Migrakunja
buffer zone user Committee (MBZUC) held to talk about future strategies that need to be
taken by all interested parties after a wild elephant killed a young foreigner during a tour
in Khorser forest (Barandabhar corridor forest). I also participated in their meeting about
wildlife crop damage of nearby community forest users. I also visited gatherings such as
the “Elephant Festival” and the “Phugwa Festival” where high ranking political leaders
and the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation participated and spoke about
conservation, development and tourism of Sauraha. Likewise, I attended a formal
building inauguration program where the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation and
other tourism leaders gave speeches about conservation and tourism. I visited formal and
informal gatherings related to community conservation and development and indigenous
activities within the buffer zone project.
I think I participated in many and also missed many formal
gatherings sometimes because I was in another field site and sometimes I already had
another appointment; however, I tried to get information from those who participated in
events. I particularly missed two programs. The first one was related with the conflicts
between parks and local people regarding the translocation of rhinos from CNP to
Suklaphanta National Park. The second one was the presentation of an army colonel
about the army’s effort in CNP conservation programs conducted NTNC. I did
not attend formal meetings of the BZCF because most of the time I did not know and the
sources that I believed would inform me never did, and more importantly on one
occasion, a responsible community forest committee leader did not allow me to stay in a
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committee meeting. Although the president already granted me permission, and other
community leaders seemed okay with me sitting in the meeting, the Maoist leader
opposed me by saying “they don’t allow their forest users to sit in the committee meeting,
how should they allow an outsider” (Field notes, September 1, 2016).
I accompanied government and community patrols within the buffer zone on at
least five occasions. For four of those times I went with the community forest's forest
guards and on one occasion I briefly traveled for a few miles with two army men and a
National Park staff. In one occasion I accompanied buffer zone leaders to observe the
ongoing construction of tourism infrastructures (a 6-8 bed viewing and sleeping tower
inside the forest) inside the Bharandabar corridor. Patrolling helped me to document
peoples' daily livelihood strategies, practices and resource use, struggles and conflicts. It
also allowed me to examine everyday activities and perceptions of state and non-state
patrolling teams. I documented how poor and marginal groups (ethnic/indigenous groups,
women, caste groups) negotiate their daily practices of conservation and resource needs.
I administered a survey questionnaire to randomly selected buffer zone residents.
A sample size of 96 respondents for the Bagmara BZCF users was determined by using a
standard statistical method at 95 percent confidence interval and 10 percent standard error
(Rea and Parker 2014, 171). In the Bacchauli VDC, I received a list of community forest
users from Bagmara BZCF. As all users were divided into 9 different “tols” (settlement
area), I used users of each settlement one by one to randomly select respondents with a
lucky draw. I selected 10 respondents from each 9 settlements and 2 each from Bodreni,
Bagmara and Laukhani settlement. When a respondent disagreed to give an interview or
if a respondent is not available, new respondents were selected with a new lucky draw.
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According to the forest users list provided by the Bagmara BZCF the total number of
forest users is only 1017, but according to many committee leaders, the actual users
should be much higher than 1200. One hotel owner was surprised to see only 1017 forest
users households and told me that this less number of total households should be the
tactics of “Saurahas’ big people” to not to update the list but informally recognize the
number. In questionnaire survey I asked questions related to household socioeconomic
and livelihood information; community forest rules and regulations; user group's
information; land use, tenure and ownership; forest resources rights; household resource
use and dependency; participation in community forest management and forest
associations; and knowledge of forest conditions and governance. I prepared
questionnaire sets and I just filled the information in each heading (detail in Chapter
five).
I used in-depth semi-structured interviews with three major groups of respondents
- buffer zone residents, government officials, NGO officials and conservation experts. In
addition to semi-structured interviews with randomly selected buffer zone community
forest users, I conducted numerous open-ended interviews with buffer zone residents. I
tried to talk with many people of different ages, genders, ethnicities and with people
working in BZ and CF etc. I also expanded my range of respondents and included
additional questions when I found that I did not have a single respondent from
Bote, Musher and people from Sukumbasi settlements (landless area) on my interview
list and in my random samples.
My house owner, Sunichara dai helped termendously in this regard. In my initial
days, he helped me in finding randomly selected respondent’s houses. After hearing
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different questions about forests, livelihoods, and land, and access to different
respondents, he used to tell me that I should also visit with an active Bote dai,
Sukumbasi tol’s dai and a Musher family. Their information became very valuable so as
to understand more issues, which I will discuss in the following chapters. In another
instance, in one evening, I was staying in my room and Sunichara dia knocked on my
door, I opened the door and asked him to come inside the room. He refused and told me
that he came just to find out whether I have visited with a guy who was arrested at his
home by the army for hitting a rhino yesterday from Sauraha area. I said no, but I told
him that I wanted to visit him. He took me to his house and we sat there and had a very
interesting conservation about rhinos, crop damage, compensation, tourism and other
social issues. As I had no intention to talk with him that evening because it was already
dark (around 8:30) and just wanted to meet him so that I can come later, I was not
prepared to take notes and did not have a recorder. He and his wife started describing the
incident, and later, in Tharu language, his wife asked Sanichara dai in Tharu
language, who was sitting by my side, if I am actually including their story in my
book. He said yes to her. I visited their home a few more times during my research. I
think Sunichara dai believed in me and helped me only because I was a Newar from
Kathmandu. He used to tell me how he was duped and also helped by Bahun friends and
leaders a number of times. He used to tell me very often that “bigranu cha bhenay Bahun
sanga sangat garnu”, which means if you want to degrade your life and property, you
should make friends with Bahun people.
In contrast, almost all formal conversation with local leaders, NP people and
organizations were arranged by phone beforehand. I interviewed local leaders, Buffer-
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zone user committee leaders, past presidents of buffer zone community forests, the
present president of community forest, other committee members, forest guards, hotel
owners, elephant owners, restaurant owners and workers, nature guides, tour operators,
elephant drivers, souvenir shop owners, foreign tourists and leaders of labor
organizations.
Before any scheduled meeting, I used to prepare questionnaire topics and write
them down in a notebook. I used to ask them but never directed the conversation. Most of
the time I let them take the topic where they wanted to, but I usually tried to bring them
into local issues. The most difficulty in getting a formal meeting is to schedule the time
and sometimes there were repeated postponements of scheduled meetings. Although
these things are nothing new to me, it happened very little. In the case of informal
conservations, I cannot recall how many times I have visited the Bagmara BZCF office
and talked with forest guards, staffs and CF committee members. On a number of
occasions, I had a conversation with the president, vice-president, secretary and with
numerous "parisad members” (sub-committee or members of a community forest
representing a particular tol6 from where the main forest committee members are
selected). The majority of conservations were not preplanned. I also shared my
preliminary findings with local leaders and community forest leaders during formal and
informal conversations.
I also conducted semi-structured interviews with NGO officials and experts. I
talked with the personnel of conservation and development organizations such as NTNC,
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WWF-Nepal, the Bird Education Society (BES), the Nature Guide Association, the
United Elephant Association, the Hotel Association, the Resources Himalaya Foundation
(RHF), the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), the Federation of
Community Forest Users, Nepal (FECOFUN), the National Planning Council (NPC) and
Tharu Kalynakari Sabha (Tharu Welfare Council). Among the government officials, I
conducted interviews with two game scouts, wardens, sub-wardens, an army chief of
Sauraha Shree Jung Gun, and a brief conversation with an Army Colonel. I did not talk
with many persons with whom I made a previous connection. For the most part, I did not
speak with professors and experts who were related to indigenous issues because after
residing in the field site I did not find many indigenous issues. Although I found later that
indigenous issues were more pronounced in the buffer zone of the western CNP, I did not
see and hear much in my research sites. I found few incidents and issues related with
indigeneity, but the analogous issues of ethnicity are not invisible in Bagmara CF area.
I used open-ended questions to understand different forms of conflict, livelihood
strategies related to conservation practices, the effects of development initiatives on rural
households, and indigenous political activities. I tried to obtain respondents' perceptions
of and experiences with forest resource access rights, conservation governance, and
community relations with international and national NGOs. However, I did not clearly
mention to all people that I was also looking at claims and struggles of different Adivasijanajati people, assuming that that will obviously put me in a category of one who speaks
of identity issues. Many Bahun-Chetri people that I met in Sauraha frowned upon people
who talk about the rights of minorities.
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I think getting social data depends on blending with people and society and
gaining the trust of people. To blend with people, to gain the trust of many people and to
diversify information from respondents, I always tried to eat in different places. During
my initial months, I ate dinner at a local Tharu house cum restaurant which was near to
my rented house and the restaurant owner was my house owner’s cousin. Later I started
eating in Thagu dia’s pasal (a snack shop). After a few months, I started eating in a local
restaurant. My main aim of going to different places and locations for lunch, dinner, and
snacks was to hear different conversations and meet with different people. My strategy
became valuable in learning about Sauraha tourism in general. In particular, I knew labor
conditions and exploitation, sexual exploitation of woman workers, and rampant
prostitution in Sauraha. I would never have gained such information without going to
different restaurants and making connections with local staffs and owners. Blending,
however, will not ensure the quality and quantity of data. I had a good relationship with a
respectable local nature guide, but I did not get much information although I spent many
hours of time with him. Despite spending time and blending, he was not a particularly
helpful source of information because he believed that talking about social issues is
talking about other people and talking about other people is, in his words, “backbiting.”
He does not want to backbite others.
More importantly, I frequently changed the way of asking a question with local
people and became very careful in choosing words when asking questions. Since Nepali
is not the first language of many local people, some people had difficulty in
understanding my questions. For instance, some people have a hard time understanding a
question when I use the Nepali word “rarstriya nikuna” for National Park. People
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commonly use the English word “Park” or “National Park”. People usually called it
“Rapti pari” or “pari” or “Chure7” when they have to refer indirectly to CNP. Similarly,
people had hard time understanding me when I use the Nepali word
“madhyaworti chhetra” for buffer zone. Most people understood the English word
“buffer zone” rather than the Nepali word. In addition, older people still use the word
“demarcation line” when they have to tell a story about how the National Park was
initially started. They say demarcation line as a “barbed wire line with a pole spacing in
certain distance to separate forest and settlement”. I usually asked people what they say
or name any forest before asking a question. They also had difficulty in understanding the
question which is too long and not too straight, for example, when I ask people what they
think about CF rules and penalties. They just give a brief answer- thikai (not good, not
bad). When I put it in a familiar way, for instance, when I asked them to tell me what
happens if you go to CF without taking a ticket or what do forest guards do if they arrest
you? Then they will start giving you answers.
I recorded many interviews without any intent to harm interviewees, and I asked
for permission to record in most interviews. I recorded every public event. I also recorded
public conversations and public meetings such as meetings about compensation and
human-wildlife conflicts. My experience of asking to record a conversation was not
helpful in getting better information. When respondents agreed to being recorded they
usually did not openly tell their stories or the whole conversation became a performance
or most usually they gave me more information after stopping the recorder. For instance,
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I went in Bodreni village looking at my random sample household. Since I did not know
about them, I was with Sunichar dai. Both wife and husband were very busy preparing a
concrete bed for their newly purchased buffalo. After convincing them to interview I
asked if I could record the conversation, with hesitation they agreed. After the
conversation was over I stopped the recorder and started other conversations. Later the
wife told me that they did not tell me all the information about conservation issues and
community leaders because I was recording the conversation and they were afraid that I
might put that on the internet.
In addition to the collection of social data, I also completed a vegetation survey of
Bagmara BZCF, but I have not included results in the dissertation. During the course of
my in-depth and survey interviews with Bagmara BZCF users, I heard about the debate
on the status of the community forest. Some users claimed that the forest looks dense
only from outside, but it is wide open if someone goes inside. They argued that large
herds of private elephants go inside every day for a number of times, and as a result, the
forest has been trampled and degraded impacting underground vegetation and the
structure of the forest. Other users who were mostly in the hotel and elephant business,
on the other hand, claimed that elephants have much less impact because each elephant
travels in a “specified route” and as a result the forest has not been affected by the
elephants. They further argued that the access of local users’ needs to be controlled for
the survival of the CF. Although I had already visited the forest for a day to see the
effects of private elephant safaris and the claims of "the elephant route" with two forest
guards, later I decided to find out the status of the forest with standard vegetation survey
on both sites.
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As it is not allowed to enter the forest alone and as it is also dangerous to go
alone, I contacted Bali dai who is one of the very experienced nature guides of the
Sauraha to go with me inside the forest. I contacted him because he is more familiar with
the forest vegetation and has worked with some other students in a vegetation survey.
Rather than on randomly selected points, we decided to conduct vegetation surveys every
200m from the North to South and from the East to West. We started from one corner in
the north and traveled straight south up to 200 m and completed the survey. We repeated
the same process until we covered the whole Bagmara BZCF forest.
In order to estimate changes in land ownership, I collected land plots that have
been sold by locals to outsiders. I considered “sold” land as the land which is fenced,
often with barbed wire, by the owner and the land which has on it hotels or restaurants.
Although land which does not have barbed wire and which has crops growing on it could
also have been sold, which I found on several occasions, I did not include such lands as
“sold” land for analysis. I collected GPS points of each land parcel that appeared to be
sold to prepare a map in GIS showing changes in land ownership. In addition, I collected
GPS points of the visible marker in the boundary of the BZCF to map a conflict between
access of forest resources.
I also collected data related to tourism in Sauraha. I collected data on a number of
hotels and restaurants of different categories. I visited one-third of the total hotels and
restaurants of different locations to find how many jobs the tourist industry has provided
to local people. I also collected the average salary of different categories of hotel
employees to find out why local do not prefer jobs in Sauraha hotels. I interviewed a
number of female and male employees to see why local women prefer going to the forest
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for cash income rather than getting easily available jobs in Sauraha. I observed how local
tourism functions in Sauraha and the labor conditions. In addition, I tried to find out the
quality of hotels and type of tourists coming to Sauraha to see why Sauraha is considered
as a "foreigners’ place" or "tourists’ place" given that most hotels and restaurants and
Sauraha tourism in general depends on Nepali tourists.
I also collected and examined documents from government and non-governmental
offices working on conservation and development. I mostly collected documents from the
DNPWC library, the NTNC office Sauraha and the Migrakunja buffer zone user’s
committee. I tried to find prevailing and divergent conservation and development
discourses within state policy documents, conservation-NGOs, political activists, and
mass-media publications. In my analysis, I emphasized the representations of indigenous
people, the spaces of nature conservation, and wildlife in these texts. This helped me to
document how nature, society and their relationships have been framed and represented
through scientific, technological and legal knowledge and practices. Getting information
from government offices, NTNC and community forests was the most difficult task
during my field work. I found that information is strongly guarded in offices, and the
access depends on the identity of a person and a connection with an insider. I had similar
experiences in many offices.
For instance, getting information from the NTNC became both difficult and easy
depending on people. I was looking for documents which were not published, such as
audit reports, audit letters and meeting minutes and others. I met with the administrative
chief a number of times but he showed an unwillingness to provide such materials. He,
however, gave me all the published materials such as leaflets and brochures, which may
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have been carefully selected by their staff after many consultations. He also gave me
more than an hour to talk about conservation history and different issues of Sauraha
tourism and Bagmara. As he is also the owner of a big hotel and the owner of a number
of elephants, his information became valuable. Later, I got help from a lower level staff
member. He was very helpful and provided much information which I think I would
never imagine I would get from the higher level staff. I collected audit reports, court
cases and many financial documents of Bagmara BZCF from the office. I strategically
used my connection with past heads of the NTNC on both occasions.
In another instance, I met a friend in the department of the forest because the
department lost their office’s documents. He is an officer at a big hydropower company.
He told me he came to the forest office because he needed a permit to cut trees at their
field site. As he was there with a Newar district forest officer, he connected me with him
and told me he might be able to help me. The forest officer recommended another Newar
guy in another forest department. He told me “if you want to find any information in the
forest department, you will have to get help from anyone who you know, otherwise it will
be very difficult because data and information are not well managed and most are
strongly guarded by each section and each officer” (field notes). He further told me that
you will not get anything in the library and the library is the place where you can go to
read the daily newspaper. I thought that should be true because they did not even have
their own flagship journal publication at the library.
Later I decided not to follow his recommendation because the process of making
the connection and asking for a favor was a long and tedious task. So I decided to go by
myself. I went inside the office and asked an office assistant. He pointed me to another
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man sitting right in front of me. I told him that I was looking for information about
scientific forest management. He started explaining basic information about scientific
management. He again asked me if I was a forestry student. I told him that I was doing
forest related work by the side of CNP, but I am a social science PhD student studying in
Miami, USA. Then he told me that he just came back from the USA a few months ago
and visited Miami and went to Key West. His son-in-law is doing a post-doc and his son
was recently admitted to a graduate school in the USA. I asked more about them and the
post-doc he mentioned turned out to be one of my friends. After that, he started to talk
more about scientific management and he took me inside his office room. He ordered a
tea and also gave me some information that he currently had. He also suggested that I
visit the office after 4 days so that I could meet with his boss who has been handling the
project and who is currently in Canada for an excursion visit.
I conducted most interviews in Nepali, digitally recorded, and transcribed for
further analysis. Using N-vivo qualitative data analysis software and based on the
grounded-theory approach, I carefully open coded (which is based on N-vivo coding) and
analyzed all interview and document content line-by-line to create categories of themes
and subthemes (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Bernard 2011). In particular, I looked for
repetition, changes, similarities and differences of words, ideas, actions/interactions,
events, acts, happenings, and consequences to find patterns in interactions among
conservation practices, development initiatives, and indigenous politics in the buffer zone
(Strauss and Corbin 1998). Furthermore, by using axial coding technique (reducing data
by linking or relating different categories and subcategories based on similarities or
difference in properties and dimensions) I organized or grouped categories and
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subcategories into central explanatory concepts or into higher order concepts to
understand phenomenon such as social and political movements and conflicts and
resource struggles (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Similarly, memos and field notes prepared
during and after interviews are coded and analyzed. In addition, all public, NGO, and
media documents including images and texts are coded using N-vivo. Also, quantitative
data from the questionnaire survey are simultaneously coded by assigning numeric values
to produce descriptive statistics.

1.2.3. Negotiating my role and positionality
I was born in a Newari farmer family. The only difference from other farmer
families was my father had a high paying intermediate government job. Although my
mother and father were both involved in farming, none of my generation had to work on
our farmlands. I was raised in the suburban village of Kathmandu valley, which is about
6 miles southwest from the downtown New-road. Living in and growing up in a
suburban part of Kathmandu is an interesting place because one sees and visits
"developed" areas every day and at the same time one will feel and live in an "underdeveloped" suburb of the city. People growing up in a suburban area need to constantly
act as modern subjects when someone meets a friend from urban areas and feels sad for
not having a paved blacktopped road, lots of vehicles and shops. I grew up with these
mixed feelings. Although clear distinctions have been blurred in terms of modern
facilities between urban and suburban within the last two decades, sub-urban areas are
not a downtown or an urban area. Local residents still know each other and have some
degree of self-sustenance. For instance, my family still grows about 50 percent of
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vegetables for our daily consumption. We used to grow 90 percent of the thing that we
consume at home until at least 10 years ago. But markets have proliferated and are still
expanding in every nook and corner of villages in Nepal, disrupting the selfsustaining life of people.
I spent a few years of my childhood in a typical Newari settlement but later
moved to a mixed tol (a settlement or a village) about a mile away. Most Newar
households were of different jaats (caste), unlike mostly Maharjan (Dongol) and few
Shrestha jaats in my previous tol (both Newari caste or jaat). Within a quarter mile
radius from my current home, there are many Bahun, Chetri, Magar,
"untouchable” jaats (Biswokarma, Mijar) and other diverse Newari jaat’s households. I
grew up with friends from all jaats and never knew about different jaats until I was in 78th grade. I distinctly remember going with my younger brother for lunch in an
"untouchable" caste neighbor’s house during some festivals. It gradually changed when I
became older. I stopped going after I found that they were "untouchable" jaat. In the later
years, I grew up mostly with Chetri, Bahun and Newar friends. Many things drastically
changed in the past 10-15 years. Behavior towards "untouchables" have changed. People
cannot be forced to do something and behave badly or discriminatory based on their
caste, although news of discrimination can be heard and seen in the media very often. At
the same time when I thought that much has changed with time in Nepal many people
still have a stronger opinion of "untouchables". For instance, some Bahun
- Chetri friends who are more educated and have advanced academic education have kept
the discourses and practices of "untouchable" alive in my own place and also in my
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research sites, which are no different than the conversation of many Ph.D. students of
Nepal who are currently studying in Miami.
After reflecting on fieldwork, I think that conducting successful fieldwork is
about performing yourself sometimes as a staunch conservationist and sometimes as a
social justice activist, sometimes as indigenous advocate and sometimes as rich or poor.
Since I know that the majority of Nepali people think that if you are returning from the
USA and are a Ph.D. student, you already are in the higher class. You have money and
your life is secure. In addition, if you are from Kathmandu and a Newar, you are already
considered as rich and in a higher class, although there are more nuances and complexity
between caste groups and within the Newar caste. I strategically used or performed my
diverse identities to make a connection with people to get authentic information and
insider views.
When I tried to become clear about my identity as a returning Ph.D. student
studying in the USA and doing conservation related research, Gokarna dai, who helped
me to connect with people in the field, told me to be humble. He told me that if I use the
word "Ph.D." to introduce myself then that is not considered humble
behavior. Karna dia's reading, however, is not incorrect. In Nepal, the level of academic
qualification is considered as a marker of your social order. Most people do not want to
know how much people know about a certain topic or whether certain people are fit for
the job or not, but most people only care about literate or illiterate and what class they
have passed. If someone boasts, then respondents might not think of that as humble. He
told me that I need to perform or act as someone who is in a lower social order such as by
saying ‘dai” - meaning you subscribe to a lower position, which means saying someone is
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an elder brother. In addition, PhD is an English word, which resembles big and better.
Similar to the words "national parks" “buffer zone”, “demarcation line”, “tourists”,
“guests”, these English words have powerful force just by being an English word. He
instead suggested that I use the Nepali word "Bidhyabaradi", which I never used. I
continued to use the word "PhD" with people who I think will understand. I rarely used
the word with local people. I used to say that I am a student trying to learn about forest
resources, livestock, and agriculture.
Sometimes I had to perform class identity- a rich person with modern sunglasses,
nice deodorant, and nice clothing. With that performance, I got better responses from
hoteliers, workers and other residents. If you look rich, you are powerful, you can invest,
you can spend more money and there is always a potential of helping someone. Stories of
rich foreign white people helping local are widespread in Sauraha. In addition, many
Nepali people wanted to make connections with someone rich and powerful.
My non-Bahun identity also helped me to get more information about how
indigenous or janajati or ethnic minority members think about social issues. When I
asked any question related with Bahun-Chetri they used to ask me what jaat or jaati I am
or they would make sure that I am not Bahun-Chetri before they start talking about
Bahun-Chetri. Some people can easily guess that I am not Bahun-Chetri by my
phenotypic characteristics, but unlike many Newars of Kathmandu my command of the
Nepali language is indistinguishable. Most Tamang people and Thaur people were very
open with me when they talked or criticized about Bahun-Chetri leaders in Sauraha, and
most Tamang people in Sunachuri rarely criticized Newar leaders because of my Newar
identity.
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1.3. Summary of dissertation chapters
In this chapter, I have provided an introduction to my major research problem. I
presented three major questions. After presenting a brief description of the research site, I
presented methods that I used to carry out the research. In addition, I presented how my
position as a Nepali Newar student from the US university facilitated or hindered
fieldwork and further analysis. In Chapter Two, I review the relevant literature to present
current gaps in the political ecological analysis of territorialized community-based
conservation. I primarily focus on four major areas of political ecological scholarship that
are related to contested property rights, construction of scientific knowledge, subject
formation within conservation and the representation of human and non-humans. More
importantly, I discuss two interrelated concepts including environmentality and
territorialization to understand how and with what strategies the state and non-state
institutions have attempted to control people and spaces, and simultaneously how local
people who are dependent on resources are challenging dominant meaning and practices
of conservation and development in the buffer zone space of the CNP. I tried to look at
the co-constitutions of space and identities through the place-based study in Bagmara
buffer zone areas of CNP. In Chapter Three, I review the socioeconomic and political
history of Nepal in different phases to provide a broader political economic and cultural
context for my dissertation research. I divided Nepal’s history in different phases based
on the major political and social changes in Nepal: before the 1950s, between 1950 and
the 1990s and after the 1990s. In the first phase, I show the ways Rana rulers exploited
labor and controlled land and resources for about 100 years. International engagement
and social development started after the 1950s but was largely hindered by the panchayat
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political system and social hierarchies. I describe increasing democratization, economic
liberalism and the simultaneous emergence of Maoist violence and identity politics after
1990s.
In Chapter Four, I look at the history of the production of the conservation and
development landscape in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal. This chapter is a critical review
of nature conservation and early development efforts of in the Chitwan Valley to
understand the ways these have shaped the production of state and non-state spaces and
institutions in the Chitwan Valley. I started with royal hunting practices as a strategy of
British-Indian rulers to control frontier spaces through Rana rulers. The practices
established the Rana regime and exploitation of spaces and resources. Furthermore, I
present international development assistances that expanded after the 1950s and the ways
these prompted the transformation of the Chitwan Valley landscape and identities of
people and the relationship between nature and society. More importantly, I show how
local and global political economy and scientific knowledge are intertwined in the
production of CNP in particular. I highlight the ways discourses of economic
development, environmental crisis and wildlife extinction shaped the lives and
livelihoods of rural indigenous people and the landscape of the Chitwan Valley. I
intentionally left the material and discursive practices related to the landscape level
conservation for future research. Chapter Five is one of my two place-based empirical
chapters from the Bagmara buffer zone community forest area. This chapter provides the
analysis and discussion of the political-ecological effects of territorialized community
based conservation. In particular, in the chapter I show how a legally designated “impact
zone” to benefit local buffer zone users resulted in the further territorialization of buffer
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zone spaces and the marginalization of forest and agriculture dependent populations. I
discuss the differential distribution of access, costs and benefits from tourism and
Bagmara CF. More importantly, I show how discursive representation of human-wildlife
conflict, development discourses and spatial and legal practices have enabled the control
and commodification of the forest and water commons. In Chapter Six, I present the
complex interrelations of conservation spaces, subject formation and the state’s efforts of
governing people and nature. I described conservation violence and militarization in the
buffer zone spaces of CNP. I noted the discourses of security and zero poaching years
and the ways they have prompted ongoing militarization and violence. I explore the
production of state-spaces and non-environmental subjects. In addition, I show how such
practices are productive of environmental subjects, ethnic identities and touristic spaces.
In addition, I discuss how state and non-state attempts to “improve” the life of people and
practices, and the ways these helping practices rest on the reproduction or construction of
new social hierarchies and identities such as caste, ethnicity and class. Finally, I describe
the ways spatial practices shape resource access and contestation over meaning and
practices of conservation.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

My research builds on and contributes to two key areas of emerging research in
the field, which are 1) critical approaches to understanding the complex interrelations of
conservation territories, subject formation, and state goals for governing people and
nature: and 2) the political-ecological effects resulting from the rapid increase in
territorialized community-based conservation (CBCs), such as buffer zones, that seek to
integrate socio-economic development goals with biodiversity protection. I review the
relevant literature to present current lacunae in the political ecological analysis of
territorialized community-based conservation and present the specific contribution that
my research makes to the rapidly expanding literature on the political ecology of nature
conservation.

2.1. Environmentality and territorialization
Prominent lines of inquiry within the political ecology of nature conservation
include the relationship among representations of nature and people, the construction of
scientific knowledge, contested property rights, and subject formation within
conservation (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Escobar 1998; Bryant 2001; Neumann 2004;
Peet and Watts 2004; Agrawal 2005; Peluso and Lund 2011). Yet the lack of politics in
the political ecological analysis has surfaced time and again (Peet and Watts 1993;
Paulson et al. 2003; Walker 2006). The study attempts to address this concern by
focusing on the multiscalar analysis of power relations operating among individuals and
institutions (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003; Campbell 2007). More importantly, this study
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emphasizes the ways modern forms of government work by controlling and producing
spaces and governable subjects (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Peluso and Vandergeest
2001; Neumann 2004; Foucault 2009). In addition, focusing on the emancipatory
potential of new political ecology, Peet and Watts (2004) also have emphasized the
importance of practical political engagement with new social movements, civil
organizations and institutions and cultural mobilization and practices. Moore (2005), in
particular, has demonstrated the importance of everyday social and cultural practices in
the struggle over land and resources. This study extends such concerns by analyzing the
ways peoples of indigenous ethnicities negotiate and contest conservation practices and
territories across multiple spatial scales and multiple levels of government.
The theoretical framework that informs this study integrates two important fields
of inquiry within political ecology. The concept of environmentality highlights
power/knowledge in the constitution and reproduction of environmental subjects in
conservation policies and projects (Agrawal 2005). Territorialization investigates the
constitution and reproduction of modern subjectivities such as nationality, race, gender,
and ethnicity through the scientific and legal framing, ordering, and identification of the
spaces of nature (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Neumann 2005; Peluso and Lund 2011).
Drawing from Foucault's notion of governmentality (Foucault 1977, 2009), this
study views CBC projects and territories in Nepal as the technologies of government that
aim to produce self- regulating subjects and governable spaces. Governmentality is
broadly defined as an ensemble of calculated attempts or practices carried out by
institutions that aim to shape, guide or fabricate the conduct of self or individuals or
groups by working through the agency of subjects (Rabinow 1991; Moore 2005; Rose et
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al. 2006; Foucault 2009) or by "educating desires, configuring habits, aspirations and
belief" (Li 2007: 5). Foucault argued that expert knowledge and rationalities, as a form of
power, mediate all facets of life including the fundamental nature of populations,
disciplinary technologies, and the legal and judicial mechanisms of the state. His
particular focus was on understanding the role of power/knowledge in creating new
subjectivities and disciplining societies for economy and order (Foucault 1977, 2009;
Rose et al. 2006). Expanding the concept around nature conservation, Agrawal (2005)
proposed the concept of environmentality, which relates environmental regulatory
practices to the internalization of such practices in the formation of environmental
subjects. Since CBC projects and territories, which are based on a participatory
conservation model, are productive of new subjectivities, knowledge, and new regulatory
rules and regulations, they necessarily engender questions of who governs, using what
logics and technologies, and towards what ends (Agrawal 2001a, 2005; Rose et al. 2006).
My research attempts to explore these questions in the communities of CNP's buffer
zone.
The fundamental practice of CBC around CNP is to protect the park by
constructing and maintaining other layers of social and physical boundaries within the
buffer zone (Bajimaya 2005). That is, CBC practices include the creation of fixed buffer
zone territories and the formation of community forestry and institutions and scientific,
legal and political practices within their boundaries. Therefore, I understand CBCs as
territorial projects of state actors and institutions—assisted by non-state actors and
institutions—for controlling and containing nature and people. To critically examine
CBC territories, this study further builds on the concept of territorialization (Sack 1983;
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Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). The concept of internal territorialization is, in particular, a
spatial strategy through which an individual, collectivity, or a state regulates and governs
the behavior or action or activities of other individuals or groups (Vandergeest and
Peluso 1995; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Neumann 2004). A major theme of
territorialization relates to the constitution and reproduction of modern subjectivities such
as nationality, race, gender, and ethnicity through the scientific and legal framing,
ordering, and identification of the spaces of nature (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001;
Neumann 2005; Peluso and Lund 2011; Nightingale 2011). In particular, as boundary
making and maintenance are fundamental processes that involve the transformation of
property rights, they produce and sustain power relations among governed environmental
subjects and between subjects and the state (Peluso and Lund 2011). Such processes may
include state-led violence and physical coercion as means through which to implement
territorializations. Thus Nepal's territorialized CBCs are contested spaces where diverse
spatial strategies, claims over territorial authority and resource rights, and meanings are
negotiated and performed.

2.2. Political-ecological effects of CBC
Western ideas and values of nature and society relationship have shaped the
establishment of strict national parks for the conservation of nature and biological
diversity worldwide. Diverse interests, social relations and contexts at multiple scales
have also structured the policies and practices related to national parks. The protection of
nature within fixed and territorially bounded spaces, however, have been associated with
diverse negative effects on lives, livelihood and landscapes. On the one hand, it is
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associated with the curtailment of rural people’s access to land and resources and the
violent eviction of less powerful rural people. On the other hand, the establishment of
national parks is related to the creation of new access to and control over land and
resources by powerful individual and groups. As a result, many studies have documented
struggles and conflicts over access and control of land and resources between rural
people and state authorities (Neumann 1998; Brockington et al. 2008; West et al. 2006).
States and non-state agencies have sought efficient, effective and people friendly ways to
deflect or reduce conflicts and protect biological diversity within and outside national
parks. Different forms of participatory community-based conservation initiatives have
been employed and are ongoing over the last few decades worldwide.
A primary strategy in CBC governance is the decentralization of property rights to
address both the protection of nature or resources and the socioeconomic development of
communities. In particular, state authorities restructure existing resource use
arrangements by devolving rights and responsibilities of resources management to local
authorities or local communities. In other words, state and non-state authorities allocate
rights to use and access forest resources to local communities of a specified geographic
area such as a buffer zone. It is based on the idea that local communities and authorities
are more efficient than the centralized government. Underlying the assumption of the
claim is the efficient allocation of resource rights. That is, if people and communities
have legal rights to property or resources they will use it efficiently, effectively, and
democratically without degrading the resources. Therefore, increasingly the participatory
governance of natural resources has sought the more efficient allocation of property
rights for the benefit of communities and for the sustainable protection of resources.
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Many attempts at the participatory governance of nature and resources have
embraced the logic of the market as an effective way to protect and use resources in the
contemporary period. In other words, the enterprises based on market-based conservation
or management consider nature as a commodity and oriented towards the market as a
solution for the long-term protection of nature and the socioeconomic development of
communities. Logically, the approach establishes a sort of private property on the
commons that facilitates the commodification of natural resources and at the same time
helps to bring the commodity into market exchange. It further assumes that the
commercialization of natural resources will bring more incentives for rational individuals
or groups to protect natural resources from exploitation by others. In addition, market
based conservation assumes that the surplus from the selling of the commodity in the
market will provide resources for socio-economic development and conservation of
resources.
Despite the rhetoric of the decentralization of resources and management rights to
local communities or local authorities and the win-win logic of market-based
conservation, many studies have shown that the seemingly benign and novel approach
has generated new social and political effects related to the access to and control over
land and resources (Neumann 1998; Brosius et al. 2005; Holmes and Cavanagh 2016;
Roth and Dressler 2012). New conservation territories such as buffer zones, which
reallocate or restructure preexisting property rights among heterogeneous populations
outside the national parks, have become a contested space where numerous interest
groups including state, non-states, the private sectors, and heterogeneous local
communities struggle to assert claims over property rights, responsibilities, and
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authorities (Walley 2004; Li 2007). Therefore, in the next section I briefly review the
literature concerning tenure arrangements to further discuss how different interest groups
or agencies struggle to gain control over land and resources.

2.2.1. Property and access
Land and resources which are traditionally used and managed by individuals,
families or groups for rural subsistence have been increasingly transformed and
understood in terms of legal access or property rights. The common property literature, in
particular, has provided important contributions to understanding tenure arrangements in
the different forms of participatory governance of nature and natural resources. Arguing
against the ‘tragedy of commons’ concept, the common property framework claims that
rational local users have effectively managed common property resources for a long time
through diverse institutional arrangements. Specifically, it argues that local communities
in different settings have effectively governed common property resources through
regulatory institutions and regulatory rules (formal and informal rules). It assumes that
local users who depend on and live close to resources have more local knowledge about
resources and communities and hence can sustain resources more democratically and
efficiently than state and private agencies (Ostrom 1990).
The common property literature classifies land and resources into four different
ownership categories, namely private property, common property, public property and
open property. Also, property has been conceptualized as a bundle of rights. These rights
are classified into different broad categories: access rights, usufruct/withdrawal rights,
management rights, exclusion rights and alienation rights (Schlager and Ostrom 1992;

42

Neumann 2005). Access rights are the rights granted by an authority to enter in a defined
physical space. Withdrawal rights are the rights to obtain or use the products of resources.
Management rights are the rights to regulate use of resources and rights to improve the
condition of resources. These rights grant authorities the power to manage the use of
resources and the access of individuals. In exclusion rights, authorities are granted rights
to determine who will have an access right and authorities can exclude individuals or
groups from entering or using certain spaces or use of resources. Authorities and
members can exclude non-members from taking and accessing spaces and resources.
Alienation rights has to do with the rights to sell or lease either or both of the above
collective choice rights or management and exclusion rights (Schelger and Ostrom 1992;
Neumann 2005). There are specific rights associated with the type of ownership of
property. For instance, common property holders usually have all rights including use,
access, management rights, exclusion right, and alienation rights in some instance. In the
case of private property, private owners will have all forms of rights including alienation
rights. These types of ownership and rights are broadly studied or understood as tenure
arrangements or tenure regimes. More importantly, unlike neatly divided modern and
legal property rights, everyday access and use of land and resources on which rural
livelihoods depend may be overlapping and complex, which vary across time, space,
scale, and the type and biophysical characteristics of resources (Schroeder 1993;
Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997).
The common definition of a property is a formal access to land and resources or
rights based on customary laws or statutory laws. Formal access to resources from
authorities can be a title or permit or license such as a fishing license to certain groups or
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permits to enter territorially bounded forest. Scholars, however, have defined property as
more than the bundle of rights over land and resources. It is a complex social relationship
between individuals or groups who have rights to resources, individuals and groups who
do not have same rights, and political-legal or socially legitimate authorities that
recognize, secure or guarantee such claims of property through existing formal laws or
informal cultural norms or values or social understandings (Sikor and Lund 2009). As
property rights are socially produced, endorsed, and sanctioned, these rights are a
reflection of power relations embedded in individual and group identities and their social
relationship, performance of authorities, regulatory rules, and material and discursive
practices and processes. Related studies have also shown that historical, sociocultural,
political and economic contexts shape people’s and groups’ right of land and resources
(Schroeder 1997; Ribot and Peluso 2003; Nightingale 2011; Peluso 2009; Neumann and
Hirsch 2000). Therefore, the way property rights are defined, controlled and contested
among heterogeneous individuals, communities and authorities and the social and
ecological consequences have been the central concern of political ecological studies
because resource tenure not only influence people’s lives, livelihood, and landscape, but
also it shapes the relationship between nature and society (Robbins 2011; Neumann 2005;
Peet and Watts 1996, 2004). More importantly, political ecological scholars have shown
that access to land and resources depends on more than formal access. Rather than a
limited definition of access as formal rights, Ribot and Peluso (2003) have defined access
as “the ability to benefit from things” (2003, 153). By definition, it includes both legal or
illegal access to resources and is shaped by “technology, capital, markets, labor,
knowledge, authority, identities, and social relations” (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 162).
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Access is a type of a bundle of power rather than a bundle of rights. Thus, the ways
access to resources or property rights are defined, controlled and contested among
heterogeneous individuals and stratified communities have been the central concern of
political ecological studies.

2.2.2. The state and property rights
Studies have pointed out that CBC initiatives strengthen state power because the
state and communities are never a separate domain as presupposed in the decentralized
approach (Heinen and Mehta 2000; Neumann 1998). In other words, studies have shown
that CBC initiatives, which are primarily initiated, imposed or supported by external
donors and organizations, have helped to strengthen state authority and expand state
control over rural areas rather than the purported rolling back of the state in decentralized
governance (Neumann 1997; Schroeder 2005; Li 2002). In describing the processes of
state expansion around community forestry in India, Agrawal (2001b) argues that
activities that formalize and systematize social action including the creation of new rules,
organizational structures that ensure the enforcement of the rules, and the discrediting
and incorporation of alternative loci (or rules) that influence the exercise of power are
fundamental in shaping the relationships between state and societies. Thus, CBC is a
vehicle of realigning past relationships between the state and people into new
relationships to make it more compatible with changing socioeconomic and political
contexts and to continue its dominance over people and resources in different forms and
strategies (Peluso and Lund 2011; Li 2002; Brosius et al. 2005; Neumann 1997).
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An important strand of research has focused on the ways political-legal authority
shapes formal access to land and resources. Related studies have pointed out that a
primary outcome of the restructuring of resource rights in CBC initiatives is the
deepening of state power and authority (Heinen and Mehta 2000; Neumann 1997). For
instance, Li (2002) examined CBC practices carried out with the financial and technical
support of foreign organizations in upland Philippines and Indonesia and documented
how the state intensifies the control of resources, lives, and livelihoods through
institutional and bureaucratic practices such as the legal recognition of people, property
rights, and ancestral domain. The recognition of customary forest in Indonesia through
the forest act helped to bring the forest under the state-controlled forestry department. It
made the customary forest liable to official licensing, monitoring and identification by
the state forestry department. Likewise, Ribot et al. (2006) and others focus on
institutional changes in six countries around forestry to examine how the state uses legal
ambiguities to obstruct the democratic decentralization of forest management. They state
that the central government in general restricts decentralization by exploiting ambiguities
or loopholes or creates ambiguities in legal reforms to establish resource control.
Schroeder (2005) explored decentralized governance in community forestry in the
Gambia and focused on the formal responsibilities of local committees. In particular, he
examines contracts, conditionality, contexts of community forestry handover, and
management processes and practices and shows that the authorities granted limited or
partial rights of forest reserves to communities after a formal contract between the forest
department, foreign authorities and communities, without losing the control of forest
authorities, which he called a “graduated sovereignty”. The contract also includes
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conditionalities on the rights and responsibilities related with forest management, use and
access. Communities had to perform according to the stipulated obligation that are listed
in the management plan and formal contracts.
Alternatively, state authorities not only grant rights and authority but also expand
their power by consolidating discretionary legal rights in resource management and
decision making (Heinen and Mehta 2000; Walley 2004). For instance, in Nepal, Heinen
and Mehta (2000) review the buffer zone regulations and argues that regulations “expand
the authority of the state by imposing restrictions in populated areas formerly not under
the control of park officials” (2000,12). It is because the regulations provided additional
power to a national park warden to control community forests, forest council’s activities
and activities with the buffer zone. In particular, the park warden has the power to form
or dissolve forest councils, forest user groups and retain community forests if councils
fail to fulfill duties and responsibilities according to the approved community forest
management plan. Wardens can fine and punish forest councils and committee members,
resolve conflicts between buffer zone council and groups, design projects and activities,
prepare local constitutions and management plans, conduct periodic inspections, audits
accounts and allocate funds in installments. Buffer zone councils and forest committees
are also required to submit periodic reports.

2.2.3. Territorialization, violence, and repression
The focus on the spatial dimension of property provides a more nuanced
understanding of how authorities operationalized regulatory rules governing property on
the ground and its differential consequences on people’s access to resources or property.
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In addition to regulatory rules, the rearrangement and reordering of spaces and people
have been the key practices of the state to control land and resources (Vandeergest and
Peluso 1995; Peluso and Vandeergest 2001; Neumann 2001; Corson 2011; Holmes
2014). Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) used “internal territorialization” to examine how
states use spatial strategies to control internal land and resources. They claim that the
modern state divides complex and overlapping spaces into simplified abstract spaces,
uses cartographic and scientific techniques to classify land and resources, rearranges
people and resources, regulates by laws and policies, and administers by agencies or
institutions. Theorizing state-building processes through conservation practice, Neumann
(2004) argues that “proprietary claims and the process of mapping, bounding, containing
and controlling nature and citizenry are what make a state a state. States come into being
through these claims and the assertion of control over territory, resources, and people"
(2004, 185). Similarly, Li (2002) argues that the state intensified control over people and
place primarily through spatial strategies such as the legal demarcation and mapping of
forest reserves. The central government also controls decentralization of the forest by
inscribing spatial limitations and the supervision of resource use and access (Ribot et al.
2006). Similarly, Neumann (2004) pointed out that state and non-state surveyed,
classified and demarcated buffer zone boundaries, and local councils and forest guards
were employed in monitoring and enforcement of bounded territories to control
communities access of wild animals in the buffer zone of the Selous Game reserve.
Spatial strategies partition complex landscapes into zones of differential access
and use. In addition, authorities strictly protected resources that are within off-limit zones
from non-members or certain people or groups represented as unfit to use. That is, spatial
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strategies determine who has access, when and where people have access, and under what
conditions people have access to land and resources. In other words, territorial practices
and boundaries create zones of exclusion and inclusion in a broad sense, where only
some are allowed to get access for a particular activity or to get certain types of
resources. Most frequently, access to and exclusion from bounded land and resources are
guided by certain ideas, social relations, identities, and material and discursive practices
Thus territorialization not only shapes access to and control over resources, but creates
subject categories such as environmental and non-environmental subjects (Peluso and
Lund 2011; Neumann 2001; Peluso and Vandeergest 2001; Ybarra; 2012; Mahli 2012).
As the establishment of conservation territories includes the legal and material
classification of space into zones of exclusion and inclusion and the enclosure of land and
resources within a bounded space, the spatial practices are associated with the violent act
of evicting people from the place of belonging and curtailment of resource access and
control, and subjugation of local practices, knowledge and history. Furthermore, the
maintenance of boundaries and claiming of land and resources within the bounded space
requires continuous monitoring, surveillance and enforcement by authorities. More
important, memories and ongoing fear of violence are vital for the efficient enforcement
of boundaries and the control of resources. Thus, violence and memories of violence are
also related with the constitution of subject, spaces, property and authorities (Peluso and
Lund 2011; Neumann 2001).
Vandeergest and Peluso (1995) claim that there are always misfits between
abstract space and lived space, which contribute to the instability of the modern state’s
territorial strategies. Therefore, as this lack of fit generates local resistance,
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territorialization always involves second order state practices such as violence and subtle
forces to establish or maintain territorial claims. Similarly, Holmes (2014) points out that
the state along with non-state agencies used territorial strategies such as mapping,
demarcation of boundaries and monitoring and enforcement of boundaries and further
used conservation discourses to legitimate state and non-state physical violence and
violent control of access of resources. Likewise, Mahli (2012) shows how territorial
strategies that limited the use of and access to land and land control was vigorously
contested through a discourse of resistance that draws from Muslim moral land use
practices and resource entitlement. Local communities used global Islamic discourses of
moral land use, law and authority to resist against colonial land enclosure. She describes
the ways colonial enclosure has also produced "radical anti-enclosure politics" including
violent uprisings and also violent colonial suppression.
Although the state has a monopoly on violence, the use of violence to control
people and resources also requires justification or rationalization. Scholars argue that
discourse and the representation of people, nature and practices play an important role in
the rationalization of violence and violent control of people and spaces (Peluso 1993; Li
2007). For instance, Neumann (2004) examines popular media representation of people
as "Others" and claims that their discursive production of the African people represents
them as different and morally and culturally inferior to white Europeans and wild
animals. For instance, the media represents African people's practices and culture as
violent, cruel and uncivilized based on the comparative treatment of wild animals by
brutal and uncivilized Others and civilized European. In addition, this representation
discursively humanized wild animals that placed poachers on the lower rung below wild
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animals on a moral hierarchy. These discursive practices, he argued, normalized and
justified war, violence and militarization in conservation in Africa. Similarly, Ybarra
(2012) argues that the military counterinsurgency campaigns, which aligned with
conservation practices, controlled people and spaces not only through spatial strategies of
dividing, delineating and enforcing forest boundaries, but they also used discursive
representations of nature and people. The jungle - a base of guerilla fighters - was
represented as “wild and savage” and a “guerilla haven” with a binary representation of
society as safe and civilized and nature as a dangerous jungle. She further writes most
military from the east view Petans as an "unhealthy place populated by dangerous
Indians" and the Maya indigenous people were looked at as suspect citizens.
Likewise, scholars have also emphasized the ways Western ideas about nonWestern Others, their place, and practices in CBC projects’ conceptualizations continued
to shape outcomes related to CBC initiatives including the access to and control of
resources, conservation outcomes and state expansion (Peet and Watts 1996). For
instance, Neumann (1997) emphasizes the ways the Western non-state agencies and
donors have conceptualized the integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP)
in Africa. He shows that the new conservation practices backed by Western authorities
include similar representations of non-western people as primitive Others and their places
as full of "danger, darkness, and irrationality" (1997, 567). In particular, he argues that
despite its rhetoric of local participation and empowerment, the involvement of people is
limited by authorities' assumptions of the idea of primitive Other. The traditional
indigenous people living in harmony with nature who are thus uneducated and incapable,
and the representations of local people and practices as destructive and backward enable
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or legitimate authorities to intervene and expand their role and power. Likewise,
Schroeder (2005) reported dismissive and condescending attitude towards rural Gambian
people in the report and plans of the German forest projects (GGFP) of the Gambia. The
project documents also represented community people as ignorant and inept in
environmental management and in need of guidance and training by the state and forest
experts. It established the authority and hierarchy of state and non-state agencies and
hindered participatory governance. Similarly, Sundberg (2006) examined participatory
conservation in Guatemala and asserted that the emphasis on democratization and
institutional reform in natural governance without social change would have little effect
because daily practices and cultural imaginaries may present barriers to the inclusion,
participation, and empowerment specific social groups. More specifically, she notes that
the presence of structural inequalities among groups and the state and NGOs narrows
visions or their deep-seated cultural imaginaries of groups such as indigenous people as
backward, inferior, culturally incapable of making a decision, and illiterate limit or hinder
active participation of peoples. As a result, she points out the persistence of centralized
decision making, the exclusion of people and the lack of democratic practice in
Guatemala. She says that these perceptions and cultural imaginaries in conservation not
only limited the success of community conservation but reproduced long-standing racial
and cultural hierarchies in Guatemala.

2.2.4. Scientific and local knowledge
CBC practices are related to the growing role of non-state conservation and
development organizations, so the ideas, values, and interests they embody shape the
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design of projects including problem identification and the solutions they prescribe. In
the processes, they not only simplify or redefine the complexity of problems but
disregard existing local understandings and knowledge related to issues and
interventions. These practices strengthen existing power relations, establish the authority
of techno-scientific agencies and control people's access and use of resources. For
instance, Goldman (2003) shows the persistence of top-down conservation practices
despite the rhetoric of devolution and decentralization of power. As a result, it limited
local participation. She claims that CBC policy and practices not only discounted local
Maasai knowledge and practices, but the policy also pointed out that local people need to
be educated, trained and advised about the western scientific understanding of land use
and management. Unlike the static, rigid, manageable and legible landscape of new
conservation territories, she documented the dynamic nature of the local ecological
system and the fluid and adaptive nature of local knowledge and practices. She further
claims that privileged western knowledge (western zone-based planning) fails to
incorporate the complexity and uncertainty of the social and natural system. For instance,
she highlights the migratory behavior of wildlife in the landscape which fits with a fluid
land management regime, but rigid and partitioned land use does not address local
complexity. However, community-based conservation territories around the national park
in Tanzania controlled Maasai land use and practices by introducing new regulatory rules
such as restrictions on forest use and banning hunting to control and regulate primitive
peoples’ destructive habits and practices. Similarly, Walley (2004) examines communitybased marine conservation initiatives in Tanzania and shows how the central state
continues to dominate through specific bureaucratic and scientific practices despite the

53

claim of community participation and decentralization. The centralized bureaucratic
structures focus on techno-centric and managerial solutions and discredit and exclude
local popular knowledge because the social hierarchy of experts and male political elites
still influences decision making. As a result, it restricted the participation of rural
residents and women in decision making. Furthermore, invoking the modernization
discourses; authorities considered rural residents as illiterate, uneducated and lacking
scientific knowledge, so they are unfit for participation in decision making related to
conservation.

2.2.5. Property rights under capitalism
Political ecological research in nature conservation has focused on the
relationship between the growing influence of market-based policies including changing
property rights, dispossession of people, and the private accumulation of surplus from
nature and society. This trend, in general, is increasingly studied under the process of
"accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2005). Recognizing the globally emerging
private appropriation of land and resources by restricting resource access and the
dispossession of people in the name of environmental ends, scholars have named such
resource control tactics in general as "green grabbing" (Fairhead et al. 2012). Scholars
argue that nature conservation policies and territories provide an enabling environment
for the commercial appropriation of nature and land or for producing new nature or the
conditions for capital accumulation (Brockington and Duffy 2011; Corson 2011). Studies
have also shown that such conservation practices including enclosure, dispossession and
associated extraction of benefits from nature and society produce both winners and losers
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with many consequences for the sustainability of nature, access to land and resources and
the marginalization of less powerful communities (Fairhead et al. 2012; Dressler et al.
2013; Brockington et al. 2008).
At the same time, there has been some shift in the structure and function of
institutions and the ways such institutions have embraced the logic of capitalism in nature
conservation (Brockington et al. 2008). Institutions with divergent interests have come
together in nature conservation enterprises, and they are involved in diverse processes
and practices including deregulation and regulation, privatization and commodification,
marketization and financialization of nature (Fairhead et al. 2012; Castree 2008; Harvey
2005). In addition, new practices also include the discursive representation and
spectacularizing of nature for private capital accumulation and expansion. Some scholars
have called such trends in conservation as neoliberal conservation (Brockington and
Duffy 2011; Buscher et al. 2012). In sum, neoliberal conservation is a form of
governmentalities that produces its suitable space of accumulation by displacing,
commodifying, enclosing, and spectacularising these spaces. More importantly, as it
intervenes around biophysical and social systems, it seeks to extend, police and profit by
separating nature (non-human) and human (Brockington et al. 2010). The intensified idea
of "selling nature to save it" defines neoliberal conservation in brief (Mcafee 1998).
Similar to market-based conservation, neoliberal conservation also contains economic
and extra-economic forces (cultural, political, scientific and non-violent processes) for
capital accumulations (Prudham 2014,433).
Scholars have used the concept of green grabbing and neoliberal conservation to
show how diverse strategies are involved in the appropriation of land and resources,
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asserting authority in conservation practices and shaping conservation and social
outcomes. For instance, Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012) argue that community-based
conservation is a form of green and blue grabbing - a gradual and piecemeal process,
which involved violence on some occasions but largely employed a gradual form of
capital accumulation by more powerful actors such as state officials, INGO, and tourist
companies. In particular, they show how new regulatory rules, the establishment of
wildlife conservation areas, narratives of environmental degradation (overgrazing),
decreasing benefits from tourism and loss of crops and the associated lack of
transparency of earnings all led to the dispossession of locals' rights of tourism benefits
(earnings). Here the privatization is not the land and labor per se, but the accumulation of
benefits by the powerful at the expense of locals. Institutions such as state agencies,
NGOs, corporations, and businesses accumulated most benefits. That is, rent-seeking
state officials and politicians benefitted from fees collected from tourism, transnational
conservation organizations benefitted from donors and private fund-raising by presenting
conservation success stories, and commercial tourism operators generated profits from
tourism industries. Similarly, Young (2003) explores the commercialization of
recreational whale watching - a form of ecotourism- for marine conservation and
development in Mexico. She argues that only a few economic benefits trickle down to
local coastal communities and a large sum of tourism revenues and benefits were
appropriated by foreign tourist companies. Moreover, she asserts that following the
change in the Mexican constitution, the state allowed the privatization and sale of ejido
land (communal land). It encouraged commercialization and the sale of the lands, which
benefitted powerful interests and prompted land tenure disputes and local conflicts in
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Laguna San Ignacio. Likewise, Dressler et al. (2013) show how market-based
conservation in Vietnam fueled conflicts and struggles over forest land and resource
control and at the same time produced social differentiation among villagers. In
particular, local actors through their political connections and power allied with state park
authorities to control additional land and valuable resources. Local powerful actors
obtained contracts from the state (park) through political patronage. Landowners received
50 years contracts and additional cash in exchange with an obligation and responsibilities
to protect forest land. Local elites further extracted benefits from park resources and local
fellow villagers prompting conflicts as well as social differentiation among local people.
The new mode of appropriation of benefits as frequently linked to the
neoliberalism of nature does not mean that older modes of appropriation of land and
resources such as legalization, territorialization, enclosure, and violence do not play a
role in shaping property rights and access. They are still the central practices in the
production of conservation spaces and private capital accumulation by dispossession
(Peluso and Lund 2011; Fairhead et al. 2012). For instance, Ojeda (2012) shows how the
different forms of violence by institutions, territorialization, and environmental narratives
and discursive representation of space and people are the powerful strategies of capital
accumulation by dispossession in an ecotourism project. She also shows how the projects
have produced and reproduced distinct environmental and non-environmental subjects
and produced tourist spaces such as beaches and buffer zones to further neoliberal goals
of capital accumulation, capital investment, and tourism promotion. Similarly, Corson
(2011) analyzes the interrelationship between state territorialization of natural resources
through conservation enclosure under neoliberalism. She argues against the popular
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notion of the state as the primary actors in territorialization. She posits that the state acts
as a vehicle in the processes of territorialization practices carried out by non-state actors.
She claims that contemporary territorialization practices not only entail the enclosure of
local lands and resources, but it also erects social boundaries of authority to determine
who can and who cannot claim to decide socially acceptable resource use and practices.
NGO’s actively participates in the process of state territorialization such as mapping
boundaries and producing maps using GIS mapping and formal maps, classifying forests
with mapping, and establishing and enforcing boundaries. These practices provide
authorities opportunities and information to determine who has access to and control over
resources. Since state authorities have limited funding and resource capacity, they seek
support from organizations and private companies in all sectors of park governance. Thus
non-state agencies have greater influence in state practices and decision making related to
who gets access and how. As a result, the state provides opportunities for private capital
accumulation through the private park, biodiversity offsets, accommodating mining and
timber interests. Buscher and Dressler (2012) also make a similar claim related to the
production of new authorities within neoliberal conservation discourses and practices.
They examine conservation in South Africa and the Philippines and argue that as the
result of growing neoliberal pressures and the hybridization of community and neoliberal
conservation, there is an increasing shift of decision making about "nature" from
communities to others (here alliance of non-state institutions) on commodity resources
and capitalist markets leading to dispossession from resources. Through their case
studies, they show that devolved conservation governance, in reality, entails alliances and
a convergence of actors across scales to further neoliberal goals.
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Although many have documented negative impacts of a market-based
conservation approach, some have also pointed out that local people favor private
investors in nature conservation in certain contexts. Gardner (2012), for instance,
examines tourism and conservation as a neoliberal site where struggle takes place. He
argues that the Maasai retain faith in market-based relationships in spite of difficulties
from both forms of foreign investors (public and private partnership, and community and
private partnership) in the tourism business in Loliondo of Tanzania. He highlights this
by showing the persistent mistrust of Massai peoples with state and NGO practices
because of the experience of loss of land and eviction in the name of conservation and
development. They see land grabbing as the outcome of the state’s approach to
consolidate power, control land and affect their livelihood practices. In addition, Massai
leaders and activists use new spaces to challenge state efforts to control land and
resources. Also, they consider NGOs as allies of the state that play a role in controlling
Massai land in the name of conservation. When the state along with conservation
organizations attempted to start a buffer zone program in the Loliondo territory, they
aligned with a tourism joint venture to secure land rights. In addition, they see foreign
investors as spaces of recognition and appropriation, most promising space to legitimate
and secure land rights and access to resources. Furthermore, they expect foreign tourism
companies will bring jobs, development, reduce border insecurity (to reduce the stealing
of Massai cattle), and establish territorial control near the Serengeti. In another, Lunstrum
(2008) similarly argues that although fortress style conservation displaced people from
their land and resource, CBC has a potential to strengthen land claims. She describes how
neoliberal land reform (the 1997 land law) in Mozambique shaped Limpopo national park
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(LNP). She argues that LNP as a "neoliberal state space" played a role in attracting
foreign investment by promoting the decentralization of land rights for economic
development in adjoining villages. Lundstrum (2008) highlights this by showing how
land reform (the 1997 land law) produced spaces both favorable for conservation inside
the national park and development outside the park. In particular, she states that land
reform promoted semi-privatization of land. This protected land rights of local
communities, which was also favorable for the promotion of decentralized CBC projects.
Similarly, these projects initiated with the help of NGOs helped in social development by
establishing a community run tourist lodge, which later promoted schooling and health
care. They also helped local communities to protect and establish community land rights.
More recently, political ecological studies have focused on the increasing use of
modern scientific and technological methods in defining, classifying and territorialization
of spaces, land, and resources. Studies are used to determine the conservation status of
resources and decide about the appropriate scale of resource conservation, management,
use, and access. Cartographic methods such as remote sensing and GIS are increasingly
used in the classification, categorization, and redefinition of complex spaces. For
instance, Turner (2006) examined current modes of environmental monitoring through
remote sensing and ongoing community-based conservation practices. He asserts that
although the current upscaling of environmental monitoring through remote sensing has
provided information on changes in large spatial extents, it does not contain mechanisms
of change, and it is more difficult to detect the causal information of change. Besides, he
says that some poor spatial resolution cannot provide accurate information about a human
signature. More importantly, spectral heterogeneity offers technological difficulties in
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classification that inhibit providing precise details of land use change. It also gives
limited knowledge of human activities and management and little information about the
causes behind changes in vegetative cover such as localized drought, wood collection,
over-grazing, and over farming. He says that Sahel livelihood practices go way beyond
the village boundary. For instance, Sahel farming and herding depend on ecological
factors such as rainfall and grassland conditions and are facilitated by the social networks
among other local villages, which are impossible to detect with remote sensing
technologies. Thus, he argues that such simplifications reflect a complicated politics of
scale and these practices have shaped the material lives and livelihoods of people.
Similarly, Campbell and Godfrey (2010) examine the genetic analysis of sea turtle
migration and population distribution to understand how ecological knowledge and
experts’ analysis plays a role in the decision making about the appropriate scale at which
conservation needs to be carried out. In addition, they consider how the ecological
knowledge of sea turtle genetics shaped the property rights of individuals and nation
states. They argue that the genetic analysis and identification of sea turtle's nesting
beaches and sea turtle distribution and migration have substantiated the claim of sea turtle
conservationists and NGOs at regional or international scales as shared resources. This
rescaling, however, contradicts with Cuba's claims of resources based on territorial
sovereignty, long-term investment in sea turtle conservation, geographical proximity and
history of use. The production of genetic information is not only related to the delineation
of conservation spaces but also determines the type of governance structure and resource
rights. Thus "molecular nature" influences regional conservation politics, which indicates
the interrelationship between science, scale, and rights.
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2.2.6. Local rights
Numerous studies have also shown that local communities are highly
heterogeneous and stratified based on their identities, status, and interests. Heterogeneous
people are simultaneously interlinked, and they establish or exist in particular social
relations in a society. As a result, CBC initiatives and practices provide differential
benefits to local people or local people have differential capabilities to benefit from the
initiatives and resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Some have critiqued the CBC framing
of the image of local peoples as traditional or indigenous, living in harmony with nature
in a way that precludes multiple social stratifications. It homogenizes unequal power
relations among people at multiple scales and obscures the ways social power relations
shape and are shaped by access and control of resources (Li 2002; Neumann 1997;
Nightingale 2003, 2006; Schroeder 1997).
For instance, Paudel (2005) examines distributive justice associated with the
ICDP around CNP in Nepal. He argues that historical structural forces such as caste and
wealth disparity continue to shape the distribution of cost and benefits and access and use
of resource from community forests and parks in the protected area buffer zone of Nepal.
He shows how poor people, who are also usually from low caste groups and who often
live near forest and park boundaries suffered the most because they are highly dependent
on forest resources which were restricted in the park by park officials and in the
community forest by local elites and high caste groups. More specifically, he points out
that Musahar, Bote and Tharus who are considered "naïve" and "introverted" were
exploited by "clever" upper caste hill migrants (my highlights). High caste and local elite
further restrict local poor people from access and use of community forest resources as
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they control buffer zone forest activities. In addition, forest user group committees are
mostly occupied by upper caste males who are less dependent on forest resources, and
they impose restrictions on the use and access of forest resources from park and buffer
zone forests. He also highlighted the influence of local leaders and the park warden and
the uneven distribution of infrastructural development such as biogas, school, and road
construction, which were all biased toward the powerful. Likewise, Thoms (2008)
examines community forests and Waylen et al. (2013) study community-based
conservation in the hills of Nepal, and both found a similar effect of caste and class
identities on use and access and the reproduction of social hierarchy.
In addition to identity-based discrimination on the use and access of resources by
local elites and state agencies, Sundar (2001) shows how participatory forest management
generated violence toward less powerful and “low” caste groups. She argues that the
ideology and practices of scientific forestry and the associated spatial arrangements,
demarcations, and legal restrictions of forest boundaries from non-users have generated
conflicts and violence over control of access and forest resources in India. The local
Forest Protection Committee (FPC) was established to control forest encroachment under
JFM in India, but their monitoring and policing activities were targeted towards migrants.
Although all villagers practice the swidden cultivation of Podu in encroached forest land
in Paderu, Andhra Pradesh, the dominant castes (Bhagats) mostly blame migrants
(Samanthas). In other villages of Raighar, hundreds of Podu cultivators were evicted and
attacked by the local FPC. In Madhya Pradesh, the forest department formed a forest
committee in a village for the protection of forest encroachment by other villagers,
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resulting in a violent conflict between two villages. She claims that the "JFM has
territorially empowered some groups against others" (Sundar 2001,341).
Furthermore, Malla (2001) explores the historical development of forestry in
Nepal and argues that patron-client relationships arising from different class, caste, and
status of people and the “chakri system8” (sycophancy) shape or are shaped by the access
of forest resources of poor people in Nepal. In the contexts of community forests, despite
the government’s decision to devolve rights and authorities to communities, the forest
department continued to ally with the local elites to protect their authority and control
community forest and resources from local access and use. In return, the alliance helped
in maintaining the patronage network for local elites. Local elites and elected leaders are
large landholders and act as gatekeepers. As a leader of forest user groups, they have
access to donor funds, manage accounts, conduct seminars and study tours, and exert
control over access. He further claims that in Nepal all these groups (the forest
department, landlords, government officials, and local elites) have understood the power
of controlling land and forest. He asserts that "since Nepal's period of unification (17431846), these elites have tried to capture as much good quality land and forest as possible.
In doing so, they have made dependents of peasant farmers, who exchanged crops,
harvest labor, and political support for access to the forests" (Malla 2001, 301).
Nightingale (2003) focuses on the western scientific knowledge around forestry
and forest conservation in Nepal and argues ideas of professional scientific forestry
constrain or undermine community forest program’s ability to promote democratic access

8

Institutionalized sycophancy system during Rana regime
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to forest management processes, undermine local knowledge and reproduce or constitute
a social hierarchy, social relations, and authorities. She shows how such knowledge is
used by local literate high caste men to control user groups and to strengthen and
reproduce their social hierarchy, assert authority and simultaneously marginalize forest
knowledge associated with illiterate, lower caste women in communities. In particular,
high caste men consider that they need to teach /educate the low caste or make them
"aware" because they think they lack appropriate knowledge or professional knowledge
such as the ability to understand forest maps or to read community forest operational
plans, which function as a legal document. A high caste person can read and understand
maps after they get training from donors and forest departments, which becomes a source
of power that is not available to illiterate lower caste men. Second, as they considered
scientific knowledge and written legal documents and maps as the higher form of
knowledge, they undermined and devalued verbal consensus building and flexible,
democratic practices. For these reasons, she says that the community forests are the site
of the reproduction of social relations. The consequences of this are not only limited to
the reproduction of hierarchy and marginalization of poor, but also the production of a
particular type of scientific forest. That is, in the training session conducted by DFO and
donors provided instructions in how to maintain an even-aged, regularly spaced
monocultural forest strand.
Some scholars have pointed out the ways local communities strategically deploy
certain cultural identities or accept externally imposed identities to cement claims over
and access to resources. For instance, Doolittle (2010) argues that indigenous leaders
strategically deployed the image of their identities as the authentic caretakers of the
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world, marginalized in the global arena, and striving for political recognition and
legitimacy. She shows how indigenous leaders showed differential understandings and
conceptions of earth and nature and a particular sense of belonging to nature. Similarly,
Perreault and Green (2013) compared two indigenous movements in Bolivia's lowland
and highlands and argued that both movements are ethnoterritorial projects that mobilize
essentialized understandings of indigenous identity to legitimize their claims to territorial
rights. In particular, they note the discursive production and mobilization of a
romanticized idea of indigenous people as the guardians of the country's resources for the
benefit of the whole county. Similarly, Sundberg (2004) examines NGO practices that
implemented the conservation program around the Maya Biosphere Reserve. She argues
that local land users represent themselves as authentic and legitimate caretakers and
change their land use practices to meet the demand of NGOs to get access to project
resources. Furthermore, Ybarra (2012) examines the working relationship between local
people and transnational conservation organizations in the buffer zone of the national
park. She shows how the organizations uncritically accepted the representation of some
Peternos people as traditional indigenous people practicing harmonious and sustainable
forestry in contrast to other Peternos people living inside the national park, who were
immigrants and seen as destructive of the forest. Thus, organizations reproduced
inequalities and resource conflicts between park and people. Likewise, Brosius (1997)
argues that environmentalists and indigenous activists represented indigenous knowledge
as sacred and ineffable to make it more appealing, valuable and narratable. In the process
of representation and transformation of knowledge, they not only created new knowledge
but also imposed their way of seeing or their meanings (western meanings).
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Other scholars, however, have questioned the representation of local communities
as a homogenous, territorially bounded people and the essentialized notion of traditional
people living in harmony with nature CBC initiatives. They have argued against such
simplified representations and have shown highly heterogeneous, stratified and mobile
communities in the CBC territories (Li 2002; Neumann 1998). For instance, Li (2002)
argues that residents, including indigenous groups and migrants, are highly complex and
heterogeneous, which do not fit the model of CBC programs. Within the indigenous
people of Indonesia, the idea of a well-defined territorially bounded community of
indigenous people is not guaranteed. Indigenous people in Indonesia and the Philippines
are highly mobile due to forced and voluntary migration. Also, in the Philippines CBC
advocates presupposed local people a "forest-dependent people” despite the complexity
of people’s practices (Li 2002). Most indigenous people in the uplands do not live in
forested land, and those who live in the forest do not necessarily wish to sustain forests.
Some indigenous people convert forests for agricultural land, while some are involved in
logging and rattan collection. In other instances, the loss of land among indigenous
people has forced people to intensify forest conversion for farming. In Indonesia and the
Philippines, indigenous people are also involved in the market exchange of local products
such as tree crops, rubber or fruit trees, rattan, and vegetables. Neumann (1997) argues
that the image of local peoples (e.g., “traditional” or “indigenous”) living in harmony
with nature precludes multiple social stratifications. It homogenizes unequal power
relations among people and associated differential access and rights. More importantly,
although the discourses and representation of traditional or customary practices has been
able to secure rights and access, he argues that it runs the risk of dispossession when
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peoples' changing beliefs and practices do not fit with the discourses of traditional natureloving natives or they are unable to demonstrate stewardship qualities.
This brief review shows that interest groups employ diverse and multiple
strategies in their struggles to control access over property. Similar to the governance of
strict protected areas, in the participatory and decentralized governance of resources, the
state employs diverse mechanisms to control land, resources, and benefits and asserts
authority including regulations, spatial strategies, violence, scientific discourses, and
representation of people and nature. However, the ways these strategies are employed
vary depending on space and park authorities. In addition, frequent assumptions of the
state and park authorities as a homogenous entity is difficult to defend in nature
conservation in Chitwan National Park. In CBC governance, I provide descriptions of
how and why state agencies play a role in structuring the land, forest and river resources
and benefits, how other interest groups make alliance with state authorities to control land
and resources and how contexts shape the control of resources, benefits and authorities.
In the same way, I will show the conflicts and alliance between NGOs, the private sector
and local forest users, including buffer zone committees and community forest
committees, in the control of land, resources and benefits. In addition, I highlight
differential access to resources, rights and responsibilities among heterogeneous people
and the power relations that shape and are shaped by access to and use of resources. I
show how issues related to property rights and strategies to control access and rights are
related to heterogeneous environmental subjectivities, identities, spaces and authorities
within society.
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2.3. Discourse and subject formation in CBC
I examine the production, circulation and the use of scientific knowledge and
cultural representations of nature, society and their relationships through a post-structural
perspective to analyze how authorities constructed the space bordering the CNP as a
buffer zone—a problem space full of conflicts between parks and people (Li 2007). In
other words, I look at how authorities defined, produced and represented the complex
relationships between park and people as the “conflict” between park and people. I also
examine the ways the conflict narrative changed over time and its consequences. As the
conflict narrative was followed by a series of CBC initiatives including conservation
territories and social development practices, I look at how the institutional arrangements
and spatial strategies played a role in the reproduction of social identities and the
construction of environmental and non-environmental subjectivities.
A post-structural perspective questions objective scientific truth claims about
people, practices, and nature, and it considers that “truths are statements within socially
produced discourses, rather than facts about reality” (Peet and Watts 1993, 228). That is,
scientific knowledge and cultural representation of reality are historically produced
discourses or narratives (Peet and Watts 1996; Forsyth 2008). Institutions such as the
state, non-state actors, scientific, media, or local organizations and experts produce
“careful, rationalized, organized statements” or the regime of representation for a certain
purpose (Peet and Hartwick 2015, 230). Hall (1992) describes a discourse as “a way of
talking about or representing something. It produces knowledge that shapes perceptions
and practices” (Hall 1992, 317 quoted in Gardner 2016). In general, discourses are
language and statements that are expressed through texts, images, and maps. More
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importantly, underlying knowledge or truth discourses are the meanings, ideas, desire or
interests of institutions that have the power to produce reality and subjectivity.
Discourses function to perpetuate the regimes of truth and to silence the undesired
knowledge of Others. Therefore, Escobar (1996) claims that "the post-structural analysis
of discourse is …. a theory of the production of social reality which includes the analysis
of representations as social facts inseparable from what is commonly thought of as
material reality" (Escobar 1996, 59).
In contrast to the debates concerning the location of power in institutions or social
relations, Foucault locates power in practices and processes, primarily in the production
of knowledge or truth, which have regulatory effects (Foucault 2007). The production of
knowledge of the “complex of men and things” – fertility, relationships, wealth, climate,
misfortunes or nature for instance - becomes the primary mechanism of power (Foucault
2007, 97). Foucault argues that authorities govern society not only through laws and
punishment (sovereign power), but through the right manner of disposing things or
“arranging things” in space for effective governance (disciplinary power). More
importantly, a modern form of power is primarily exercised by ensuring the well-being of
a population (Foucault 2009). The administration of the life processes of a population,
what Foucault calls bio-power, requires the detailed calculation and legibility of “men
and things” (Foucault 2009, 97; Scott 1998). For instance, the discursive transformation
of meanings of nature or the classification of nature into “natural resources” or
“environment” or “wilderness” is a form of power produced through new knowledge of
nature. Such practices not only restructure existing access to resources but also produce
new subjectivities and subjects (Luke 1995; Goldman 2001; Darier 1999). In

70

international development discourse, Escobar (1996) argues that power is exercised
through the discursive production of knowledge of non-western space and populations as
an undeveloped space and deficient poor people. The production of statistical facts and
the categorization of countries based on per capita income labeled two thirds of countries
as generically poor with populations riddled with poverty. That is, the internalization of
such knowledge or discourses of society and nature produce specific subjectivities and
social dominance.

2.3.1. Scientific knowledge and crisis narratives
In this section, I briefly review how authorities produced, circulated and used
scientific knowledge and the cultural representation of nature, society, and their
relationships in nature conservation. On the one hand, positivist scientists or realists, in
particular, consider scientific practice as value-free and neutral. Data and information
obtained from scientific practices are considered objective facts. For example, the
scientific research of an environmental change or degradation generates objective truth
and unbiased information of the phenomenon. On the other hand, social science scholars
or relativists, in particular, are critical of the assumption of objective scientific truth and
value-free scientific practices and knowledge. As political ecological works, however, do
not entirely abandon the existence of reality of a material object and phenomenon, they
argue that scientific knowledge is a representation of multiple realities. Thus scientific
work only produces partial truth. Also, scholars argue that researchers do not produce
scientific facts in a vacuum, but facts are shaped by or constructed in socioeconomic,
political and historical contexts. Scholars argue that scientific practices are value-laden
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social activities and thus the knowledge and understanding produced and circulated are
not neutral (Sayer 2000; Kuhn 1996). In nature conservation, institutions and individuals
with specific interests, ideologies, and identities define and produce knowledge related to
resource use, change and problems. Moreover, the ways nature and environmental
problems and changes are perceived and experienced depends on social difference,
experience, and perceptions. Therefore, knowledge production, circulation, and
representation of environmental realities shape or are shaped by social structure and
contexts (Forsyth 2008).
A significant strand of research focuses on the politics of environmental
knowledge. It is primarily related to the construction of environmental crisis narratives
such as the Himalaya environmental degradation narrative (Eckholm 1975; Thompson
and Warburton 2017; Guthman 1997) or the forest degradation and desertification
narrative in Africa (Fairhead and Leach 1996; Rocheleau et al. 1995; Forsyth 2008).
Critical scholars have questioned the simplified explanation of and causal links between
degradation and human-induced environmental changes. Such simplified explanations
mostly blame the victim and less powerful groups. Many political ecological studies,
however, have provided complex historical and multiscalar political economic arguments
to debunk or explain degradation narratives. In addition, studies have documented the
articulation of perceptions, ideologies and the production and circulation of the
degradation narratives (Guthman 1997; Fairhead and leach 1996; Blaikie and Maldavin
2004). Also, many scholars have argued against the equilibrium model in understanding
the social and ecological system and changes, and instead studies have based their
arguments on the non-equilibrium dynamics of the system and changes (Turner 2016). `
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2.3.2 Regulatory knowledge and subject formation
More recently, scholars have drawn from Foucault’s power/knowledge and
discourses to examine the construction of environmental crisis or degradation narratives.
Scholars have called such regulatory, environmental knowledge or truth discourses that
govern people and spaces as “eco-governmentality” or "green governmentality."
(Rutherford 2007; Darier 1999; Li 2007). For instance, Luke (1995) examines
environmental degradation discourses of the Worldwatch Institute. The Institute
simplified and represented nature as a vulnerable energy-conversion system, and they
presented human population growth and increasing material consumption as the causes of
environmental degradation. Also, he claims that the photographic image of the earth
taken by the Apollo 8 astronauts helped to transform the idea of the earth as a fragile and
tiny planet which needs protection and policing from degradation. The institution's
bioeconomic calculations and panoptic practices produce “the environment” from nature.
The environment thus is encircled with knowledge or enveloped within new disciplinary
discourses.
Similarly, Goldman (2001) examines the World Bank's new global green
regulatory practices including a global truth and rights regime for the management and
use of the environment and natural resources within and between countries. He shows
how the Bank claimed its authority and strengthened its power through sustainable
development discourses in the Mekong hydropower project and produced new subjects. It
employed green ideas and discourses such as the production of truth about nature. It
produced new meanings, orderings, and values of people and spaces. Experts represented
nature as degraded and in need of protection. Furthermore, experts categorized
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undifferentiated nature into different eco-zones such as fisheries, watersheds, wetlands
and extractive reserves. These newly constructed objects were administered by new
governing bodies or institutions. They also described the mountainous rural population as
ecologically destructive and backward and framed them as in need of improvement. In
addition, they classified people into distinct categories such as forest users, wetland
managers, forest labors, and trespassers. This new knowledge of people and nature
produced a new environmental state and a modern rational subject, and it constructed a
new rights regime and evicted resource-dependent people from their place in the name of
improvement and modernization.
Rather than the scientific explanation of resource crisis and degradation, scholars
have focused on the ways different ideas, beliefs, and perceptions of people shape the
understanding of degradation and decision making or policies related to resource and
nature conservation. Zimmerer (1996) examines the alarming soil erosion crisis and its
associated causal links in Bolivia. He examines perceptions of different interest groups
and individuals related to the problem of social erosion. He argues that people and
institutions have divergent views or perceptions of the problem. Non-Bolivian
development institutions blamed peasant farmers’ and herders' ignorance and rural
backwardness for unsustainable grazing, farming and deforestation and the resulting soil
loss in Bolivia. As a result, different education initiatives were carried out for rural
farmers including seminars, educational pamphlets, posters, and demonstration plots. For
older peasants, soil erosion was related to the "earth deity's wrath" because of the
widespread disrespect, animosity, inequality, and violence within society. Young
peasants, however, related the problem to human-induced causes and for the local trade
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union members, the problem was primarily related to local human-induced causes and
state economic policies. In the same way, Brown (1998) focused on differential values,
perceptions and interests to understand the narrative of resource degradation by local
rural people and subsequent control of access within the buffer zone of Bardiya National
Park, Nepal. She points out that rather than scientific knowledge it was the role of
different conceptualizations, values and interests among groups that shaped biodiversityrelated policies. She also found that tourism industries, conservation groups, and the state
have a more significant role in the formulation of conservation and tourism policies. She
claims that the strict protection of parks and the limits on resource access and use are
related to the lack of historical information on resources as used by locals and the
conventional belief that the local use of resources is inherently in conflict with wildlife
conservation and tourism development. She states that the floodplain grazing lands of the
national parks were not a pristine wilderness area, but rather rural people had been
extensively using the space for agricultural land and livestock grazing until 1975.
The representation of people, nature, and practices, which are also related to
culture and identities, influence how people think, understand, perceive, and contest.
Scholars have also documented the significance of representation as a discursive tool to
generate knowledge about reality and how this influences subject formation (Neumann
1997; Moore 1998). The role of foreign donors and conservationists have always played
an essential role in nature conservation. External donor agencies and scientific
organizations based in the Western countries not only provided financial and technical
support in strict nature conservation but also exported and imposed the ideals of
wilderness in the global south in the name of the protection of nature (Neumann 1998).
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Political ecological studies that built on the post-structural perspective have focused on
discourses, meanings, and representation of nature and society. The idea that nature and
society are a separate domain where pristine nature needs to be protected and managed
from ignorant rural people has been the primary ideology behind strict nature
conservation such as national parks and the idea is still prevalent in other types of nature
conservation (Neumann 1998). For instance, Braun (1997) analyzes the ways nature
(wilderness) and rainforests have been represented as distinct from the culture in a
different time by different powerful interest groups or actors to legitimate neocolonial
relations in British Columbia. He traces the historical emergence of ‘nature' as a discrete
object of aesthetic reflection, scientific inquiry, and economic and political calculation.
The production of abstract spaces plays a role in the transformation of forest to market
and the state. In particular, he shows the ways current and historical representations
consider nature as an empty space of economic and political calculation. He argues that
such discursive representations legitimized the continuation of the binary between nature
and society and further prompted displacement of resources from one group to other,
more powerful interest groups. He argues that colonial ideas and practices are still
dominant in the management of landscape and resources such as in sustainable
development, biodiversity management, and ecosystem restoration.
This brief overview demonstrates that institutions produce scientific knowledge
and representations of people, nature, and their relationships in specific historical times
and spaces as truth discourses. These truth discourses or regimes of representation and
their underlying meanings, however, can function as a regulatory rule or norms guiding
practices that can produce new authorities, subjects, and subjectivities for the effective
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governance of nature and society. In nature conservation in Nepal, I examine how
historically produced scientific knowledge and representation of the relationship between
nature and society established the authority of foreign techno-scientific authority,
conservation spaces and environmental and non-environmental subjects. Also, I examine
a series of conservation interventions and their consequences for lives, livelihoods, and
the landscape of CNP.

2.3.3. Regulatory rules and subject formation in CBC
Recent political ecological studies have also focused on the ways individual and
group subjectivities and environmental subjects are produced or not within participatory
nature conservation. They have primarily considered institutional arrangements and
participatory mechanisms and socioeconomic incentives as regulatory practices that
shape environmental subjects and subjectivities (Li 2007; Agrawal 2005). For instance,
Agrawal (2005) examines the transformation in environmental subjectivity with the
introduction of new participatory forest governance in India. He claims that rural
villagers and leaders who were previously engaged or complicit in forest-related criminal
activities changed into the new environmental subject, the subject who acts and thinks
and cares about the forest. Agarwal argues that the degree of people’s involvement in
regulatory practices such as engagement and participation in monitoring and enforcement
shapes environmental subjects and subjectivities. He described the term
"environmentality” and pointed out that the emphasis on institutional arrangements and
participation in regulatory rules and practices are central to the analysis of environmental
subject formation. Similarly, Li (2007) argues that international conservation and
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development institutions that introduced regulatory rules and promoted the engagement
of people in conservation were introduced to produce new environmental subjects. The
negative effects of a national park in access to and control of land and resources, and the
failure of improvement projects to ensure the welfare of rural people’s lives and
livelihoods generated a political response. The failures were related to the experts’
simplification of local socioeconomic and political realities and their reliance on
technical, non-political solutions. The introduction of participatory projects that followed
a previous improvement project in highland Indonesia aimed to reduce the political
response and transform the belief and aspirations of local people. In her book, Li (2007)
argues that the forest conservation rules were made flexible as a compromise or to
accommodate peoples’ challenges. In particular, the rules included flexibility in time and
space of resource collection and uses inside the park. The park spaces were divided into
different use zones (buffer zone where the activity is allowed) and non-use zones (a
wilderness zone). Spatial strategies included the monitoring and enforcement of the park
area. That is, the non-use zone was policed and enforced. The conservation project also
included participation of local communities in techno-scientific practices such as
mapping the zones and other spatial activities. It also included joint monitoring activities
and education programs.
Disciplinary practices of institutions or authorities are, however, not totalizing in
their effect. Not all populations are disciplined or become subject to discursive practices
and regulatory rules. That is, the practices differentially impact the heterogeneous people
situated in diverse spaces and times. However, contrary to many political ecological
findings of the importance of identities and agencies of people, Agrawal (2005) puts less
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emphasis on the role of preexisting subject categories such as gender, caste, or ethnicity
as the primary mechanism of the changed beliefs and thoughts. Many scholars have
documented the role of preexisting identities and the ways they shape subjectivities in
general. For instance, Nightingale (2011) shows the ways preexisting multiple social
identities—intersectionality—(re)produce social difference, hierarchy, and subjectivities.
She highlights the embodied performance of difference (movement of bodies, work
practices), agro-forestry practice (forest harvesting, agricultural work), food
consumption, and ritual practices, and the ways these social practices are manifested in
material spaces (Nightingale 2012). These everyday embodied symbolic performances
and spatial practices shape subjectivities and hierarchy. Similarly, Birkenholtz (2009)
documented the ways preexisting identities such as caste, class, and ethnicity and
political, economic contexts shape environmental subjectivities in decentralized
groundwater governance in India. Also, Nightingale pointed out the dynamic nature of
subjectivities and the ways subjectivities change according to the changing context and
power relations (Nightingale 2011a, 2011b).
Describing the role of socioeconomic and political contexts and social power
relations, scholars have also enriched the concept of environmentality in particular and
post-structural understandings of subject formation in general. Scholars have shown how
regulatory norms and social and political-economic contexts and social power relations
shape the formation of subjects and subjectivities (Nightingale 2011; Brikenholtz 2009).
Robbins and Sharpe (2003) studied subject formation in the residential yard of the United
States. They examine the formation of a "lawn people," the people who use chemical
fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides in their residential yards, despite the knowledge of

79

its harmful effects. They argue that the increasing use of pesticides is related to
socioeconomic and cultural contexts at multiple scales, beginning with the restructuring
of the chemical industry and new marketing strategies by the lawn chemical industry at
the global scale. Second, increasing lawn inputs are related to residential class structure
and the identity of the community. Lawn maintenance has become the symbol of pride,
status and class identity and a symbol of family values. It reflects the authentic
experiences of community, family, and connection to nature. Third, they argue that the
growth of the moral economy of lawn management expands the growth of harmful
chemical use. The formation of community and fear of alienation from community and
family intensified local demand. Lawn management has become an activity or practice to
maintain positive neighborhood cohesion, playing a role in the production of community.
Other scholars have looked at the ways spatial strategies—territorialization—
plays a role in the production of a new subject. As territorialization practices produce
new spaces with the demarcation of fixed boundaries and the maintenance of boundaries
by authorities through regular monitoring and enforcement of rules, such practices
control people and resources inside and outside the boundary. Authorities monitor and
regulate people’s movements, activities, and practices within the boundary. Besides,
authorities teach or educate people about things and practices allowed and restricted
within the boundary. Furthermore, signposts or any communication tools are used to
communicate rules and policies. Authorities also record people’s behavior related to
boundary crossing. Fines and punishment are used as enforcement of rules. Neumann
(2001), for instance, looked at the Selous Conservation Program carried out by the state
and non-state organizations at the community wildlife management area of Tanzania. The

80

GTZ – Germany's bilateral organization—started integrated conservation and
development activities in the buffer zone of the game reserve. The key intervention was
the partitioning of land through surveying and titling, which facilitated the monitoring
and surveillance of local people in the wildlife management area and the game reserve.
Game scouts were appointed and provided with training in monitoring and surveillance.
Thus he argues that the failure of conservation agencies (central government and nonstate) to control illegal hunting and poaching of wild animals through violence and the
non-cooperation of local communities in sharing information about illegal activities was
surmounted through the design of more-subtle ways of self-surveillance by communities
at the village level. This was achieved when the people entering the spatial demarcation
of the village wildlife management area had to be conscious of the presence of game
scouts and their presence inside the management area. Thus, he claims that the buffer
zone plan serves as the "disciplinary mechanism to create a different kind of peasant
consciousness toward wildlife based on a schema of generalized surveillance" (Neumann
1979,209). Highlighting more discursive aspects associated with the concept of the
“internal territorialization,” Peluso and Vandergeest (2001) examine genealogies of
"political forests." This particular idea of state forest illustrates the constructed nature or
political nature of a forest. They argue that these political forests, associated with colonial
forest practices including "scientific forestry" and "customary forests" are particular
discourses of land declared as forest, which had played a role in colonial state-making,
and in the constitution of racialized landscapes and distinct subjects. They further claim
that "the ways colonial governments resolved the question of native or "minority" rights
to land and forest resources contributed to the creation of people (as "natives, "Foreign
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Orientals, " "primitives, " or "minorities") and frequently territorialized these identities as
well as patterns of resource access" (2001, 800). These all served to extend colonial
power and territorial control, helped in transforming landscapes and property relations
and played a role in the constitution of new subject categories
In a similar fashion, Ybarra (2012) examines a territorial project and the ways it
produces non-environmental subjects. The military counterinsurgency campaigns, which
aligned with conservation practices, is a spatial strategy to control the jungle and people.
It used spatial strategies of dividing and delineating the jungle into nature and agriculture
and enforcing the boundary. They represented the jungle, which was a base of guerrilla
fighters, as “wild and savage" and a "guerilla haven," utilizing a binary representation of
society as safe civilization and nature as a dangerous jungle full of narco-peasants. Also,
she writes most of the military from the east saw Petans as "an unhealthy place populated
by dangerous Indians," and the Maya indigenous people were looked at like suspect
citizens. The discourse of space (ungovernable), people (narco-peasants) and forest
condition (crisis narrative) by foreigners and local elite helped to produce territorial
projects to save the place and save the forest from migrants and displaced people.
Consequently, the conservation projects, similar to military practice, celebrated the
identity of some "traditional indigenous" groups as forest conservationists and sustainable
and immigrants as destructive and reproduced racialized landscape and identities shaping
access to and eviction from the territory.
Ojeda (2012) examines the ecotourism project around Tayrano National Park in
Colombia. She argues that people living and working in Tayrano National Park who
opposed neoliberal goals were considered not-green-enough subjects and considered as
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bodies out of place – the eco-threats. Social and spatial demarcation and representation of
people and practices play a role in criminalization. For instance, Colons peasants and
fisherman living and working inside Tayrano National Park were considered invaders,
illegal occupants, and environmental destroyers. Conservationist and development
organizations represented fishermen’s practices as improper environmental behavior
because of a lack of consciousness with respect to coral reefs and fish shortages and
represented the men as para-militaries and narco allies, not as real fishermen. These
organizations also represented peasants as coca growers and coca pickers and framed
their illicit crops as the cause of forest depletion. On the other hand, other Colons
peasants living in the buffer zone of Tayrano National Park were represented as ecoguardians. This was because they participated in a tourist lodge project, which was a
combination of conservation, illicit crop eradication, community building and ecotourism
development. They not only learned to conduct touristic businesses but committed
themselves to maintaining conservation and tourism development by starting sustainable
economic activities such as beekeeping, organic farming and other “green” projects.
They complied to be transformed from coca growers and pickers to tourist hosts and
became green peasants, neoliberal entrepreneurial subjects involved in the
commodification of nature through ecotourism business practice. She claims that the
representation of some people and practices as eco-guardians and others as eco-threats
have produced distinct environmental and non-environmental subjects, tourist spaces
such as beaches and buffer zones to further the neoliberal goals of capital accumulation,
and tourism promotion.
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2.4 Conclusion
Many studies have considered how regulatory knowledge, rules, and practices are
hegemonic practices which provided no room for resistance. Scholars, however, have
documented numerous examples of the ways rural populations have resisted efforts to
become governmentalized people and resources. In the process of resistance and struggle
to control land, resources, and benefits, rural people have embraced particular
subjectivities. For instance, Tania Li argues that the limitations of the improvement
projects of the state and foreign NGOs and donors to address lives and livelihood of rural
people produced the critical positionality of local individuals as indigenous people (Li
2007). Similarly, Malhi (2011) argues that the struggle to gain control over territory
through enclosure and territorialization practices produces a discrete Malay landscape
and Malayan subject, the Malay Muslim peasant. The territorial strategies that limited the
use and access of land and control by the colonial government were vigorously contested
through the discourse of resistance that draws from Muslim moral land use, practices, and
resource entitlement. They used global Islamic discourses of moral land use, law, and
authority to resist colonial land enclosure. She describes the ways colonial enclosure have
also produced "radical anti-enclosure politics" including violent uprisings and also violent
colonial suppression.
In contrast to Agrawal’s (2005) focus on regulatory rules and practices in the
formation of subjectivities and subsequent environmental subjects, Cepek (2011), from
his long-term study in a community-based conservation project in Ecuador, questions the
theoretical and analytical use of environmentality as a concept in understanding the
formation of subjectivities and environmental subjects. He argues that although
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conservation projects in Cofan territory entail the constitution of new institutions,
regulations, and practices, it does not transform the Cofan into "environmental subjects."
In contrast, he says "Cofan conservationism is the result of a gradual and organic process
of community-internal discussion in a specific historical, political, and ecological
conjuncture” (Cepek 2011, 501). Giving importance to the capacity of human agency, he
argues that the "people are capable of forging a critical, self-aware, and culturally framed
perspective on collaborative projects for socioecological transformation." (Cepek 2011,
501).
The above examples illustrate that regulatory knowledge, rules, or incentives that
structure or regulate human activities or desires or practices in general shape or are
shaped by subjectivities and subject. In particular, scientific and cultural representation
practices, institutional and spatial practices, improvement projects, cultural politics,
struggles, and everyday livelihood practices play a role in shaping new meanings and
ideas in participatory nature conservation. In a village of the CNP buffer zone, I examine
how state and local elites have constructed and reproduced space, social, and
environmental subjectivities.
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Chapter Three: Socioeconomic and political history of Nepal

In this chapter I present the social, economic and political history of Nepal. This
chapter includes the history after the unification of Nepal and the rise of Shah dynasty.
The chapter aims to provide a brief historical context to understand the emergence of
territorial based nature conservation in Nepal. The chapter is divided into three distinct
sections. The first section discusses briefly the socioeconomic and political context of
Nepal before 1950. In the second and third sections, I present the socioeconomic and
political context of the periods 1950 to 1990 and 1990 to the present, respectively.

3.1. Socioeconomic and Political History of Nepal before 1950
Two major historical events fixed the current territorial boundary of Nepal. First,
Prithivi Narayan Shah, the Shah King of the Gorkha principality, conquered numerous
small principalities and diverse societies and formed them into a unified Nepal after
1768. Second, in 1814-1816, Nepal fought a war9 with British-India for the control of
land taxes and revenue from the mid-western Tarai (Butwal and Shivaraj) and transHimalayan trade route between India and Tibet. The defeat in the Anglo-Nepal war and
the subsequent treaty—the Treaty of Sugauli—reduced Nepal’s territorial control and
fixed the current territorial boundary. In this treaty, Nepal agreed to provide able-bodied
manpower as a mercenary army to British-India—the Gorkha soldiers—and agricultural
crops from Tarai such as sugar, jute, and cotton as well as timber to ensure political

9

As the region was the primary source of revenue to the government and as the area had massive revenue
generating potentials, the Shah Ruler attempted to annex the entire stretch of the Himalaya. They tried to
control the trade routes between India and Tibet through Kathmandu (Gaige 1975).
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support and the guarantee of non-interference in Nepal’s internal affairs (Joshi and Rose
1966; Ghimire 1992). The treaty established the semi-colonial state of British-India.

3.1.1. The Rana regime and semi-colonial relationships
In 1846, Jung Bahadur Rana gained control of the state from the Shah rulers after
the massacre of courtiers in Kathmandu and instituted a heredity Prime minister from the
Rana family. Through the support of British-India, the Rana family ruled Nepal for 104
years from 1846 to 1950. British-India indirectly ruled Nepal through Rana rulers and
institutionalized the semi-colonial state (Bhattarai, 2003). For instance, Rana rulers
helped British-India quell the Sepoy mutiny in 1857; in return, British-India returned
some of the territories captured in the Anglo-Nepal war, specifically Naya Muluk,
comprising the current four districts of western Tarai. Rana rulers not only established a
strong external relationship with British-India by sending troops or allowing the British to
recruit Nepali as mercenary soldiers, but also British rulers and dignitaries frequently
visited Nepal for wildlife hunting. Jang Bahadur Rana also visited Britain and France in
1850 as a guest of the state. Following his return from Britain, Rana Prime Minister Jung
Bahadur Rana enacted a Muluki Ain, that is, a national legal code. This legal code
formalized the Hindu caste hierarchy and the code also became the basis of the first legal
and administrative reform related to land, resources, and trade in Nepal. Rana rules
completely put Nepali people in the darkness for 104 years, and they extracted resources
from people and nature (Joshi and Rose 1966; Caplan 1970).
Following the unification of diverse principalities, King Prithivi Narayan Shah
combined diverse communities and the heterogeneous population into a single Hindu
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caste hierarchy. Broadly, on the top of the hierarchy were the high caste Hindu groups
(Bahun-Chetri10) and on the lowest rank was the “untouchable” caste Hindu population.
Rulers also ranked all non-Hindu mid-hill and mountain populations—mostly Janajati11
or Indigenous groups—in a middle position. In particular, it reorganized the population
into these distinct categories according to the “pure” caste (non-alcohol drinker) and
“impure” caste (people drinking alcohol). Similarly, they subdivided the “impure” caste
(Bahun-Chetri) into the “clean” caste (contemporary indigenous groups) and the
“untouchables” Hindu caste. After 1851, the first Rana Prime Minister, Jung Bahadur
Rana, legalized the expression of the real Hindu state and the Hindu caste hierarchy in the
national legal code, Muluki Ain of 1854 (Joshi and Rose 1966; Bista 1991). It established
the supremacy of the high caste Hindus, Bahun and Chetri, and inscribed differential
social and spatial practices, privileges, fines, and punishments according to the hierarchy.
As the king occupied the highest position in the state or was considered the Bhupati
(master of the land or the state), the ownership of all land under the jurisdiction of the
state belonged to the Hindu king and rulers (Regmi 1971,63; Burghart 1984).
Throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries, the patrimonial state and the
Hindu caste system rationalized feudal control and exploitation of land, labor and
resources (Caplan 1967; Regmi 1976; Ghimire 1998; Guneratne 2002, 1998). For
instance, peasant farmers had to pay one-half of crops to rulers and provide free labor for
70 days each year (Metz 1995). The Hindu aristocracy had the right to collect tribute and
taxes and could lend money at high interest rates, a situation that often led to the

10

also used as Khas-Arya by some

11

Janajati is also used in Nepal instead of Indigenous-Nationalities.
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privatization of communal lands and forests and the dispossession of lower caste ethnic
groups (Caplan 1967; Regmi 1976; Ghimire 1998). The state also encouraged Hindu
communities to settle and cultivate in the mid-elevation highlands, which were already
occupied by ethnic minorities under a system of communal land tenure. Rana rulers also
strictly restricted any foreign visitors and any form of foreign interventions or the
development of any social or physical infrastructure such as a state bureaucracy, an
educational system, medical facilities, roads or a transportation system.

Figure 3.2 The Hindu caste hierarchy based on Hofer 1979, 45-46)
As the land and forest were the major sources of state revenue, various spatial
strategies were also employed to control land and the revenue. The partitioning of state
domain into distinct land types, assigning meanings and differential rights to land
categories, enclosing or assigning access to some groups versus other groups and the
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institutionalization of such practices in legal code intensified after the rise of Rana rulers.
The use of violence and fear has rarely been discussed in published texts, although it is
entirely safe to assume that the central mechanism of control of people and resources was
legal and military violence. The first spatial arrangement, however, was the classification
of land into state land and communal land. State land was called a Raikar land, which
included forests, wasteland, river, and roads. Individuals or families did not have the
private ownership of public land for any purpose including agricultural use. The state or
the king had rights to sell, mortgage or bequest any types of Raikar land. Authorities
categorized Raikar land into Birta, Jagir, or Guthi land based on the kind of land grants
and land administration. Non-state land, which was called Kipat land, included
community-owned lands such as paths, sources of water and pasture land. On Kipat land,
a community had overriding authority over the state claims (Regmi 1976, 19).
Birta land, in particular, is a type of Raikar land. It is a form of private property,
where individuals had defined rights. That is, landowners had rights to increase rents,
evict tenants, and use, transfer, and sell Birta lands. Birta landholders12were exempted
from state land tax, fines, and duties. However, they were required to provide men and
material during the war and other emergencies (Regmi 1976, 36). Birta landholders also
had other privileges such as the obligation of local inhabitants to provide unpaid labor
services on Birta land. Birta land was granted "in favor of priests, religious teachers,
soldiers, and members of the nobility and the royal family” (Regmi 1976, 19). That is, the

12

Some forms of tax were present but the taxes were very nominal, which Birta holders were satisfied with
because the taxes provided more legitimacy with respect to their ownership of the land. In the Rana regime,
in particular, taxes such has Chhap and Tiruwa were used to encroach over the privileges of Birta
landowners (Regmi 1976, 35)
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majority of the Birta-owning class were rulers, their families and high caste Hindu such
as Bahun13 Other Birta-owing people were individuals and groups who had close
connection with ruling elites and royals such as some of the Newar14.
According to the Muluki Ain, rulers had rights to confiscate the land if the owner
was guilty of an offense or the land was held without the valid documentary evidence,
Birta title. Mahesh C. Regmi documented categories of Birta land and the cases of the
confiscation and granting of Birta land before it was abolished (Regmi 1976, 28-34). For
instance, Jung Bahadur Rana acquired the “waste or forest land” of the far-western Tarai
regions, comprising the present districts of Banke, Bardiya, Kailali, and Kanchapur, as
the Birta for his service to the king Surendra. His successors and other Rana rulers
disregarded legal provisions and enacted new regulations to grant state’s land to their
families and to confiscate land from others (Regmi 1976, 31-32.). In addition, rulers used
land regulations to scrutinize “the valid documentary evidence of Birta title in the name
of reigning king” and confiscated land from those who did not have sufficient
documentation15. Regmi, however, reported that the primary reasons for the examination
of valid documentary evidence of Birta land title were not to confiscate the land per se

13

Bahuns or Brahmans. Buhuns is a commonly used word in daily languages similar to Chetris, Newars,
Gurungs, Tamangs, etc.
14

Scholars and popular writing frequently elide heterogeneity and social differences within a Newari
group.
15

Based on Land Survey Regulations 1805-6, rulers accepted Birta land granted made by previous kings,
queens, and princesses. Only the land granted by officials without royal authority and “the area in excess of
the figure mentioned in the grant was confiscated." In the condition when the valid documentary evidence
of Birta title was not available, “lands were not confiscated if the adjoining landowners took an oath that
the grant was authentic” (Regmi 1976, 29).

91

but to extract taxes from newly reclaimed land and to bring the land under the ruler's tax
jurisdiction.
Jung Bahadur Rana also used various regulations and royal decrees to grant Birta
lands in order to expand his authority at the beginning of the Rana regime. For instance,
in 1846, Jang Bahadur Rana granted "wasteland" as a Birta land to armies in exchange
for the cultivated land confiscated in 1805. Furthermore, the Hindu religious belief of
rulers also motivated the land grants. In 1846, Jang Bahadur Rana granted Birta to the
Brahman community “to safeguard the religion of the Hindus" and to maintain a military
(Regmi 1976, 30-31). Thus, Regmi states that “the beneficiary of a Birta land grant was
therefore not merely a landowner: in many respects, he resembled the lord of a manor in
England during the middle Ages" and the system was the worst manifestation of
"inequality and exploitation" (Regmi 1976, 33-38).
This practice of governing people and land by granting state lands to individuals
who are loyal to rulers and the confiscation of the land from those who were disloyal not
only reinforced the state’s proprietary claims over land, but also strengthened the power,
authority and social hierarchy of the rulers. On the other hand, as this system provided
the social prestige and secured the economic bases of receivers, it also maintained
personal loyalty to rulers because "disloyalty was punishable by confiscation of
property." Therefore, the Birta land grants, in general, played a more significant role in
class formation and the establishment of patron-client relationships (Regmi 1976, 25).
Other land grants that served a similar purpose to rulers are called Jagir land and Gutihi
land.
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The Jagir land grant is another form of the land tenure system. State authorities
granted the Raikar land to government employees and functionaries for their current
services as Jagir land. A Jagir landholder (Jagirdar) had rights to use the land until “he
remained in the service of the government” (Regmi 1976, 75). Rulers employed this landgrant system to encourage land reclamations and resettlement in previously "unclaimed
wasteland" and to expand a military base in strategic locations. Guthi, on the other hand,
is state land granted to religious and charitable institutions such as temples, monasteries,
schools, hospitals, and orphanages. Institutions have ownership of Guthi land. Similar to
the Birta system which had helped to expand the power and authority of granter and
receiver, the Guthi system primarily “helped to satisfy the religious propensities of both
the rulers and the common people” (Regmi 1976, 46). It helped to expand Hindu religion
in non-Hindu places. Although a Guthi land grant can be either wasteland or cultivated
land, the Guthi land granted by royals was primarily "wasteland".
In sum, rulers and their families, in particular, used various spatial and legal
strategies of land classification and representation to control land, resources, and
revenues from state land. More importantly, they used the strategy and land grants to
maintain power and extract resources by cultivating and strengthening patron-client
relationships16 between rulers, administrators, and grant holders (Bista 1991; Regmi
1999). Consequently, it not only rationalized and established the extractive regime for
more than 100 years, it institutionalized the Hindu religion and also established the

16

The Chakari system is a type of patron-client relationship. "Its most common form is in simply being
close to or in the presence of the person [patron] whose favor is desired." The relationship becomes
complex when there is a formal or informal gift or resources or information or favor exchange between
people of unequal power relations such as class, caste, or status hierarchy (Bista 1991, 5).
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dominance of some high caste hill Khas-Arya and Newar elites. In addition, it justified
the exploitation of some ethnic groups in the form of compulsory labor.

3.1.2. Kipat, communal land
Kipat land is a community-owned land such as paths, sources of water and
pasture land. The Kipat owning community had overriding authority over state claims. It
is a land tenure arrangement based upon local custom and which recognized the person
reclaiming the land (Regmi 1976, 87). In addition, indigenous or autochthonous
communities retain their customary practices on land which are identified by communal
authority or a state. Kinship, customary occupation, and their location (defined by
particular geographical boundaries) determine the membership on the Kipat land. The
Kipat land was inalienable outside the community, but members had rights to sell within
groups. Besides, individual also had rights to cultivate their plot. In the condition of the
vacancy of the plot, the community, not the state, had rights to decide on how to use the
plot. In contrast to the tax based on the size of Raikar land, home determined the state tax
on Kipat land. After the unification of modern Nepal and waves of migration,
“newcomers (Indo-Aryan groups in particular) acquired land rights under a statutory
form of landownership, such as Birta or Jagir,” (Regmi 1976, 88). On the other hand,
indigenous people retained their customary rights on Kipat land through customary
practices on land and forest. Most of the Kipat owning communities inhabited the eastern
and western midlands of Nepal (Regmi 1976, 88). These communities include Limbu,
"Rai, Majhiya, Bhote, Yakha, Tamang, Hayu, Chepang, Baramu, Danuwar, Sunuwar,
Kumhal, Pahari, Thami, Sherpa, Majhi, and Lepcha" in. (Regmi 1976, 88).
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The effective governance of indigenous people and their customary practices on
land became a challenge to the newly unified state because it contradicted with the state’s
land tenure arrangements and the revenue demand of the period. The direct control of the
land and people was not feasible for several reasons. First, it was politically undesirable
for a newly unified state, and second, the state also lacked the capacity of complete
control. Third, the chance of revolt and resistance by a "turbulent community" was higher
(Caplan 1967; Regmi 1975, 93). Fourth, the labor and military power of indigenous
communities, who could flee to neighboring states, were more critical than land per se to
rulers for the expansion of the revenue, territory, and security17 (Caplan 1967; Regmi
1975).
Therefore, Shah rulers recognized customary practices of some people as
customary rights in their territories (Caplan 1967). For instance, in Pallokirat, Shah
rulers, through royal decree, recognized the authority of local chiefs or headmen and
guaranteed their customary practices and rights to their ancestral Kipat land. Following
the conquest of Pallokirat in 1774, Prithivi Narayan Shah declared and assured the Limbu
chief and the inhabitants that they would be permitted "to enjoy the land from generation
to generation, as long as it remains in existence." (Regmi 1976, 93). These tactics not
only integrated the newly unified principalities but also strengthened the administrative
apparatus of the state. The arrangement made the state work more efficiently, as the state
officially recognized and granted rights and responsibilities to the village headmen to
maintain law and order, collect taxes, and impose fines and punishment (Caplan 1967).

17

. As Rulers were expanding their territory to the eastern region such as Sikkim following the conquer of
Kathmandu valley, they needed the support of Mongoloid communities such as Limbu (Caplan 1967)
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However, actions of the Indo-Aryan18 immigrants who had settled in the hills of
Nepal since the 11th and 12th century had political and economic effects on the Kipat
owning communities in the hills (Regmi 1967). In particular, the loss of Kipat land to the
“superior” Indo-Aryan migrants was the major problem (Ghimire 1998). In Pallokirat, as
in other areas, the possessory mortgage of the land and outright sale was one of the major
factors of Kipat land loss. Non-Limbus controlled large amounts of Kipat land through
such mortgages even before rulers formalized rights and rules on the lands. Caplan
(1967) noted that by the end of 19th century, “the rate of Kipat conversion into Raikar
land reached alarming proportions” (Kaplan 1967, 110). Scholars have documented such
mortgages in one area of Illam, where approximately 70 percent of Kipat land was under
possessory mortgage by 1964-65 (Regmi 1967, Caplan 1967). These circumstances
prompted the large-scale out-migration of Indigenous populations to Darjeeling, Sikkim,
and Bhutan as laborers and as the Gurkha soldiers for Indian and British Army (Caplan
1967).
To reduce the effect of such land-alienation or dispossession from the land, rulers
had also devised policies to control the problem by creating landholding collectives and
inalienable rights, recognizing specific areas as Kipat land. In other words, rulers
recognized customary practices as customary rights and spatially fixed the problem of
dispossession and the potential loss of labor and military power by creating and

18

Following the Muslim invasion of India during the 11 and 12th centuries, many Indo-Aryan immigrants
arrived and settled in the hill region of Nepal, they gradually displaced many communities from the region.
In particular, many longtime inhabitants experienced a similar type of displacement from their land, and
this continued after the unification period and intensified during the Rana regime (Kansakar 1973 in
Ghimire 1998).
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protecting the Kipat land. For instance, the royal order recognized that “Limbus were
leaving their Kipat lands because of harassment by moneylenders and oppression by
government officials” (Regmi 1975, 97). Regmi also noted that “royal orders confirming
Kipat rights on ancestral lands usually were issued only when it was necessary to impress
labor services from Kipat owners, or when it appeared that lack of tenure security was
leading to depopulation" (Regmi 1975, 98). The order was also issued to stop outmigration by declaring a moratorium on the payment of a moneylender's loan for eight to
ten years and a three-year remission on homestead taxes. Also, rulers attempted to
resettle hill population in the Tarai plain to solve the problem of out-migration. In 1899, a
royal order to the Limbus of Pallokirat requested that they clear the forest and resettle in
the Tarai region of Nepal (Morang), rather than migrate to India. (Regmi 1975, 97). In
Kathmandu Valley and other places, according to 1799 Land Administration Regulation
for Kathmandu Valley, the selling of Kipat land was considered as an offense. Until
1901 and 1903, the government through royal order banned the selling19 of cultivated
Kipat lands, but not of the “waste” Kipat lands.
Rulers also initiated gradual and indirect strategies of transforming or
appropriating Kipat land. Major strategies employed were the partial recognition and
formalization of customary practices into customary rights. According to the royal orders,
the Kipat holder had to maintain the documentary evidence of Kipat land. That is, when
customary practices were recognized, the state's regulation inscribed only partial "rights,"
and when a royal order confirmed the Kipat holding, "the area and boundaries were

19

However underground mortgaging of Kipat land was very common.
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seldom specified," and the documents rarely mentioned all customary and ancestral
practices of inhabitants (Regmi 1975, 94). As a result, many Kipat holders were without
documentary evidence. The government also imposed several other measures to control
Kipat land such as the imposition of the ceiling, provisions of compulsory unpaid labor
and taxation by Kipat holders (Regmi 1975, 99). Besides, in Pallokirat, the government
encouraged non-Limbu immigration and settlements to break the hegemony of Limbu
ownership of land by granting all “vacated” Kipat land as a Birta to non-Limbu
communities. The government also refused to recognize Kipat landownership rights on
the "wastelands." These wastelands were transferred into Raikar land and the state later
granted the land for reclamations to non-limbus. Similar strategies were employed to
control other indigenous people's Kipat land (Regmi 1976, 101).
In 1886, the government enacted legislation to transfer all the Kipat land that
Limbus had sold to non-Limbus into Raikar land. As possession of the Kipat land
through mortgage was not allowed to non-Limbus after the death of the Limbu
mortgagor, the government later amended the law that allowed the non-Limbu creditor to
cultivate on the mortgaged holding. These legal and spatial strategies helped in
maximizing state revenue by gradually bringing Kipat land under the Raikar system,
strengthening the security of the state's territory by recruiting armies from indigenous hill
communities and providing the labor needed to reclaim land in the Tarai region. Some
authors have even documented that in 1801, King Prithivi Narayan Shah granted the
lands of Nagarkot and the eastern side of Kathmandu Valley as Kipat land to Tamang
communities (Regmi 1976, 90). Furthermore, Regmi noted that the Revenue Regulation
of Doti and Achham traditionally treated Kipat land as a form of Birta to a community
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for their specific service, a Sewa Birta (Regmi 1976, 99). These cases indicate that the
royal order and legal practices had not only recognized some customary practices as
customary rights, but they played an active role in the construction of new customary
land and rights. Rulers, however, did not grant land to all indigenous communities as a
Kipat land nor did they always recognize customary practices. For instance, Rai people in
Majhikirat, who were weak compared to Shah rulers, were not able to secure their Kipat
land. As a result of the dispossession from their Kipat land, many Rai people resettled in
the forested areas of the Tarai region. In addition, not a single indigenous people and
group within the whole Tarai plains were ever recognized. Instead, rulers and scholars
have represented the place as a "wasteland," "forested land," or "vacant land." Therefore,
Rai (2013) asserts that until recently rulers and scholars represented Tarai as "a swampy,
malaria-ridden, unhealthy, and wild place without history and civilization" (2013, 90).
This constructed and political nature of Kipat land and the rulers’ attempt to communal
fix the indigenous communities in the hills contradict with an argument that the Kipat
land and rights were given as “primordial” or natural land categories (Regmi 1975;
Ghimire 1998). Therefore, the land categories or land rights reflect power relations
between rulers, local authorities, and people.

3.1.3. Invisible Tarai land and the people of Tarai
Tarai was a dense forest and a major source of revenue for the state. In particular,
high-value Sal forest and wild animals such as elephants and agricultural crops were the
major sources of revenue from the Tarai. For instance, in 1793, the annual revenue from
the wild elephant and timber sale was about 20 percent and 40 percent respectively of the
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total revenue of the country (Kirkpatrick 1996 in Budhathki 2012). Therefore, Nepal
fought a war with British-India in 1816 (Anglo-Nepal war) to control this major source of
revenue to the government (Gaige 1975). The vast areas of Tarai land, which comprised
about 21 percent of the total land area of Nepal and was the home of many indigenous
people such as Tharu, Derai, Dhimal, Bote, and Musher were seldom discussed in the
social, economic and political history of Nepal. Most communities and their practices
were rendered invisible until recently. Rulers and other powerful people represented
Tarai forest land as "unclaimed forest" or "wasteland" or Kala Banjar. These
representations of Tarai land not only rationalized the control of Tarai's forest and
resources but also justified the exploitation of indigenous inhabitants.
To increase laborers in Tarai and encourage permanent settlement in forested
areas, Rana rulers also encouraged the migration of people from the hills and from India.
They also provided free agricultural land and residential areas to migrants' families.
Also, "criminals and runaway slaves who reclaimed wasteland in the Tarai were
pardoned and given freedom" (Adhikar and Dhungana 2009, 47). Jung Bahadur Rana
acquired the “waste or forest land” of the far-western Tarai regions, comprising the
present districts of Banke, Bardiya, Kailali, and Kanchapur, as the Birta for his service to
the king Surendra. In addition, until the fall of the Rana regime, the "unclaimed
wasteland" in particular was granted as Birta land to expand cultivation in the Tarai
region and to encourage settlements outside of urban areas (Regmi 1975). In the early
1940s, "regulations were enforced permitting any person who reclaimed wasteland in the
Tarai region to acquire it as Birta on payment of the capital value of the yield at 5
percent” (1976, 24). Rana exploitation of indigenous Tharu of Tarai areas during a
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hunting expedition has been well reported by scholars (e.g. Guneratne 2002). For
instance, after the defeat in Anglo-Nepal, the Shah rulers encouraged the extraction of
resources from the Tarai region and imposed heavy taxes on agriculture and trade of
resources. Some scholars have even reported that rulers sold more than 200,000 people as
slaves and bonded labor in the Tarai region (Rangan 2000, 29).

3.1.4. The Jamindari system
Jung Bahadur Rana formalized the Jamindari system in 1861-62 mainly as a local
state’s revenue administration to maximize tax and agricultural expansion in the forested
wasteland of the Tarai region. Rulers appointed local functionaries primarily to collect
taxes and rents in the form of harvested crops or free labor service from Raikar land at
the village level. The appointment of local state functionaries called Jamindar played an
important role in the effective governance of rural tenants or laborers. Their major
function was to create the enabling conditions to expand revenue by providing
agricultural financing, promoting private enterprise, expanding cultivation, encouraging
the reclamation of wasteland and forested land, and expanding and encouraging
immigration, settlement, and labor management.
As the Jamindar operated at a village level and as they were primarily drawn from
the local village administration such as village head or leader, they had a more significant
connection with rulers and state administration on the one hand and the tenant subjects on
the other hand. Their rights and responsibilities as a judge of absentee landlords and
state's rulers were not limited to revenue collection. Rather, their role in the social,
economic and political life of the village was much broader including such activities as
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participation in and management of village rituals and festivals, conflict resolution, etc.
Hence, they functioned as an agent to enhance the legibility of local reality for the
security and economy of the state. They also played a significant role in the entrenchment
of the state and state's power by ensuring the legibility and surveillance of tenant
subjects.
The above-discussed extractive regime of the feudal relation of surplus extraction
from peasants and ethnic people set up by the Rana and ruling elites completely
transformed the southern landscape and the control of land and resources. Scholars have
reported that the eastern and the central Tarai lost most of their forested areas by the early
19th century (Oldfield 1981). The Tarai forest used to extend from east to west of the
entire stretch of Nepal in the past, but most forest that was proximate to towns and was
important for commercial value was "more or less cleared away" by British companies
for the commerce of timber. (Kirkpatrick 1996, 35). For instance, rulers cleared much of
the eastern Tarai forest for timber. However, the Great Forest of the Chitwan Valley was
intact until 1793. Some timbers from this area were traded to bordering Bihar and some
went up to Calcutta in India (Kirkpatrick 1996, 33). Similarly, the resident wild elephant
population of Nepal completely disappeared from the Tarai forest, which was one of the
major sources of revenue during the pre-1950 period. The early decimation of the rhino
and tiger population from the region is also associated with the royal hunting of the
period (as discussed in chapter 4), which became the basis for the establishment of
territorially bounded hunting reserves and national parks.

102

3.2. Socioeconomic and political history of Nepal, 1950-1990
The 1950s marked a major shift in the social, economic, and political history of
Nepal. Two major political leaders—BP Koirala (a Social Democrat and a main leader of
the Nepali Congress Party) and Puspa Lal Shrestha (the first general secretary of the
Communist Party)—led the first national political movement and civil disobedience
against the Rana regime in 1950 to establish democracy and overthrow the Rana regime.
In the global context of the 1950s20 and with the support of international countries and
leaders21, the political movement ousted the hereditary prime minister system of Rana
rulers and reinstated the power of the Shah Dynasty in 1951. In addition, India mediated
the power-sharing compromise between political parties, the Shah rulers and the Rana
rulers (Ghimire 1998). As a result, the representative of the Nepali Congress Party and
the Rana rulers formed a cabinet under the direct leadership of King Tribhuvan (Riaz
and Basu 2010; Jha 2014; Joshi and Rose 1966).
Following internal conflict and the split of the Nepali Congress Party in 1952,
King Tribhuvan directly appointed MP Koirala, a half-brother of BP Koirala, as a prime
minister of Nepal, who was more conservative and had a strong supporter of Rana
leaders. In 1954, king Tribhuvan held absolute power over parties (Riaz and Basu 2010:
44). In 1955, Mahendra Shah, a British educated son of King Tribhuvan, became the king

Cold War diplomacy at the end of WWII, China’s control of Tibet and expansion of communism in
1951, and the end of British colonialism in India after 1947 together provided a favorable geopolitical
context to protest against the Rana regime. British colonial rulers helped to sustain the Rana regime in
Nepal. In addition, many Indian politicians and the Indian Congress Party helped and supported the
movement (Hachhethu and Gellner, 2010) because many notable Nepali exile politicians had prior
connections with Indian politicians and they also participated in protests against British-India. The Nepali
Congress leaders also formed their party in India.
20
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after the death of his father. He delayed the promised election but announced the first
parliamentary election in 1959. Jha (2014) describes the prolonged political transition
period as a struggle between fragmented parties and between factions within parties “for
power and lobbying with the palace for patronage” (2014, 10). Eight different
governments including direct rule by the king are the indication of the political instability
and the strength of the palace in the 1950s (Hachhethu and Gellner 2010). Just a week
before the election, King Mahendra, however, unilaterally declared the constitution of
Nepal would circumvent the promise of constitutional assembly election in June 1959. A
leading constitutional expert—Sir Ivor Jennings—from the UK and other Nepali experts
helped to prepare the constitution. King Mahendra directly rewrote some parts of the
constitution to control power. The new constitution empowered the king as the head of
the state and granted power to dismiss the national assembly (Riaz and Basu 2010; Joshi
and Rose 1966).
By this time, the Nepali Congress Party had already abandoned their socialist
agenda and leftist principles and had embraced constitutional monarchy instead of
constitutional assembly (Maskey and Deschene 2008). In the parliamentary election, BP
Koirala secured a two-thirds majority and the communist party of Nepal22 also won 4
constituencies (Gaige 1975). Although BP Koirala became the first democratically
elected prime minister of Nepal and was popular both nationally and internationally, he

22

The Communist Party ran for 46 places out of 109 constituencies including in Kathmandu, Palpa, and
Rautahat (Tarai district) (Gaige 1975. The Rayamajhi fraction of the party later supported the king after the
Coup or King Mahendra’s direct rule. (Gaige 1975).
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was not able to carry out any of the promised and intended land and forest reforms23,
because of the opposition of national elites. Instead in 1960, King Mahendra, after his
return from his visit to Britain, dismissed the first democratically elected prime minister
citing the 1960’s border conflicts between China and India and the expansion of China in
Tibet (Riaz and Basu 2010; Joshi and Rose 1966). In 1962, King Mahendra promulgated
a new constitution, suspended parliamentary democracy and introduced a party-less
panchayat political system. In contrast to the Western form of democracy, he claimed the
system as "grassroots democracy suited to the soil” of Nepal (Jha 2014, 11). The
political system banned all political parties and political activities and granted the king
control of all executive, judicial and legislative power.
In addition, the panchayat government introduced a new constitution in 1962. The
constitution inscribed various forms of political and administrative reform, embraced
participatory development, decentralization, and mobilization of organizations for social
development. In particular, the panchayat system introduced a four-tier political structure
and institutions. The village panchayat and municipal panchayat were the lower levels
administrative institutions, followed by the district panchayat and at the top was the
national panchayat. Similar to Rana rulers, the system (re)produced patron-client
relationships between the king and local elites and administrators and between local elites
and local leaders. This royal patronage expanded rampant administrative corruption,
nepotism, and mismanagement of state resources and foreign development funds (Metz
1995; Bista 1991).

The landed class supported the king’s move to dispossess BP Koirala’s government because of Koirala’s
commitment to land reform and redistribution to tillers. He believed that “as long as land was not in the
hands of the tiller... industrial development was infeasible” (Joshi and Rose 1966, 309).
23
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In response to direct rule by the king, the Nepali Congress party along with
communist parties started to organize a political movement and small-scale armed
revolution against the king during 1960s and 1970s. For instance, communist revolt in
Jhapa (eastern Nepal) attempted to fight against landlords in 1972. King Mahendra not
only used state forces and violence to control political movements but also strategically
used foreign socioeconomic development initiatives and aids to reduce the internal
discontent of people. With the technical and financial support and pressure of bilateral
and multilateral agencies, he initiated social and economic development policies and
projects such as the land reform of 1964, the Village Development Project, the Rapti
Valley Development Project, and, more generally, spatial reorganization which expanded
state power without much benefits to local rural farmers (as discussed in another section).
In response to the growing political movements of the late 1970s24 and after the death of
King Mahendra in 1980 during a hunting trip in Chitwan, his son Birendra became king
and later proposed a referendum to decide on the future of panchayat system25. Political
parties supporting the panchayat system secured the majority vote rather than those
favoring multiparty democracy. As the political control was less stringent, the Nepali
Congress and communist parties continued to organize violent and non-violent protests
during the 1980s (Karki and Seddon 2003).

24

Political protest following the death of Bhutto's in Pakistan turned into political movement against
autocratic government in Nepal
25

After the hostile political situation in India and student-led political unrest within Nepal.
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3.2.1. Nepali Nationalism and the nation building
The panchayat government also promoted a program of cultural assimilation of
Nepal's multiethnic and heterogeneous groups into a single Hindu culture and caste
hierarchy as part of its nation-building strategy (Gellner 2007; Hangen 2007; Hachhethu
2003; Bhattachan 2012; Pfaff-Czarnecka 1997). The constitution inscribed Nepal as a
Hindu state for the first time (Hachhethu 2003). In particular, the panchayat government
under absolute monarchy extensively promoted symbols and practices drawn from Hindu
culture (Lawati 2007; Hachhethu 2003). For instance, Nepali language (which belongs to
dominant high caste hill Hindu) was not only promoted as the national language, but also
extensively and deliberately promoted in all sectors including in education, media, and
communication (Gaige 1975; Hachhethu 2003;). In addition, they promoted high caste
hill Hindu custom, dress and religion in all sectors (Hachhethu 2003). Scholars claim that
the Panchayat era slogan ‘one language, one dress, one country" (ek bhasa, ek bhesh, ek
desh) reflected the ruling elites’ effort to create cultural uniformity and Hill nationalism
(Hangen 2007; Lawati 2005).
Consequently, Bahun-Chetri groups have grabbed the majority of available
opportunities because of their structural position and high literacy. For instance, Blaikie
et al. (1980) have reported that high caste Hindus from hill groups along with the Newar
occupied 92 percent of the high official positions in the bureaucracy in 1973. Although
Khas-Arya comprised 31% of total population, they occupied two-third of all higher
positions in the judiciary, civil service, trade unions, whereas other ethnic groups were
relatively less represented (Gellner 2007). In particular, scholars reported that high caste
hill Hindus comprised the majority of leadership positions in state and non-state
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institutions including in the executive, administration, judiciary, parliament, science and
technology, and education (Gellner 2007). The presence of women of any ethnicity
remained negligible in every sector. Similarly, Nepali nationalism has been constructed
from the culture of Hill people (mid-Hill) and way of life and sustained through the
opposition with expansionist India, whereas the Tarai plain was mostly inhabited by
people with cultural ties with India, many who had migrated at an earlier historical time
and subsequently were looked at as suspect citizens more loyal to India than Nepal. As a
result, the alienation of Tarai people from political opportunities and citizenship has been
justified and ongoing in Nepal (Gaige 1975). More importantly, Dor Bahadur Bista
pointed out that the increasing expansion of high caste Hindu cultural values –a fatalistic
value and dependency that he called Bahunis—disrupted ethnic peoples' values and
culture, which not only affected societal progress but discriminated against and colonized
ethnic minority people and their ethnic values (Bista 1991).
By the1950s foreign countries and donors started to have significant influence in
the socioeconomic, cultural and political sphere in Nepal. At the beginning of the 1950s,
Nepal signed a trade and transit agreement26 with India which Bhattarai called a “semicolonial treaty" (Bhattarai 2003, 124). The treaty and successive renewal of the treaty
after every ten years produced and reproduced the semi-colonial status and economic
dependency of Nepal to India. India had a monopoly on the industrial, financial and fiscal
sectors in Nepal and maintained exploitative semi-colonial relations. Nepal’s trade deficit
with India increased after the 1950s. In addition to its open border with India which made
26

Nepal also signed a trade agreement with India in 1923 to create a common market in India and Nepal
(Bhattarai 124)
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the exact trade between the two countries difficult to determine and control, the trade
treaty also allowed Indian industries to operate in Nepal’s territory without any
restriction27. As a result, India-based companies controlled most of Nepal's industries.
India also had the power to restrict Nepal's access to international transit facilities.
Moreover, other foreign-owned multinational companies expanded their market into
Nepal through Indian companies. Explaining the incorporation of Nepal in the world
market, Bhattarai argued that “world imperialism enters Nepal riding an Indian
expansionist horse” (2003, 127).

3.2.2. Planned development, land reform
Following the overthrow of the autocratic and patrimonial Rana regime and the
reinstatement of the power of the Shah dynasty and royal families, and the change in the
global political context in the early 1950s, foreign experts' committees helped to prepare
the first systematic five-year economic development plan for Nepal. They provided the
majority of the Nepal development budget or the majority of sources of finance
dependent on foreign aid and debts. The US and Indian foreign aid to Nepal for planned
development were amongst the highest in 1956 and following years. Russia, China, the
UK, New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, the Ford Foundation and the UN started to

Indian companies gradually colonized Nepal’s domestic industries such as tea, shoes, biscuits, paper soap
and others. Indian companies also controlled raw materials, capital, and trade of garment and carpets which
flourished in Nepal after the 1980s. Similarly, in tourism, most star hotels are controlled by Indian
companies. (Bhattarai 2001, 127). India unfairly benefitted from Nepal’s natural resources such as water
resources through unfair agreements that politicians made at various times. Bhattarai claims that the 1920
Sharada Dam agreement, the 1954 Koshi agreement, the 1959 Gandiki agreement, and the 1996 integrated
Mahakali Development Project agreement and the Joint Communique of June 1990 were all part of a
project to gain the monopoly of Nepal water resources.
27
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provide foreign aid after 1959. The first five-year economic development plan for Nepal
recognized three primary limitations of the implementation of the plan; the lack of
statistical data, institutional capacity and sources of state's income. It aimed to invest 30
percent of the budget in infrastructure development and agriculture development as 85
percent population "eke out a precarious living from agriculture" (Malla 1961, 11). They
recognized the potential revenue generation from forests and planned and immediately
demarcated the28 forest land and allocated 7 percent of the budget for geological, aerial
and cadastral surveys to classify land use and facilitate the demarcation of forests and
public areas. It also emphasized the need for the development of medium-sized, cottage
and tourism industry. The plan and subsequent plans focus on economic growth or
expanding state's revenue to address Nepal's underdevelopment and poverty.
Before 1956, the government lacked adequate knowledge about the status of
existing land use, and forest resources and powerful landlords and rulers controlled most
land and forest under various land tenure system. In 1952, Regmi (1987, 19) documented
the distribution of 1,927,000 ha of cultivated land as follows; Raikar (50%), Birta
(36.3%), Guthi (2-4%), Kipat (4%) and Jagir and Rakam and others (7.7%) (1987:19).
As Rana and their rulers occupied most of the cultivatable land and forest, the post-Rana
government attempted to restructure landownership through various land reform policies.
By the end of Rana regime, rulers and elite families owned one-third of the forest, about
75 percent of which was controlled by Rana families (Blaikie 1980, 182). Thus, the
government introduced the Private Forest Nationalization Act 1957, which provided the

28

Tarai as a part of the Gangetic plain. It lies on the southern border of Nepal. It occupies about 21 percent
of land areas.
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legal basis for the nationalization of Birta land on forest and wastelands. The Act also
nationalized all forest land. That is, it removed all prior control and use of the forest
under communal arrangements. It also empowered the forest department to control all
forest land, to police it and oversee licensing. In addition, the government also abolished
the Birta system.1 The Birta Abolition Act 1958 did not formalize the ban on the sale and
mortgage of Birta land, but only introduced a new taxation system on Birta lands.
Reviewing the Birta system, Regmi argues that the Birta abolition act of 1959 was
primarily aimed to abolish Birta system and widen the land-tax base rather than land
reform.
Similar, geopolitical contexts, donor’s pressure, and internal political discontents
forced Mahendra for land reform in 1964 and compelled him to embrace administrative
reforms and development initiatives to increase state revenue and bring more land under
cultivation. The reform did not fundamentally alter the distribution of land ownership
which was originally intended, it nonetheless nationalized all collectively managed land
and forest under communal land tenure system and terminated associated customary
institutions and practices (Ghimire 1998; Shrestha 2001). For instance, 9.9 percent of
landowners continued to own 60.8 percent of total cultivated land in 1972. In 1962, 3.7
percent of the rich and feudal class used to own 39.7 percent of the land (Khanal et al.
2005, 21). These policies became the basis of the further control of all forested land
under the Ministry of Forest. In addition, the Forest Preservation (Special Arrangement)
Act of 1967 was introduced to increase the enforcement role of the Forest Department.
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3.3. Socioeconomic and political history of Nepal, 1990s
In 1990, the pro-democracy movement ended the party-less panchayat political
system and established the multi-party democratic system. Several communist parties
under a single banner (the United Left Front), the Nepali Congress and international
contexts29 played a major role in the movement. Following the restoration of multi-party
democracy, the new constitution was prepared which redefined Nepal as a “multi-ethnic,
multi-lingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu, and constitutional
monarchical kingdom" (Gellner 2007, 13). It embraced the bicameral system of
parliamentary democracy30. The constitution relegated the king’s role to constitutional
monarchy. However, it continued to uphold the power of the king as a head of the state,
the supreme commander in-chief of Nepal’s Royal Army. In addition, analyzing political
institutions after 1990 to 2002, Lawati (2007) states that "over-centralization contributed
to the abuse of power, corruption, erosion of democratic institutions, and governmental
instability" (Lawati 2007, ix). In addition, the constitution continues to define Nepal as a
Hindu kingdom and the Nepali language as the official government language (Lawati
2007; Hachhethu 2003). Nepal's governance structure and political culture that
maintained the centralizing power of hill Hindu caste males continued to perpetuate their

29

International support including the role of Indian government and politicians, Western countries and
international human rights organizations were significant. Some other important contexts that helped
instigate internal and external environment include yearlong India's trade and transit blockade to landlocked
Nepal in 1989. In response to the economic blockade, King Birendra also signed arms deal with China,
which further distanced India against the establishment (Thapa, 2011). Similarly, people were frustrated
with the scandals and open corruption of foreign aid money that was received for 1988 earthquake victims.
The economic hardship that followed prompted middle-class urban youth against the government.
30

It includes National Assembly (Rastriya Sabha) with 60 members (10 out of 60 positions are nominated
by the king) and the House of Representatives (Pratinidhi Sabha) with 205 directly elected members.
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socioeconomic and political dominance31 and the exclusion of Hindu “untouchable” caste
groups and non-Hindu ethnic groups (Lawati 2007; Bista 1991).

3.3.1. Maoist people’s war
Five years after the start of the multiparty democratic system, the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) started an armed revolution in April 1996. In the past, various
communist parties and leaders have attempted to reform or challenge the feudal or semifeudal system by participating in the election or covert communist movements. For
instance, the United People's Front, union of communist parties, which started the 1996
Maoist movement, participated in elections after 1990 and became the third largest party
with only nine out of 205 seats32. The Front, however, took the revolutionary path—the
protracted people's war—with a systematic guerrilla war plan to establish a new
democratic socio-economic system by ousting the semi-feudal and semi-colonial system
(Bhattarai 2003). According to the top leader of the Maoist party Dr. Babu Ram
Bhattarai, the people's war is the reflection of and an attempt to change the persistent
structural problems associated with the socio-economic system of Nepal33 including the

31

For instance, despite one-third of the Bahun-Chhetri population, the proportion of officer-level entry job
in government service of the group increase from 69 percent in 1984 to 83 percent in 1996. The Newar
population is 5.5 percent but occupied about 9% of the jobs. Similarly, caste and ethnic differences are
reflected in life expectancy, per capita income, literacy and HDI (Thapa 2011, 7).
32

Nepali Congress Party (NCP) and Communist Party of Nepal (UML) hold the first and second position
with 109 and 78 seats respectively
33

According to 1990s data, Nepal was the second poorest country with a poverty rate of about 70 percent
population below the absolute poverty line. About 90 percent people live in rural areas, the majority of
people are illiterate, and 81 percent of the population is based on agriculture. Food production is the lowest
in 30 years.

113

growing unequal control and distribution of land and resources34, the failure of repeated
planned development and increasing debt and foreign aid. Others also argue that the
Hindu caste hierarchy and ethnicity-based social exclusion of Janajati and
"untouchables" and discrimination and inequalities played an important role (Karki and
Seddon 2003, Thapa and Sijapati 2004). In short, the people's war was the war against the
ongoing political-economic system and the attempt to transform the system.
In 1996, the Maoist party started an armed revolution in the name of the
socioeconomic transformation of the country by establishing a federal republic. The
Front, which later become the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) submitted a 40 point
memorandum35 to the then government before the war. The Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) adopted and raised ethnic issues more forcefully than any other political party
after 1990. Their proclamation to end high caste Hindu's socioeconomic and political
dominance, establish the secular nation, and promote federal autonomous regions
appealed to many ethnic people (Lawati 2007; Karki and Seddon 2003). Such
declarations gave them more momentum to recruit ethnic and marginal populations, and
later they established ethnic liberation fronts. Other major issues that helped explain the
rapid growth and success of the Maoist insurgency included structural inequalities

34

About 50 percent of national income controlled by 10 percent of the population.

35

They wanted to establish a new democratic socio-economic system and demands were related to
nationalism (abolishment of unfair trade and transit treaty with India, control of the monopoly of foreign
investment and industries, restriction of activities of NGOs and INGOs, ), public activism (security forces
under people’s control, secular state, equal rights to women, elimination of “untouchables”, equal status of
all languages, free press, real decentralization, local right, autonomy and control over resources), and
people's livelihood (land rights of tillers, minimum wages, free medical and education, drinking water, road
and electricity and others). They also argued against privatization and liberalization policies and mentioned
that these would only serve imperialists interests (Karki and Seddon 2003).
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(poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment), economic inequality (land ownership, inclusion,
exclusion- caste and ethnic groups), and the external role of India and the excessive
brutality of the State (Bhattarai 2003; Thapa and Sijapati 2004). The force that they
achieved through ethnic communities helped them wage armed rebellion or a “people’s
war” for more than 10 years from 1996 to 2006, which killed more than 13, 347 people
(8377 killed by the state and 4970 by the Maoists), 3347 people disappeared and at least
200, 000 people were displaced (Thapa 2011, 9). They were able to control more than 70
percent of territory before they came into the peace agreement, and subsequently, they
became the significant political power after the peace process of 2006 (Thapa 2011).
Following the Royal Massacre of 2001, Ganendra became a new king. As he was
unsatisfied with parliamentary democracy and the performances of political parties, he
dismissed the Nepali Congress government led by Sher Bahadur Deuba in October 2002
on charges of incompetence, and he established a new government under popular leaders
from the panchayat era. He further reinstated Sher Bahadur Deuba as prime minister in
May 2004. In February 2005, King Gyanendra again dismissed the Deuba government,
took control over executive power, and formed a new cabinet under his chair. Although
he claimed to restore peace and solve the ongoing Maoist problem, the security situation
deteriorated. All major political parties including the Maoist party allied with the sevenparty alliance and signed the 12-point pact in New Delhi against the royal coup. Civil
society including donors, NGOs, media, professional groups and other groups such as
forest user groups not only played a critical and most influential role in the 2006 political
movement but also played a role in providing legitimacy to the Maoist party by
supporting and making alliances with the movement (Shah 2008).
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As a result, the second People's movement started on April 6 in which eighteen
people died in 19 days of the movement, and it forced the King to relinquish executive
power after 15 months on April 25, 2006. Maoists came to competitive multiparty
politics in 2006 following the success of the second People's Movement, which changed
the whole dynamic of politics in Nepal. The comprehensive peace agreement was signed
in November to end the decade-long Maoist war. Following the peace settlement, Nepal's
interim government published an interim constitution in 2007 that declared the
constituent assembly election. But the constitution was protested by most ethnic groups
including Madhesi and Janajati activities. In particular, the violent Madesh movement
emerged in the plains in 2007 demanding regional autonomy36 of ethnic Madhesi people
in Tarai and redelineation of electoral constituencies. The interim government signed at
least six agreements with Madeshi and Janajati groups after the violent and non-violent
protest ensuring groups that their demand of territorial autonomy would be included in
federal restructuring (Thapa 2011, 12). The Constituent Assembly (CA) election was held
on April 10, 2008, in which Maoists emerged as the major political force. The Maoist
party chair, Pushpa K Dahal became the prime minister, and the government formally
declared Nepal as a secular and federal republic country. They dissolved the monarchy.
He later resigned over the conflict to dismiss the Nepal Army chief. The coalition
government formed in May 2009. Since the government failed to promulgate the new
constitution in 2011 and the constitutional assembly, the government extended the CA
term for the fourth time. During this period, three new governments were formed. The

36

Madhesi people demanded all Tarai as one autonomous region. Madesh movement of 2007 and 2008,
which lasted for 21 days, and 30 people died. Maoist purposed the issue of regional autonomy during
people's war; they purposed nine identities (ethnicity-based) autonomous regions after the peace agreement.
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latest prime minister of the first Constituent Assembly called for a fresh election in
November 2012. The election relegated the Maoist party to the third position with less
power and the Nepal Congress won a majority of CA seats. Nepali Congress's Sushil
Koirala became prime minister. To address long-established ethnic grievances of ethnic
groups and their demands, the State Restructuring Committee37 of the CA and the HighLevel State Restructuring Commission submitted their report with identity-based
federalism but with different numbers of federal states in 2010 and 2012 respectively. But
the proposed identity based federal model was opposed by all major parties and leaders,
who argued that that the model would eventually lead to the disintegration of the state
and would increase ethnic conflicts (Shneiderman and Tillian 2015). In 2013, after the
dissolution of the constituent assembly in 2012 without a new constitution, a new
constitutional assembly election was conducted. The following assembly promulgated a
new constitution based on geographical federalism after the 2015 earthquake.
Consequently, ethnic and regional interest groups protested against the model of
federalism and the boundaries of federal states. In particular, Madeshi based parties and
ethnic groups have been protesting against the government over territory and devolved
rights. Around 30 people have died in the protest and conflicts.

3.3.2. Ethnic and indigenous movements
Although various ethnic organizations—in the name of Janajati (nationalities)—
were active before 1990, identity politics became prominent and more visible only after

37

The Committee's dissenting minority also proposed a six state federal model.
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Nepal's restoration of multiparty democracy and a higher international engagement
(Pfaff-Czarnecka 1997; Hangen 2007; Lawati and Hangen 2013). Ethnic demands and
issues such as a quest for social and political identity, reducing inequality and
discrimination in the sharing of resources, and increasing representation in the political
structure have been going on since then (Hachhethu 2003). The demand was taken to new
heights after the interim constitution declared that the state would embrace a federal
democratic republic model in 2008.
One of the major identity-based political demands and conflicts that are more
visible and prominent in Nepal's politics focuses on indigenous people's rights. The Nepal
Federation of Nationalities was established in 1991 to organize different ethnic
organizations. They renamed it as the Federation of Indigenous Nationalities of Nepal
(NEFIN) (Nepal Adivasi Janajati Mahasung) in 2004 with the support of foreign nongovernmental organizations. The government also established an independent
foundation—National Foundation for the Development of Indigenous Nationalities
(NFDIN)—that works as a government unit after the passage of the 2002 National
Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities Act. The act has recognized 59
groups representing 38.8 percent of Nepal's population as "adivasi janajati" (indigenous
nationalities) defined in the act as "a tribe or community as mentioned in the Schedule
having its own mother language and traditional rites and customs, distinct cultural
identity, distinct social structure and written or unwritten history." NEFIN, however,
defines indigenous nationalities or adivasi janajati as 1) first settlers prior to the
formation of Gorkha and Nepal state; 2) dominated groups with no representations in the
state organs; 3) non-Hindu caste groups; 4) those who have a language, culture, and
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religion different from the national elite; and 5) those listed by the 2002 National
Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities Act (NEFIN 2015).
Later, Nepal became a signatory to both the International Labor Organization’s
(ILO) 169 agreements and the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) in 2007 and 2009, respectively. These international agreements have provided
legal and political grounds to claim indigenous rights over ancestral territories, land, and
resources (Hangen 2007; Rai 2013). Indigenous politics in Nepal have focused on the
rights of self-determination, rights to land and resources within defined ancestral
territories, and social and political representation and recognition (Hachhethu 2003;
Lawati and Hangen 2013). These demands are intertwined with national politics. While
Maoist national politics greatly politicized ethnic differences, they raised ethnic issues
more forcefully than any other political movement after 1990 (Hangen 2007; Gellner
2007). These developments have provided a political climate favorable to the assertion of
indigenous territorial claims. As a result, indigenous movements in Nepal are actively
promoting cultural identities while rejecting the dominant culture and ideology associated
with Hindu religion (Guneratne 2002; Hangen 2007; Krauskopff 2007; Thapa 2011). A
UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples recently observed that Nepal's
conservation areas now cover most of the indigenous ancestral territories (Anaya
2009:23).
The Panchayat regime had banned political parties, and they look at any formal
non-governmental organizations with suspicion. The regime only allowed NGOs that had
an official connection and patronage with elites (Shrestha 2010). The democratic and
economic opening has provided spaces for the growth and institutionalization of diverse
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forms of national and international non-governmental organizations and donor agencies.
Although differences are enormous, these different organizations including donors,
INGOs, NGOs, media, professional groups and other groups such as forest user groups
are usually discussed under civil society. Their presence has helped and challenged
peoples, local organizations, and the state. Shah (2008) argues that their interest "centers
around a new hegemonic desire for a global economic system that sets human rights,
democracy, and free markets as its core principals" (Shah 2008, viii). He further states
that civil society in Nepal "is intrinsically linked to the political process and its
contestation over power and resources" and it has emerged as a "key node through which
global political and economic powers act and react in Nepali society" (Shah 2008, 2).
Furthermore, Shrestha (2006) argues that, in Nepal, NGOs, in particular, have a close
relation with state and political parties, and they cannot be understood independent from
the state. Likewise, their interest is more flexible, cost-effective and responsive to its
donors. Thus, donors, neoliberals or any powerful actors may use this power to fulfill
their interests.
Although Nepal started to receive foreign aid after the 1950s, after the 1990s, it
was flooded with international development agencies and foreign aid. In addition, the
nature of the agencies changed from mostly bilateral to multilateral and from grants to
soft loans (Guthman 1997). Only around 40 bilateral donors and non-governmental
organizations and 12 multilateral agencies were active in Nepal by the 1980s. Now,
NGOs, in particular, have increased from 193 in 1990 to 33,000 in 2006 (Shah 2008).
Furthermore, the amount of money provided to NGOs has also grown enormously. For
instance, the British government began to help NGO/civil society through the Enabling
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Sate Program (ESP) in 2001. Its objectives were to encourage programs related to social
and economic development in general. Among many other influences, this foreign aid
made a significant impact on a political movement that occurred after the 2006
movements. It funded several professional and identity-based national organizations and
federations including NGOs Federation, Nepal Bar association (lawyers), Federation of
Nepalese Journalists, Dalit federation and Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities
(NEFIN) (Shah 2008). This funding made them more visible and organized in the 2006
social movement. NEFIN, in particular, played a critical role in and after the 2006
movement. Their funding amounts and sources have expanded greatly and helped them to
push their agendas (Hangen 2007, 25). In addition to financial assistance, foreign
assistance in terms of recognition, visits, legitimation, and protection has become critical.
National and local government bodies who are unsatisfied with the activities of NGOs
have advised NGOs not to use terminology such as "empowerment" and "civil-society
building" in their program. Moreover, the government in 2005 has released a draft code
of conduct which suggested NGOs not to "get involved in activities that undermined
social harmony". The Code also empowered the government to dissolve NGOs (quoted in
Shrestha 2010, 208).

3.3.3. Economic liberalization
Despite decades of international support, foreign aid and a series of national
development plans around infrastructure, agriculture, health, education, and industries,
the social and economic conditions of Nepal remained unchanged (Boch-Isaacson et al.
2001; Bhattarai 2003). In response, Nepal adopted broad economic policies reform based
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on neoliberal ideas38 after 1990, which attributed Nepal’s economic stasis to the lack of
foreign exchange reserve39, marginal increase in GDP40 and the rise in total government
expenditure41 and subsequent deficit in the balance of payment. Although Nepal’s
development expenditure was heavily funded by foreign aid (up to 40 percent), these
macroeconomic situations led to a drastic reduction in total development expenditure
during this period42. Scholars argue that these conditions were primarily related to the
socioeconomic and political status of Nepal (Sharma 201643). That is, Nepal has a
centralized political and administrative structure (Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001). It continued
to uphold its feudal structure because of the lack of political commitment to embrace land
reform. This failure to initiate agrarian reform limited Nepal's opportunity to increase
economic benefits from labor and agriculture sectors (Bhattarai 2003). Moreover, the
finance minister of the panchayat government, Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani, advocated
for neoliberal economic reform since 1984 (Sharma 2016). International contexts such as
the trade and transit problems, special trade treaties and open borders and dependency
with India created an economic crisis in Nepal (Blaikie et al. 1980; Bhattarai 2003). More

38

This idea reflects the virtue of free market, private property (individual or community), personal freedom,
liberty and voluntary participation as opposed to greater and coercive government, central planning, and
welfare programs.
39

Rs 675 million in 1983

40

8.1 percent to 8.4 percent

41

total expenditure increased from 14.9 percent of GDP in 1980 to 20.7 percent in 1983

42

38.7 percent in 1980/81 to 17 percent in 1982/83

Uneasy Questions – a speech by Dr. Pitamber Sharama in Literature Festival in Pokhara. Published in
Setopati Daily. Accessed on February 16, 2016
43
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importantly, wider acceptance of neoliberal economic policies and ideologies directly
influenced economic reforms and policies in Nepal after the mid-1980s.
These internal crises and external contexts prompted the government to negotiate
for an economic stabilization program with the IMF in 1985 (Khanal et al. 2005, 39).
Nepal implemented a structural adjustment program with loan support of the IMF/World
Bank in 1986/87. This imposed various conditionalities for national policies and
institutional reforms. As a response, Nepal implemented various reforms including the
devaluation of currency, deregulation in trade and emphasis on tax rationalization,
reduction of government expenditure, liberalization in industrial licensing, export
promotion and privatizing enterprises (basically both micro and macro level policy and
institutional reform, creating an enabling environment for private sectors) (Khanal et al.
2005). These policy reforms focused on macroeconomic restructuring, public enterprises,
agriculture and forestry, industry and trade and development administration (BochIsaacson et al. 2001).
After the 1990 political movement and restoration of multiparty democracy in
1990, Nepal embraced another round of economic liberalization and market-oriented
economic reforms in the 1990s through the Bretton Wood Institutions Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) (Khanal et al. 2005, 46). These policy reforms
were reflected in Nepal's eight-year development plan and later plans. Besides, despite
previous policy reforms "donors noted persistent project implementation problems, partly
resulting from Nepal's rigid economic policy framework" (Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001,
307). This period is marked by donors’ influence to comply with ESAF conditions and
efforts to synchronize national economic policies with neighbor India. India's market-
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oriented economic reform in the 1990s compelled Nepal to embrace similar economic
liberalization policies as Nepal shares an open border and close economic ties with India
(Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001). The ESAF put more emphasis on macroeconomic reform
and sustainable economic growth and development. Subsequently, government
introduced deregulation of trade and of industrial, monetary, financial and fiscal policies
and the agricultural sector. New policies were introduced to attract private and foreign
investment. Likewise, privatization of public enterprises and tax and tariff structure
reform were carried out. The government also introduced other programs such as
infrastructure development and reform of human resources. For example, the World Bank
conditionalities specifically required Nepal to focus on agriculture, forestry, and natural
resources management among other sectors. In particular, it also had a specification to
include "legal and administrative steps to establish an effective community forest
management system" to benefit farmers and maintain forests (Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001,
316).
Although macroeconomic reforms were given priority after the mid-1980s, Nepal
continued to support basic needs programs included in the sixth five-year plan (1980-85)
but with the input of diverse actors and different mechanisms. In particular,
macroeconomic reforms emphasize regional development through decentralization of
development processes from top-down to bottom-up planning and participation of people
in the implementation of projects. Kathmandu centered planning in districts and villages
in general. Two primary policy documents prepared after the reform inscribed the
neoliberal policies around forestry and nature conservation. With the support of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) and FINNIDA (Finnish International Development Agency),
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the government prepared the Forestry Master Plan (1989) that has the provision of the
decentralization of power to user groups and the involvement of private sectors.
Similarly, policy reforms emphasized private and voluntary institutions rather than
government agencies to promote employment generation and rural development.
In the foreword of the Nepal Conservation Strategy (NCS) 1988, which was
prepared by HMG and IUCN with the grant support of USAID and the Canadian Aid
agency, then prime minister Marich Man Singh Shrestha expresses his pleasure that NCS
“has been careful to develop" a conservation agenda "that addresses the needs of the
people and aims to link conservation with development" (HMG/IUCN 1988, xi). The
document recognized the importance of water, land, and forest to achieve development
objectives of Nepal in general and to provide "basic needs" of the people in particular.
More importantly, it further emphasized the role of local, national and international actors
including the private sector, donors, and nongovernmental organizations. The private
sector was encouraged in the protection and management of forest through forest
enterprises and industries. It also mentioned that "to improve forest land productivity,
more of the responsibility for forest management and the production of forest crops will
be transferred to the private sector through leasehold agreements and other agreements
with user groups at the ward level" (HMG/IUCN 1988, 108). Besides, it recognized that
"user groups, provided with necessary support, can be among the most effective
implementers as well as direct beneficiaries of the National Conservation Strategy for
Nepal" (HMG/IUCN 1988, xix).
After the mid-1980s, some policies and projects that reflect neoliberal ideas were
introduced and implemented. For instance, KMTNC, a national NGO which was formed
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under the protection of palace and royal patronage, launched the Annapurna Conservation
Area Project in 1986 in the Himalayans area. Similarly, in 1988 the participatory Makalu
Barun Conservation Area and the National Park was established with the financial
support of the Global Environmental Facility and under the management of DNPWC and
the Woodlands Mountain Institute, a US-based NGO. Likewise, the National Parks and
Wildlife Conservation Act of 1973 was amended on several occasions to promote private
sector tourism inside the National Park, to accommodate and permit NGOs in nature
conservation and to introduce a participatory conservation approach in biodiversity
conservation after the mid-1980s (Sharma and Wells 1998; DNPWC 1973).
Another sector that received more attention after the 1990s is tourism
development for economic growth. Although tourism has always received attention in
national development plans, tourism promotion as a site to expand foreign currency
earnings and economic development became a priority after the 1990s (Sharma and Wells
1998). Tourism is one of the major sectors of foreign exchange earnings, and it has
contributed to 18.5 percent of the earning in 1985. In 1987/88 unofficial foreign
exchange earnings were around US $ 113 million (Sharma and Wells 1998)44. By 1996,
its contribution was 18 percent of total foreign exchange earnings (US $ 117 million) and
3.8 percent of the country’s GDP (Nepal 2000). As a result, the Eighth five-year plan
(1992-1997) has greatly emphasized tourism development. More importantly, the
Tourism Policy of 1995 emphasized monetary and financial incentives to encourage the
private sector and foreign investments in tourism including infrastructure development

44

Official foreign exchange earnings from tourism was US $ 76 million in FY 1987/88

126

such as hotels, resorts, and domestic air services. Hotels and resorts were included in the
category of industries to facilitate growth and benefit from industrial economic policies
(SAWTEE and AAN). For instance, The Industrial Enterprises Act of 1992 and the
Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act of 1992 were enacted to promote
private sector investment. These Acts included provisions of no license except in defense,
health, and environment, provisions of repatriation of foreign investment and created a
conducive environment for easy foreign investment. Furthermore, the Ninth five-year
plan (1997-2002) extensively promoted the private sector and also dissolved the statecontrolled Tourism Department and established the Nepal Tourism Board—a semigovernment body—to encourage private-public sector partnership (SAWTEE and
AAN45).
Donors' projects reflect not only their foreign policy interests and their idea of
development, but also their strategic interests. For instance, in addition to Nepal's serious
poverty, USAID's interest in Nepal was largely shaped by cold war diplomacy and
Nepal's strategic location between India and China, relevant to the security of South Asia
(Khadka 2000). Although US foreign policy to subdue growing communist influence was
always a priority in Nepal (Bista 1991; Khadka 2000), interests and priorities of USAID's
projects that were initiated in Nepal after the 1980s were largely influenced by neoliberal
political, economic policies and ideologies (Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001). A few of
USAID's projects are discussed below because USAID is the first major and the most
experienced and influential bilateral donors' agency to Nepal. US policy objectives
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developed after the 1980s as listed in the "Blueprint for Development" prioritized private
sector and voluntary institutions through decentralization in development processes to
achieve local development as they were considered more efficient than the public sector
(Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001, 229). In particular, USAID initiated long-term "integrated
development projects" to address "linked problems." It encouraged local participation,
community-based management, institutional development and training and the promotion
of national and international private and voluntary organization (Skerry et al. 1991, 263).
For instance, USAID Rapti Zone Rural Area Development project (RDP) Phase I
began in 1980 for five years in Nepal. The project aimed to complement the
government’s "basic needs" plan. Its priority sectors included food and agriculture, rural
development and rural works, forestry and natural resource management, employment
and skill development, and institutional development. Rural works in particular focused
on community-owned Panchayat forests to develop plant fodder and fuelwood species,
establishing nurseries and promoting community forestry. The sectoral focus changed
following the coordination problem in the large-scale integrated project and following the
shift in focus of the Reagan administration in 1983. The revised integrated development
project focuses on "resource conservation, household production systems, private sector
incentives, devolution of power and responsibilities to district and panchayats and family
planning" (Skerry et al. 1991, 297). The project led to the initiation of a community
forestry program in the Rapti region in mid-western Nepal and the promulgation of the
Decentralization Act, 1984. Phase II of the project began in 1987 for eight years. The
project objective was "to increase household income and well-being through increased
productivity and improved sustainable management of farm and forest resource systems."
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It promoted participation of government line agencies, local farmer's organizations and
private sectors (Skerry et al. 1991, 301). The project evaluation recommended an
increasing focus on building capacity of local forest users group, establishing and
expanding nurseries and strengthening government department's capacity. It also
encouraged establishing local and small private enterprises in agriculture and forestry
activities.
As a part of an integrated project, USAID funded WWF-Nepal “to supervise core
staff of the Annapurna Conservation Area Project in techniques of protected area
management, financial control, and program administration; and to create a permanent
international conservation, training and research institute primarily focused on Chitwan
National Park" (Skerry et al. 1991, 272). This helped King Mahendra’s Trust for Nature
Conservation (KMTNC) (now National Trust for Nature Conservation) to initiate the first
experimental community-based plantation project in the Bagmara community forest in
1989, which later became part of the Bagmara buffer zone community forest in Bacchauli
VDC after the establishment of a buffer zone in 1996.
After the1990s USAID focused on four new initiatives around “Democracy,
Business, Family and Environment" with major goals to strengthen competitive markets
with minimum government, child survival and family planning services, supporting
private groups and users to manage renewable natural resources, expanding market
opportunities around agriculture, and increasing the role of non-governmental
organizations. In agriculture, "the focus was on democratization, decentralization, local
control of resources, and strengthening the private sector" (Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001,
314). Likewise, USAID, supported the implementation of the Forestry Sector Master plan
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through forestry development projects from 1990 to 1995. It primarily focuses on
strengthening the capacity of government lines agencies, user groups, and private firms
by providing training to manage and conserve natural resources. It also encourages local
production of forest resources, supports research in community resource conservation,
and helps user groups in resource management in and around the national park including
Chitwan National park.

3.4. Conclusion
The policy reforms and donors’ projects did not address the problem of fiscal
deficit and deficit in the balance of payment. Moreover, the policy and projects did not
contribute to economic growth, nor to changes in the feudal agrarian structure of Nepal,
but it provided more opportunity for the few in the privileged class, affected efficiency,
competitiveness, and performance of the economy and perpetuated a culture of
dependency (Khanal et al. 2005, 26; Bista 1991). In particular, it failed to incorporate and
address structural inequalities and institutional problems (highly centralized government
administration and centralized and hierarchical political culture) associated with Nepali
society (Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001; Khanal et al. 2005). Besides, the RCUP project
evaluation reported that "contrary to ‘bottom-up' rhetoric, both USAID and HMG had
identified all of the ‘lead Panchayat' [local conservation councils] before implementation"
and they have no authority in project planning (Boch-Isaacson et al. 2001, 312).
Ultimately, the projects considered interventions as only technical with the design and
implementing team including mostly technicians.
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Chapter Four: The Production of Royal Chitwan National Park

This chapter describes the production of state and non-state spaces and authorities
through nature conservation and development initiatives in Nepal. It is simultaneously the
examination of the disintegration of rural indigenous people lives, livelihood and spaces.
I discuss how material-discursive practices and processes shape and are shaped by the
strict national park in Nepal. In particular, the chapter traces the ways spatial and
representational practices have played a key role in the production of Royal Chitwan
National Park (RCNP)46. The chapter also discusses how these practices have helped in
the establishment of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation as a
powerful state authority that controls the vast territory of Nepal. The chapter highlights
the articulation of diverse discourses and political-economic interests in shaping lives and
livelihood, landscape and identities of people and place. The first section describes royal
hunting practices and their relationship to the production of the RCNP and colonial
subjects. Here I focus primarily on the pre-1950 period. The second section discusses the
history and origin of the RCNP with the focus on cold war development practices. I show
how images and representation of places produce Nepal as an underdeveloped country
and how it concurrently produced a space for further foreign interventions. In the third
section, I present the production of the RCNP in Nepal. The period is from 1960-1980.
The institutionalization of RCNP and subsequent conservation practices such as

As the name suggests the Royal of Nepal has all power to name and control areas. “Royal” in all naming
was removed after the abolishment of the monarchy in 2008. I will continue to use RCNP for this chapter
46
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landscape-scale level conservation and community-based conservation will be discussed
in a following chapter.

Figure 4.3- Chitwan National Park of Nepal with research site in red color. (Map by
Yogesh Dongol)
4.1. Royal hunting, royal encounters, hunting reserves
The wildlife hunting practices of the British-colonial rulers of India and the Rana
rulers in the Chitwan valley shaped the nature conservation history of Nepal. Before the
Rana regime, there is less evidence and reporting of Shah Rulers’ practices of hunting of
big wild animals for recreation purposes. However, rulers and elites used to catch big
wild animals such as elephants for transportation and trade in Nepal and India. For
instance, in 1851 alone, about “200 elephants were captured and exported” and the state
generated significant income from elephant sales. The export of elephants gradually
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decreased by the end of the 19th century, and exports were restricted by the needs of
rulers (Regmi 1988, 185). In addition to the extraction of benefits from land and labor,
rulers and ruling elites had always emphasized the removal of high-value timber to
increase the state's revenue. Some scholars have also documented that rulers extracted
high-value hardwood Sal trees from the Tarai forest and converted the forest into
agriculture land in Tarai belts bordering India. Rulers exported hardwood timber such as
Sal to British India for the construction of railway ties/sleepers. Despite the massive
exploitation of timber and wild animals and conversion of forest for agricultural
expansion from the entire stretch of Nepal's Tarai by the 1950s, the inner-Tarai47 forest of
the Chitwan Valley was intact (Smythies 1942). Some argue that the rulers protected the
valley from exploitation to defend against invasion from their southern neighbors. The
argument is untenable given that the entire stretch of Nepal's territories was indirectly
under the control of British-India. That is, the Chitwan Valley as a defense to British
rulers is hard to defend. Also, Oldfield (1884) and others claim that the valley was
extensively cultivated and later abandoned, resulting in the growth of dense grassland and
forest (Oldfield 1880 on MullerBoker 2000, 34). Given the existing population of Tharu
indigenous people and the malarial environment, that argument is also hard to defend.
The Chitwan Valley, however, is the home of Tharu indigenous people, who practiced
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Nepal is generally divided into different physiological and geographical zones. Tarai is the plain areas of
Nepal which occupies 15 percent of land and it borders with northern India. Most Tarai land shares an
“open” border with India. Inner Tarai is the valley between the Siwalik hills which are also called Dun. The
Chiwan Valley extend to 100 km East-West and 40 km North South and the Rapti River bisects the valley
and drain into the Rapti River (Gurung 1980). The Valley is in the inner Tarai belt which has Mahabharat
range in the north, Siwalik hills in the south and Narayani river in the west. Climate of the valley is warm
and humid and it is at the 190 m altitude. It has alluvial soil and mostly gets rainfall in monsoon season. It
has different type of vegetation (e.g. Sal forest, riverine forest). In the past, it was called a Kalapani – a
Death Valley because of the prevalence of malaria (Gurung 1980).

133

shifting cultivation. More importantly, many argue that Rana rulers (before 1950) and
Shah rulers (after 1950) strictly protected the valley as a private hunting ground. The
latter argument is convincing because Jung Bahadur Rana, for instance, used to maintain
700 tame elephants dispersed in 32 stables for hunting purposes (WWF 2003). He had
also kept 120 special force of Sikaris (professional hunters). The Sikaris' duties were to
find fresh tiger tracks and to bait tigers with goats and buffalo calves to facilitate royal
hunting.

4.1.1. Rana hunting practices
Rana rulers' inclination in wildlife hunting, however, started only after their
increasing participation and engagement in big wildlife hunting while accompanying
British-Indian hunting parties in the Chitwan Valley. Many scholars have reported that
Rana rulers and foreign dignitaries practiced massive hunting of rhinoceroses, tigers, and
elephants until the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1950 (Smythies 1942; Gurung 1983).
For instance, in 1850, Jung Bahadur Rana killed 30 tigers in a single hunt. Another
account documented that during his regime, Jung B Rana killed over 550 tigers (Smythies
1942). Jung Bahadur Rana frequently invited foreign dignitaries for hunting in Chitwan
Valley in particular. Budathoki (2012) documented that British royals killed 218 tigers,
84 rhinoceroses, 63 leopards and 33 bears on five different occasions between 1876 and
1938. In 1911, King George V of Great Britain employed 600 tamed elephants and killed
39 tigers, 18 rhinoceroses, and other animals in an eleven-day hunting party around the
Chitwan valley (Gurung 1983). Similarly, the Viceroy of India killed 120 tigers, 38
rhinoceroses, 17 leopards and other animals in 1938 (Gurung 1983). Likewise, prime
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minister Judda Shamsher Rana killed 433 tigers in the seven-year period between 1933
and 1940 (Nepali Times, April 201648).
Since hunting was necessary for the consolidation of power and resources, rulers
had protected big wild animals from locals through various strategies. Although Hindu
rulers had considered elephants as the incarnation of "Lord Ganesh," they extensively
used elephants for transportation and trade. Elephants were important sources of state
revenue, and thus rulers had used religious representation as the major mechanism to
control elephants from local people. The elephant habitat was also represented as an
"elephant forest" and protected from rural people (cited in Budathoki 2012, 1). Moreover,
in 1864, Jung Bahadur Rana (JBR), through the State laws of 1864, had imposed various
fines and punishments including a 1000 NRs fine and three years of jail term (Regmi
1988). The death penalty was the punishment for the killing or poaching of rhinoceroses
(Adhikari 2002), but royals, their families and royal dignitaries could kill rhinoceroses for
"sports hunting" (Starcey 1957). Besides, during the regime, rulers had imposed six
months' imprisonment to anyone who intruded into forests with the intention of hunting
wild animals for monetary gain. (Budathoki 2012, 69). Rana rulers had also established a
hunting management office in the royal palace and employed hundreds of rhino guards
(Gaida Gasti). As the name suggests, rulers recruited the guards for the protection of
rhinoceroses and the management of hunting practices.
Jung Bahadur Rana, the first Rana prime minister, strictly protected rhinos and
tigers as "royal game animals" in the Chitwan Valley (Mishra 2007; Spillett and Tamang
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Nepali Times. http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/editorial/politics-threatens-to-undo-achievements-inconservation-nepal,2952 Nepali Times. Accessed on June 9, 2018
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1966). The protection of "royal game animals," however, was not based on a fixed
territorial boundary. The private hunting ground of Rana rulers was not the same as the
"hunting reserve" or "wildlife reserves" as they are commonly understood in the modern
classification of protected areas. Until the 1950s, there was no existence of protection of
wild animals in a legally protected and fixed territorial wilderness space. Therefore, the
representation and classification of wild animals and nature was the primary mechanism
of control from local exploitation. That is, the controlling mechanism was primarily by
making a claim or establishing a claim over nature or resources so that it reflects nature
as the private property of royals or rulers such as royal forest, royal animal or religious
forest. A Tharu respondent from the Chitwan informed me that Jung Bahadur Rana had
maintained ritualized friendship ties (mit launi) with a giant high-value Sal tree to protect
it from local exploitation inside the current CNP areas.
The hunting of "royal game animals" such as tigers (Panthera tigris) and
rhinoceroses (Rhinoceros unicornis) in the remaining Chitwan Valley served many
purposes for rulers. That is, royal hunting parties played a significant role in asserting the
control of the state's frontier space and people through elaborate hunting practices and
performances. The yearly royal hunting parties were also the time of consolidating and
extending power, authority and dominance in frontier spaces and people through
elaborate practices, performances and encounters (Subedi 2013; Bhatt 2003). Moreover,
the Rana regime used hunting not only to maintain power relations and legitimacy vis-avis British colonial power, but also the hunting parties had helped British-Indian rulers to
indirectly control India's frontier land with greater efficiency and with less economic
burden. The Rana used to take the royals hunting as an opportunity to please and to make
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bonds with British rulers. They used to invite royalty from Britain and Europe and
foreign dignitaries to take part in royal hunting. British rulers used this to extend indirect
control over Nepal's territory.
At the same time, the rulers’ hunting practices were also related to the production
of colonial subjects and social hierarchy or order. Smythies (1942) represented Nepal's
rulers’ hunting method or practices--the ring method of tiger shooting—as supremely
efficient but emphatically "nerve-racking," compared to British big game hunting
practices which were conducted "neatly and quickly without undue fuss or danger"
(Smythies 1942, V). British colonial rulers had also maintained the big game wildlife and
habitat through particular representation in colonial writings. E.A. Smythies in 1942, who
accompanied royal hunting, noted Chitwan as "the famous big-game reserve of Nepal,
and one of the most beautiful places in the world. Chitwan! An area of mystery and
romance, known by repute to many white men, but seen by so few" (Smythies 1942, 80).
Furthermore, E.A. Smythies visited Chitwan during the Second World War (1941- 1945)
and described the valley as "a sportsman paradise, with uncounted numbers of rhinoceros
and other big game, and comparatively unspoiled habitat" (Gee 1959, 61). He further
rationalized hunting by representing the big game animals as wild “beasts” and by
representing tiger, for instance, as they "did much damage to village cattle" (Smythies
1942, 45).

4.1.2. Consequences of hunting
The consequence of this massive hunting was that big game animals were
decimated. Some have reported that most of the forested areas were lost from the eastern
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and the central Tarai by the early 19th century (Oldfield 1981). For instance, the resident
wild elephant population of Nepal disappeared entirely from the Tarai forest, which was
one of the significant sources of revenue during the pre-1950 period. Rulers exploited
Chitwan resources through land reclamation for agriculture expansion and timber
extraction, and wildlife resources were heavily used to meet their growing military
demand. The early decimation of rhino and tiger populations from the region is also
associated with the royal hunting of the period. In 1923, Colonel J. C. Faunthorpe and
Mr. Aurther S. Vernay traveled to Nepal to collect rhinos and tigers for taxidermy for the
American Museum of Natural History. They noted the decline of big wild animals. They
reported that "In the Morang District of the Nepal Tarai this rhinoceros was plentiful not
many years ago, but now not a single specimen is...to be found within two hundred
miles" (Faunthorpe 1924,179). Therefore, they traveled to the Chitwan valley to collect
rhinos and tiger specimens. They described the valley as the only remaining wildlife
habitat.
Scholars frequently downplayed the impact of the royal hunting parties on rhino
and tiger populations with the justification that the hunting was not very frequent
(Gurung 1983; Budathoki 2012; Mishra 2007, 2009). Citing Oldfield’s 1880 accounts,
Dinerstein (2003) argues that the royal hunting was "benign" because at that time
Chitwan valley had a large wildlife population, high "reproductive rates" of tigers, and
rotational hunting of tigers in large areas. Moreover, hunting was only done by royals and
not allowed for others, with the death penalty as punishment for the poaching of rhinos,
considered as royal animals. He further writes that large hunting was "rare" (Dinesterin
2007, 54). Furthermore, Smythies (1942) noted that the tiger population was safeguarded
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for several reasons; first, because tiger habitats are huge, stretching from the hills for 550
miles, second, the ring method is inefficient in hills which allows tigers to escape, and
third, the hunting of tiger, rhino or buffalo were allowed only with the royal's special
permission. Similarly, others justified hunting because the excessive tiger population "did
much damage to village cattle" (Smythies 1942, 45).
These royal hunting practices and representation of wild animals and place are
related in part to the construction of Rana authority and sustenance of the Rana regime
for 104 years in Nepal. The hunting practices as a political strategy to consolidate power
did not stop after the fall of the Rana regime in 1950. Shah rulers, their families, and later
conservationists emulated the wildlife hunting strategy as a political strategy. King
Tribhuvan in 1961 invited Queen Elizabeth for a royal hunt in Chitwan National Park.
Nepali royals welcomed the Queen and dignitaries with elaborate preparation and
performances. That is, it served the purpose of consolidating power and asserting control
over frontier land and people. For instance, Bhatt describes how government officials’
encounters with Shah rulers during hunting events shaped bureaucratic subjectivities and
constructed royal subjects (Bhatt 2003). Also, royal hunting was the event by which
common people in the frontier understood royal power and the state's presence (Bhatt
2003). The hunting practices of the Shah rulers after the 1950s, however, were later
rationalized as "benign," "un-exploitative, or "cultural". For instance, Mishra represented
the rhinoceros as "a talisman, an enigmatic creature suffused with magical force. Ugly yet
enchanting. Massive yet delicate. Terrifying yet tame. Holy and revered for its mystical
powers, yet a destroyer of farmlands." (Mishra 2007, 11). Similarly, the tiger was
represented as "noble and gentle savagery. Gracious and dignified, yet wild and
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bloodthirsty. A calm and composed cat and yet a dangerous and cruel carnivore “(Mishra
2009, 5). His representation of rhinoceros and tigers as good and bad allowed him to kill
a rhino, for example, for a "holy ceremony" of royals such as the Tarpan ceremony in the
service of a king (Mishra 2007, 243). He justified the Tarpan ceremony of king Birendra
by representing the ceremony "for peace and prosperity in the Himalayan Kingdom of
Nepal (Mishra 2007, 205). Similarly, such representation at the same time helped to
strictly protect wild animals to fulfill the elites and foreign interests.
More importantly, the practices of hunting big wild animals took a different form
and carried different meaning after the 1970s. After the 1970s, conservationists used the
same hunting methods to dart big wild animals to fit radio collars to study wild animal's
natural history, to translocate in other places including in other national parks and in
foreign zoos, to appease the ritual desire of shah rulers, and to kill "problem animals"
such as a "man-eating tiger". The impact of these practices are the construction of new
authorities and identities of people and place. These topics are discussed while presenting
the history of CNP’s establishment in the next section.

4.2. The origins of the Royal Chitwan National Park
More engagements with foreign countries started after the overthrow of the Rana
regime in 1950. Although this increase in bilateral and multilateral foreign aid and
technical assistance for social and economic development was primarily guided by the
logic of cold war diplomacy (Khadka 1992), foreign interests and practices in Nepal
produced new ways of understanding self, society, and nature among Nepali people. This
section discusses the origin of the Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal. My aim in this
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section is to trace diverse conservation and development practices and discourses that led
to the establishment of a territorially based strict nature conservation space, RCNP. In
particular, I critically examined the ways nature, society and their relationships are
represented – that is, the production of the truth of people, nature, and practices. In
particular, the chapter traces the ways space, representation, and power relations play a
role in the production of Chitwan National Park. It further discusses how discourse
related with the protection and conservation of forest and wildlife constructed authority.
The chapter highlights the articulation of diverse interests and political economic
contexts in shaping lives and livelihood, landscape, and identities of people and place. In
the first section, I discuss the production of the ‘American Valley,” social order, and the
underdeveloped subject. I examine the ways the development interventions represented
Nepal, Nepali people and spaces, and how it produced the conditions ripe for
conservation interventions.

4.2.1. Development discourses and the making of the "American Valley."
After four years of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Nepal, the
American-styled development experiment in Nepal started in 1951. The US government
provided the first symbolic foreign aid under the Point Four agreement for mineral
exploration and survey along the Himalaya (Skerry et al. 1991; Gurung 1970, 262).
Although the population census of Nepal started in the Rana period, the systematic record
keeping of the population of Nepal started only after the establishment of the Department
of Statistics in 1950 with the support of the United States. Before the census, the UN and
the Government of India provided census training to Nepali personnel in 1949, and later a
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UN expert also helped in statistical analysis. The first "modern and complete census" was
conducted in two phases: the first one started in 1952 and the second was started and
completed in 1954 (NOS 1954). The information was collected from different "zones"
and "blocks" from each district to facilitate population census. Districts maps were used
to delineate each census block and information of an individual name, age, caste
affiliation, religious affiliation, gender, language, literacy, occupation, and others social
data were collected from each household (DOS 1954). Moreover, by the land surveys of
India and Pakistan conducted in 1914-1926 and 1945, the US Army Corps of Engineers,
also published a land-use classification maps of Nepal in 1955.
Many United States Operation Mission (USOM) publications also represented
Nepal as a "long-isolated", and "blank slate" without a socioeconomic and political
history of colonialism and thus a suitable space for an economic development experiment
(Skerry et al. 1991, 36; Blowers 1973). The census, in particular, discovered the rapid
growth of population between 1941 and 1954. It noted that more than ninety percent of
the population depends on subsistence agriculture. It also stated that about ten percent of
the land areas of Nepal was under cultivation, two third of the cultivated land belonged to
big landowners, and landless peasants and tenants farmed most of the land (NOS 1954).
Moreover, USOM publications represented most of the mountainous region as steep and
"fragile" with a "high population density" and as unsuitable for extensive farming. In
contrast, Tarai plains were represented as the only suitable areas for extensive farming
(e.g., Bowers 1953; USOM/Nepal 1961; Pant 1956, 11). This classification of Nepal
territories into different longitudinal zones and binary representations of Tarai valley and
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people in contrast to the mountainous hills rationalized the development interventions
carried out in the Tarai plains after the 1950s.
After 1952, the US, in particular, started to provide major foreign aid and
technical support under the project called the "Village Development Project," which was
also known as "Tribhuvan Village Development programme" in Nepali publications.
Through USOM initiatives, the US provided foreign aid and technical assistance to help
Nepali people to "progress," "modernize" and to "break the bonds of mass misery" and
improve a standard of living (USOM/Nepal 1961). In 1954, the US funded the first major
foreign development intervention. After individual aids and projects, the USOM began
the Rapti Valley Multi-Purpose Development Project (RDVP) in Chitwan Valley in 1956.
A leading Nepali member who was involved in the development of the first five-year
plant (1956-1960) describes the overall project as "the model project" to show how Nepal
needed to do economic development (Pant 1956). The project expected to establish “the
American Valley” in the Rapti valley of Chitwan (US Dept. of State 1961, 20; Rubin
1964, 226). More specifically, the USOM Nepal project director in the foreword of a
review publication describes the purpose of the project was to tackle common problems
such as "disease, poverty, and ignorance" of the Nepali people and to improve the
standard of living. That followed USOM initiatives to "help them to help themselves”
and “to break the bonds of mass misery"49 (USOM/Nepal 1961). The modernization and
development project included programs such as malaria eradication, road construction,
resettlement, land distribution, agriculture expansion, industrial development, forestry,
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Excerpt from the inaugural address of President J F Kennedy of January 20, 1961 (USOM/Nepal 1921
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and others (USAID 1961; Mishra 2007). As claimed by many scholars, it was indeed the
fight between the US, Russia, and China to control non-aligned nations through the tactic
of development. When the US-sponsored Village Development Project and the model
RVDP project were going on in the Chitwan Valley after mid-1950s, Russia was helping
Nepal in building a hydroelectric power station, and China was surveying a road through
the Chitwan area (Rubin 1964, 226).
In particular, the first program started in the valley was the Malaria Eradication
Program in 1952 until 1961. It involved training Nepali men to spray DDT powder
(Dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethene), map preparation and spatial classification of Tarai
region, spraying in all places including inside houses, barns, huts, water bodies and
marking homes. In 1959 alone, the team sprayed DDT in more than 420,203 houses.
Moreover, the post-Rana government with the support of USOM also started initial
resettlement of people from the hills to Chitwan’s Rapti Valley. The project included the
resettlement50 of landless and flood-affected hill population for the expansion of
cultivation (Shrestha 2001, 202). The RVDP project aimed to contribute to local and
national economic development through the cultivation of food and cash crops in the
Tarai plains, and restore "the natural ecological balance of the Himalaya sub-mountain
region." The project also attempted to reduce "population pressure" in the hills through
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The development initiatives were primarily guided by the cold war diplomacy (detailed in Chapter 3).
They aimed to relocate flood and landslide affected landless population from the hills to the Tarai and
enhanced more labor power to bring more land under cultivation (Shrestha 2002, 202). Some argue that
King Mahendra deliberately promoted the clearance of forest in the southern border of Chitwan (Thori area
bordering northern India) and the resettled hill populations for national security purposes. As northern
Indian population was rapidly growing in the Tarai region, due to the eradication of malaria, and as the
result of an open border, King Mahendra, who was hugely nationalist, initiated hill migration to promote
Hill centered Nepali national identity.
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resettlement in the Tarai and to reduce forest degrading practices such as shifting
cultivation in the "fragile" mountains (Pant 1956, 11). It opened up 1200 square miles of
fertile land, and 50,000 people were resettled in the valley. The USOM also selected the
Rapti valley because of its geographic location as the agricultural and industrial products
from the valley could be easily exported to the Indian market because of its proximity to
Indian borders (USAID 1961). They provided eight acres of land to each household and
established eleven schools (US Dept. of State 1961). RDVP worked through government
committees or offices that had the power to allocate and regulate land distribution.
Although initially intended to distribute land to landless and flood victims of 1954, "the
RVDP's handling of land allocation was marked by rampant malfeasance, nepotism, and
patronage" (Kansakar 1985,114 in Shrestha 2002, 205).
Moreover, the project helped to form a Village Development Council in each
village. The panchayat or the "nine-man" council functioned as the intermediary between
the people and the project team and also functioned as a self-help group in which people
participated in projects relevant to daily life including the construction and maintenance
of water canals, wells, irrigation, etc. (UoM 1970, 9551). The project helped to establish
more than 3400 village councils in Tarai and social and economic development such as
road construction and sawmill establishment (Shrestha 2001, 202; Mishra 2007).
Following a project to eradicate malaria, the US helped to open up a 56 mile, two lane
gravel road connecting Kathmandu valley.
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4.2.2. Construction of underdevelopment and subjectivity
Development practices and representations established Nepal as a "backward,"
"primitive" and "under-developed" country without any modern technology and
infrastructure in comparison to a modern and developing country such as the United
States. The binary representation of people, place, and practices as shown in the USOM
publications (above figures) not only established the modern world order based on ideas
of modernity and progress, but also these development initiatives imparted the specific
idea of development and progress or what it means to be a developed or modern country
and a modern people. These established what Escobar (1994) called the effect of
development as a discourse which has the power to produce space, in this case, the space
of an under-developed third world country and along with that, a development
subjectivity. The most important consequences of the idea of development is the way it
has ingrained itself into Nepali people's imagination and the way that development or
Bikas has become the social organizing force of heterogeneous Nepali society (Pigg
1993).
Following the eradication of malaria from the Tarai region and the spread of the
news of available land in the plains, many hill populations started to migrate and legally
or illegally settle in Chitwan and neighboring districts. Besides, a large number of people
from bordering India also migrated in the Tarai region. Kansakar recorded high
migrations of hill populations with an annual average population growth rate equal to six
percent between 1954- 1961. The valley population increased from 36,000 in 1950 to
100,000 at the beginning of 1960. Gee (1959) reported that by 1959, the RVDP project

146

officially resettled 12,000 hill population into the 53.5 square miles of “the home of
rhinoceros and other wild life” in the Chitwan valley’s grasslands (Gee 1959, 68).
Likewise, many migrants who did not receive government granted land
encroached on public or forest land for settlement and cultivation. Encroachment on
forest and public land by new landless migrants was a common trend, and it was
extensive and rampant in the Chitwan valley (Shrestha 2002, 206). Most scholars have
reported that the Chitwan valley was completely covered with dense forest with few
settlements of Tharu indigenous people (Faunthorpe 1924; Gurung 1983). As a result,
citing USAID findings Gurung (1983) reported that by the early 1960s, the Chitwan
valley lost two thirds of its forest cover because of the increase in the human population
and subsequent resource pressure and agricultural expansion. Also, many have reported
that livestock increased up to 20,000 head around CNP areas, putting pressure on wild
animals (Mishra 2007). These large numbers of livestock were in direct competition with
rhino habitats. Therefore, many argue there is a direct relationship between the decrease
in rhino populations and the increase in human population growth and habitat
encroachment. As a result, experts claimed that the rhino number decreased (Mishra
2007; Gee 1959, 1963; Spillett and Tamang 1966).
These development initiatives changed the social and ecological dynamics of the
plain. They reorganized people and spaces by promoting the resettlement of hill
population to the southern plains (Lal 2014). While the United States’ improvement
activities attempted to strengthen the social and economic development of people through
malaria eradication, agricultural expansion in previously forested land, and resettlement
of people and land reform, it differentially shaped the heterogeneous society and nature
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and their relationships. For instance, the monarchical government controlled most land
and resources under the pretext of protection of wildlife from illegal settlers and naturebased tourism development in the Valley. Consequently, the improvement projects
provided a new opportunity for exploitation and at the same time dispossession of rural
indigenous people. Although the RVDP project attempted to strengthen the landholdings
and property rights of the Tharu people by changing their traditional ownership and
practices into legal land ownership, the practices actually dispossessed Tharu people of
their land ownership in their place. Tharu people used to occupy 90 percent of land in the
Chitwan Valley before the RVDP project; their ownership of land decreased to 14
percent after the project (Robertson 2016). The "malaria eradication" program, in
particular, become the "Tharu eradication” program (Robertson 2016). These are the
topics of the next discussion.

4.3. Conservation discourses and the making of Royal Chitwan National Park
The 1950s’ social and economic development activities in the Rapti Valley
reorganized, restructured or changed the social and ecological dynamics of the Chitwan
Valley. These changes in society, nature, and their relationship invited a new round of
national and foreign economic development interventions. The government, with the
pressure from donor countries, introduced various legal restructurings52 of forest and land
rights such as the 1957 private forest nationalization act and the 1958 Birta abolition Act
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New land and forest laws primarily led to privatization of the land controlled by previous Rana rulers
under past land tenure system.
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to restructure feudal land arrangements53 and land under communal ownership. The
government introduced land reform in 1964 with limited impact on rural and poor
people's land ownership and access (detail in the previous chapter). Apropos to the
Chitwan Valley, the government also published the first wildlife law, the 1957 Wildlife
Conservation Act, primarily to regulate wildlife hunting and to protect wildlife from rural
people. Besides, a few months before the first rhino survey of Nepal in March 1959, King
Mahendra declared a 68 square mile Mahendra National Park (or Mahendra Mriga Kunja
- a Deer Park) in the north of the Rapti River. The Act also established a Rhinoceros
Protection Department under the District Forest Office of Chitwan. The department had
41 security posts including 26 in the eastern Chitwan areas, nine in the northern Reu area
and seven in the western Nawalpur areas. Each post had special rhino protection, in the
form of a rhino patrol team called a Gaida Gasti. Gee also reported 122 armed rhino
guards- Gaida Gasti- and other higher ranking staffs during his 1959 survey. This Acts
employed representations similar to informal Rana representations regarding the
protection of their big game animals such as tiger, rhinoceros, and elephants from people.
The Act continued to represent the rhinoceros as a "royal animal" and "nationally
protected animal" and prohibited the killing of rhinoceros (Adhikari 2002). Existing
purposes (e.g., royal hunting and revenue) and mechanisms (e.g., royal decree and
representation) of the control of big wild animals started to change after greater
engagement with foreign economic and wildlife experts.

53

Rana rulers and elites controlled most land until the 1950s under various land tenure system such as Birta
ownership. One-fourth of cultivable land was under Birta land tenure system controlled by Rana rulers,
their families and Jamindars- local functionaries (See Robertson column in Nepal times, and also Regmi,
also Rose)
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4.3.1. Early rhino surveys and the production of knowledge
When Lee M. Talbot conducted an Indian rhinoceros (R. unicorns) survey in 1954
on the request of the Survival Service Commission (SSC) of IUCN in the Middle East
and Southern Asia; rhinoceros was already considered as an "endangered species" despite
the lack of ground-level data (Talbot 1956). Even before E. P. Gee visited Nepal for the
rhino surveys, he wrote a section about the Indian rhinoceros in Talbot's report where he
pointed out that 72 rhinoceroses out of 100 that died were related to poaching in 1954 in
Nepal. Moreover, in 1958 the SSC of ICUN received information about the "alarming
slaughter" of about "500 rhinoceros" by the" band of Indian poachers" in the Rapti Valley
after the fall of Rana regime (Talbot 1956, 192; Gee 1959, 68). They presented a bleak
and alarming picture of the rhino population in the Rapti Valley because of the mismatch
in the birth rate and death rate of rhinoceros. They believed that ongoing large-scale
poaching of rhinoceros would extirpate rhinoceros at a pace faster than the natural growth
of rhino population54.
In March 1959, on the request of the Survival Service Commission of the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (SSC of IUCN), E. P. Gee, a British
wildlife biologist and a long time tea planter of Assam, India conducted a rhino “survey”
in the “main rhinoceros area” of the Rapti Valley to collect “authentic information” on
rhinoceros habits, distribution, numbers and movements (Gee 1959, 59-68). E. P. Gee
carried out the first rhino survey, and until then, Nepal authorities possessed “no maps,
and appear to have no instructions to observe or study rhinoceros” (Gee 1959, 81). He
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It is because by this time scholar knew about the natural history of rhinoceros. That is the slow addition
of new rhinoceroses because of a long gestation period (18 months), and that the rhino gives birth to a
single baby rhino at a time.
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carried out the first rhino survey for two and half weeks in the entire 1250 square miles of
the Rapti Valley with the aid of a large land-use map of the region. According to his
accounts in the report, he traveled ten days in the valley on a single or few elephants for
the "survey." He recorded fresh rhino tracks and droppings to find rhino distribution, but
the survey was primarily based on what others had informed him about the possible
number of rhinoceros sightings in different locations. Using the existing land-use map of
the Rapti Valley and his brief rhino survey in the Valley, he produced new knowledge or
truth about the rhino's number, distribution, habitat, and behavior.
With the financial support of the Fauna Preservation Society of London and the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, R.G.M Willian, Chief Conservator of
Forests to Nepal assigned under the United Nations Technical Aid Organization in March
1962, requested E.P. Gee again to survey rhino population of the Chitwan Valley in
March 1963 (Gee 1963). E. P. Gee traveled to Nepal for sixteen days and visited the
southern part of the Rapti Valley called the Reu Valley for a day on the 9th of March and
returned back to Kathmandu the next day. In his two week visit to Nepal, he gathered
information from high ranking officials of the Forest Department and concerned
authorities about the situation of the rhinoceros population, distribution, and poachings,
and he discussed issues of wildlife conservation in Nepal. Describing the meetings with
high ranking Nepali officers, he writes, " with the aid of a large-scale map of Nepal we
had detailed discussions on wildlife conservation in various parts of the country" (Gee
1963, 71).
In his first rhino survey, Gee estimated 300 rhinod in the region and plotted rhino
numbers and distribution all along riverine vegetation of the valley. He represented
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rhinoceros as the "the vanishing species of the world" (Gee 1959, 59). From what others
have said to him, he mentioned poaching 60 rhinoceros, twenty-four rhino horns were
recovered, and 13 persons were arrested. He claimed that most poachers of the western
Chitwan are "new settlers" or "hill Nepalese" such as Gurung and Magars, and poachers
of the eastern and northern Chitwan area are from neighboring India (Gee 1959). He also
noted that the Tharu people are a "simple and innocent folk" and they are not involved in
a great degree in the poaching. Poached horns are mainly transported back to Calcutta,
India to be traded with China (Gee 1959). He documented that the poaching of rhinoceros
increased to an "alarming extent" and has reached the "peak" in the Valley in the early
1950s (Gee 1959, 62). He, however, further claimed that grassland habitat loss is more a
danger than poaching in the Rapti Valley. He pointed out that the competition between
human population and wildlife for space is in a critical state. In particular, the effect of
ongoing development activities such as resettlement, agricultural expansion, the
conversion of rhino grassland into agricultural land, the impact of irrigation activities on
important water resources of rhino habitats, and the growing human population in the
area was greatly impacting the rhino's riverine habitat.
In his second survey (1963), Gee spent only a day in the Chitwan Valley and
pointed out many conservation problems and the status of rhinoceros. For instance, he
noted that poachers from the Indian border and others have "killed" about 140 rhinoceros
between 1958 and 1962. In particular, Indian poachers killed seventy-five rhinoceros
between 1959 and 1960, and “eighteen killed by poachers or by fighting” between 1961
and 1962 (1963, 70). The Reu Valley that borders with India lost 18 out of 24 rhinoceros
between 1959 and 1963 (Gee 1963, 70). From the information gathered from local and
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government officials, he estimated that the rhino number decreased from 300 to 185 by
1962. He also praised a Gaida Gasti person for killing two "Indian rhino poachers" by
using a firearm in 1960 and also praised the government for awarding cash to the person
for killing poachers (Gee 1963,70).
Gee's surveys in 1959 and 1963 cannot be considered a wildlife survey compared
to rhino surveys carried out after the 1980s, which are also not free from flaws
(Dinerstein 2003; Yonzon 199455). Even E.P. Gee confessed that the rhino number could
have been much more than what he estimated. He believes that the estimation is much
less than what the population actually should be in the Chitwan valley because the survey
was brief, it covered one-tenth of the entire area, and the visibility of rhino occurrence
was greatly affected by dense tall grass and dense forest. Similarly, he noted that the
estimation of the rhino population would have been greater if the survey was carried out
using a larger number of elephants. Therefore, he did not agree on a "hopeless" reporting
of the rhino status before his survey (Gee 1959, 60). However, every subsequent
academic and non-academic publications and national wildlife policies used the survey
and the rhino numbers as the benchmark to justify interventions and introduce new
interventions (e.g., Mishra 2007; Dinerstein 2003; Adhikari 2002). More importantly,
some continued to report 60-80 total rhinoceros in Nepal in the early 1960s despite E.P.
Gee's rhino "survey" estimate of 185 in 1962 (Dinerstein 1990). Similarly, the rhino
population estimate before 1950 as 1000 continued to be used in every academic and
non-academic publication without serious questions about the validity of the number.
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The rhino survey also never mentioned or elaborated on how rhinoceros died and
when the death of a rhino is considered poaching. If the absence of rhino horns and
hooves are considered as death due to poaching, the poaching data also cannot be
considered as "authentic information" because there is a high possibility of rural people
and government employees extracting rhino horns from dead rhinoceros. Studies have
shown that rural people used to eat rhino meat, extracting horns was not illegal, and horns
were used by local elites and royal for a religious purpose (Mishra 2007; Dinerstein 2003;
Kunwar 2013). More importantly, the high death count of rhino—whether deemed
"natural" or "poached"—during the 1950s and 1960s can be considered natural because
of the possibility of the impact of the extensive spread of DDT in the Valley to eradicate
malaria for thirteen years from the early 1950s to mid-1960s. The possible impact of
DDT on wildlife has never been researched or never considered as a worthy subject of
research in wildlife conservation in Nepal.
In the distribution of rhino maps, Gee's also represented rhinoceros distribution
and habitats of rhinoceros all along the sides of rivers. Although the riverine forest is the
prime rhino habitat, Dinerstein (2003) found that rhinoceros density depends on the
density of Saccharum spontaneum and Lauri (1978) found that rhino density depends on
the habitat diversity. Others have found that rhino prefers habitat closer to human
habitation, which provides nutritious food when food is lacking in the forest. Riverine
habit is preferred because it provides food, water for drinking and wallowing. Riverine
habitat also is important due to its mixture of grassland for food and it provides enough
shade in a tropical climate for resting (Dinerstein 2003). However, the Rapti valley's
prime landscape shaper is annual flooding which has both good and bad consequences to
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herbivores and ungulate. It has beneficial impacts because it brings fertile soil and deposit
in the plains, which becomes the fertile ground for the growth of younger Saccharum
spontaneum species, which are the nutritious food of rhinoceros in particular. However,
the annual flooding also has an immediate effect. It sweeps away small animals such as
baby rhinoceros. Therefore, the Sal forest which is in a relatively higher altitude where
water percolates faster compared to the riverine forest, is very important for the survival
of rhinoceros. The Gee surveys grossly simplified rhino's habitat only based on the
rhino's food and water availability. Besides, he generalizes all rhinoceros as equal. Young
rhinoceros are vulnerable to annual flooding, and old rhinoceros are vulnerable to adult
rhinoceros for the competition of food and mating. Therefore, older rhinoceros prefer to
live closer to villages where they can avoid competition with adult and stronger
rhinoceros and quickly get nutritious food and safety.
Gee’s rhino “surveys” also documented changes in the “nature” of rhino’s
behavior. He noted that frequent encounters with humans as the result of authorized and
unauthorized hill settlement, poaching activities and sports hunting have induced a
different "mode of existence and a temperament" on rhinoceros. Rhinoceros "have
become nervous, frightened of the sight of human beings, and almost entirely nocturnal"
(Gee 1959, 60). Similarly, it is hard to believe his accounts of natural rhino behaviors.
First, it is impossible to find the behavior of rhinoceroses by just doing ten-days of
fieldwork. Second, I have seen different behavior among a few rhinoceroses in Chitwan
Sauraha. For instance, old and weak rhinoceros who cannot compete for food and safety
with adult rhinoceros frequently reside near villages and are so adapted to the built
environment and crowded people that they show no "wild behavior." They are so habitual
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that they do not even react to people present. A highly experienced former CNP warden
who now currently works for WWF-Nepal shared a story with me during my interview,
as follows:
So, the WWF people with foreign dignitaries and an ambassador of a country
visited CNP when I was a warden, and I took them to the Bagmara CF for
Elephant Safari. We were in two elephants when we saw two rhinoceros inside a
wallowing site. Even after a few minutes of encircling of the rhinoceros they did
not move, and one of the elephant drivers tried to poke the rhinoceros to make the
visitor happy or for bigger tips. I yelled at him not to do that. I remember one of
my friends in Kathmandu told me that rhinoceros in CNP are like an animal in a
zoo. They do not show wild behavior.56" (Field interview).
However, some rhinoceroses may react differently; they move very quickly and
looks scared when they hear sounds. In another instance, I was with a highly experienced
nature guide (Bali dai) when I was conducting a vegetation survey inside the Bagmara
Community Forest. I was behind him and searching for an "exact" GPS point inside the
forest. My focus was on GPS, I was about five meters from the point, and suddenly the
guide stopped me. I took shelter in a big Simal tree (Bombax ceiba). Later, he made some
sound, and the giant rhino ran away in a few seconds. He told me that female rhinoceros
easily get scared when they hear male rhinoceros. The point is, rhinoceros behave
differently and essentializing CNP rhinoceros as "nervous," "frightened" or "nocturnal"
obscures how different rhinoceroses behave in different circumstances.
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Interview with a former CNP warden Mr. Ram Pret Yadav
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Based on his survey, Gee (1959) recommended the strict protection of certain
areas, clear demarcation of boundaries of reserved forests and the control of
encroachment and poaching of forest resources from the areas. He recommended the
establishment and naming of Mahendra Migra Kunja (deer park) as Mahendra National
Park. In particular, he suggested that the northwestern side of the Narayani River, which
is "the majestic and unspoiled Sal-forested Mountains which have deer and wildlife needs
to be included in the national park. He also recommended the eviction of villages that are
within the Mahendra National Park areas after an appropriate compensation by the state
(Gee 1959, 68).
He is also the first one to emphasize the importance of Bharandabar forest as the
nature corridor linking the south of the Rapti River and the northern Sal forest (This idea
became the primary conservation approach after the 1980s). He showed dismay at the
ways the prime rhinoceros habitat, the "unspoiled Sal forest and grassland" (the
Bharandabar forest) along the Khagri Khola that "forms a natural corridor" for seasonal
migration of rhinoceros, has not been included in the park. He noted that the addition of a
corridor would be a step forward to include "the best rhinoceros country" south of the
Rapti River (Gee 1959, 69). He argued that without the addition of the unspoiled
northern areas and the southern corridor, the Mahendra National Parks is not a "viable
ecological unit" to promote normal rhino behavior and to protect rhino habitat for
seasonal and local migration (Gee 1959, 60). He may also be the first one to hint at the
possibility of a buffer zone around the national park. To make a "viable unit", he
suggested making a "buffer belt" on either side of the park "where grazing and firewood
or thatch cutting are allowed, but in which no settlement or shooting except bona fide
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crop protection is permitted, the rest of the area might be opened as shooting blocks
under strict control with full protection of rhinoceros and other rare species" (Gee 1959,
70). The report also recommended the need for "education and publicity" to impart
consciousness to people about the “cultural and economic value” of wildlife. The report
recognized the potential of wildlife tourism for economic development (Gee 1959, 84).
Similarly, in his second survey report, he recommended a series of interventions
that the Government of Nepal needed to undertake to protect wild animals and habitat.
First, he recommended the establishment of a new national park on the southern side of
the Rapti river which was "mostly unspoilt and uninvaded by settlers" (Gee 1963, 70).
Although the area had relatively fewer hill settlers in the early 1960s, the area was the
home of many Tharu indigenous people. Second, he recommended that the park be
protected "properly and legally" by statutory laws because he argued that the mere
declaration by the King and forest department would not protect the park. Third, to
control poaching and save wild animals from the "extermination," he recommended,
"continued vigilance and severe penalties" (Gee 1963,69-71). Fourth, although he had
some reservations about the translocation of rhinoceros to other places because of high
cost, uneasy transportation, and crop damage potential, he recommended driving
rhinoceros from the Rapti Valley to the Reu Valley. This was because the Reu Valley had
a "holding capacity" of about "forty to fifty rhino" with proper maintenance of grassland
(effective burning of reeds and grasses), and the Rapti valley was "more densely settled
and cultivated" than the Reu Valley. Fifth, he recommended the establishment of a
wildlife division or branch under the Forest Department, re-constitution of the Wildlife
Advisory Board, and formulation of wildlife policy. Also, he suggested arranging a
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foreign visit and training to selected officials and emphasized the need for a wildlife
survey by experienced foreign biologists. Finally, similar to the 1959 survey
recommendation, the report also recommended the "wise use" of the country's wild fauna
and flora (Gee 1963, 69). In particular, the report suggested the establishment of new
national parks in Tarai and high Himalayas areas are important "for the development of
tourism to obtain more foreign exchange" (Gee 1963, 68). Describing the tourism
potential in Nepal, he writes “there is no doubt that tourism could eventually prove to be
one of Nepal’s main industries, and that another Switzerland or Kashmir lies shrouded
and unrevealed to the world due only to inaccessibility” (Gee 1963, 75). Therefore, he
suggested that publicity be used to increase consciousness among Nepali people about the
cultural and economic value of wildlife and conservation.
His proposed area for wildlife conservation and the Mahendra National Park in
the first survey report were primarily based on only a few settlements in the area rather
than the actual "rhino distribution" as represented in the map. Mahendra National Park
was not a riverine forest, and the occurrence of rhinoceros in the area is few. Although
he painted the gloomy situation of the rhino population, most rhino areas were not
included in the proposed national park. The current Chitwan National Park does not
include any areas that Gee's first survey recommended or proposed, however, the current
CNP includes most "rhinoceros areas" that he proposed after the second survey.
Meanwhile, following the wave of hill migration in the Chitwan Valley after the
eradication of malaria, the monarchical government, in the beginning of the Panchayat
government (1962), formed a high-level land settlement commission. The Assistant
Minister and the IUCN appointed a forest Conservator of Nepal (R.S.M Willian) who
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chaired the commission. In October 1963 (five months after the rhino survey) they
surveyed the area to determine the “legal status of the Chitwan settlers” and the extent of
forest encroachment (Willan 1965; Bolton 1975a). This "fact-finding commission"
investigated the impacts of encroachment on forest and wild animals. The commission
reported, "a very disturbing state of affairs on illegal settlement and forest destruction"
(Willan 1965, 159). They documented a high concentration of livestock and overgrazing
of forests and the replacement of "desirable forage plants with undesirable ones such as
thorny shrubs and bushes." They noted the "increasing food shortage" and the possibility
of "disease transmission" because of the "omnipresent" practice of overgrazing by
livestock (Spillett and Tamang 1966, 565). Although the concrete boundary pillars for the
demarcation of village and forest areas were used in the rhino sanctuary after the
recommendation of the rhino surveys, the team reported that the maintaining of
boundaries was a major problem because of the growing human and livestock population
of the Valley. As a result, many hill people from the northern Mahendra National Park
and Tharu indigenous people from the southern rhino sanctuary were evicted from their
place and relocated in the south Nepali border with India (detailed in a separate section).

4.3.2. Rhino survey 1968
In 1968, the UN-appointed Dr. Graeme Caughley (a wildlife expert who had
served as a wildlife biologist in Zambia, Africa) and Hemanta Mishra of the Forest
Department to carry out another "first scientific survey" in Chitwan to collect information
about rhino numbers and to know "viable breeding populations" of rhinoceros (Mishra
2007, 32). Hemanta Mishra writes that Graeme Caughley returned from Zambia and thus
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he was familiar with how the poaching of rhinoceros and agriculture expansion had
decimated 90 percent of the rhino population in Zambia (Mishra 2007). They were
concerned about rhino poaching because of the increasing human population in the
Chitwan regions (Mishra 2007, 38). They conducted the first "comprehensive" rhino
census in Chitwan (Mishra 2007, 39). They divided Chitwan Valley into four sectors and
counted rhinoceros in the mornings and afternoons. They also crisscrossed these sectors
"systematically" through a helicopter for "hours" to conduct aerial surveys (Mishra 2007,
38). In addition, they used two elephants for a month to do a ground survey of
rhinoceros. They reported an "extremely serious" status of rhino for two reasons. First,
the rhino numbers have decreased to about 90-108 rhino numbers from "more than a
thousand in the early 1950s". Second, they observed that out of the total population only
"5 percent" were mothers and calves (Mishra 2007, 42).
Although they know that rhinoceros are a "great wanderer," they assumed that
rhinoceros will not move from one sector or location to another during a month-long
rhino census (Gee 1963, 73). In addition, writing about the validity of their rhino census,
Mishra writes "we could easily see not only rhinoceros but also other wildlife. The way
our flight lines were organized made it unlikely that we would double count any
individual. However, we had missed a few from the air, particularly in the dense forests
and tall grass" (Mishra 2007, 39). As later rhino surveys have indicated, the possibility
of missing counts is large in CNP primarily because of the tall and dense grassland of S.
spontaneum57 or commonly called elephant grasses because the grasses can even cover-
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S. spontaneum grows up to 3-4 meters in height with in-penetrable dense grassland.
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up giant elephants. In general, rhino detection depends on the intensity and scale of the
ground level survey through elephants. Moreover, later survey reports have mentioned
that the accuracy of detection and distinguishing rhino gender is extremely difficult
because rhinoceros will not wait until researchers distinguish their gender by their distinct
type of body folding (later survey used photographs, which still do not solve the problem
of time needed to take photographs). Mishra (2007) writes that Graeme Caughley
predicted that rhinoceros would go extinct by the end of 1980 if the trend of rampant
habitat destruction and poaching persists in Chitwan. He further points out the major
reason for the decrease of rhino numbers from 1000 to 100 in 1968 was primarily
because of the loss of rhino habitat, but it was not because of the poaching of rhinoceros
(Mishra 2007; Spillet and Tamang 1966). More importantly, Hemanta Mishra writes how
they presented extinction narratives to convince the King and leaders to establish the park
and pass the national park and wildlife conservation act. He writes; "stretching
information…without distorting the facts on the status of rhinoceros and tigers in
Chitwan", and "spiced the report with an alarmist scenario of doom and gloom, claiming
that rhinoceros would be extinct in Nepal within ten years" and tiger population was "no
more than ten" in Chitwan (Mishra 2007, 72). They further highlighted the issue by
publishing in the newspaper which gathers more attention.
In the meantime, foreign and Nepali experts were claiming the strong relationship
between the "wilderness-oriented tourism industry" and the economic development of
Nepal (Mishra 1974. Many believed that national parks could play a key role in the
"expansion of Nepal's economically important tourist industry as they have in Africa,
North America and elsewhere" (Mishra 1974, 2; Spillet and Tamang 1966; Bolton 1975).
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Most strongly believed that Nepal's economic growth depends on "the tourist industry,"
which is the main sources of foreign exchange (Mishra 1974, 2). In particular, the
success of the Tiger Top hotel and their Campsite within the Rhino Sanctuary which
started in 1965 has been well known to the forest department and for that matter to the
King (Gurung 1988; Spillet and Tamang 1966). Likewise, Spillett and Tamang (1966)
noted that the success of the foreign-owned Tiger Top hotel inside the park, which was
established in November 1965, had set "an excellent example of how a national park can
be developed for tourism by private enterprise and also earn revenue and foreign
exchange with only a relatively very small investment by the Government" (1966, 560).
More importantly, a leader of the Sauraha also told me during my fieldwork that King
Mahendra suggested that his close local contact person, a Tharu Jamindar (Mallu
Mahato) (later resident of Sauraha), open a hotel for tourists. These accounts suggest that
tourism was the primary activity that foreign and national experts and governments were
trying to push to generate state revenue and economic development in the park.

4.3.3. The Himalayan environmental degradation narratives
In addition to the discourses of "rapidly disappearing" lowland Tarai forests and
subsequent extinction of rhinoceros and other wild animals, the Himalayan
Environmental Degradation (HED) narratives in the hills of Nepal was gaining ground
among donors and ecological experts (see Blower 1973; Eckholm 1975). The
environmental degradation narrative in the hills such as soil erosion, forest degradation
and rapid wildlife loss in the Tarai region were widespread among donors such as
USAID, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Food and Agriculture
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Organization (FAO). The HED narrative has been debunked and criticized by later
publications (Guthman 1997). In particular, scholars have argued that such scientific
crisis narratives articulate with international and national development aid regime
(Guthman 1997). These crisis narratives, however, became the basis for the establishment
of four national parks including RCNP and others during the 1970s (Guthman 1997;
Heinen and Kattel 1992).
In December 1970, the government of Nepal under the UNDP/FAO Technical
Assistance Programme appointed John Blower – an FAO/UN advisor - to assist Nepal on
national park and wildlife management and to develop a network of national parks. He
also had previous experience in conservation work in Africa. Blower completed "the
extensive survey" for three years in Nepal and found that the local people's practices
related to forest and wildlife as major wildlife conservation problems. He noted that the
major problem of Nepal is the human population growth and subsequent pressure of
forest land and wildlife (Blower 1973). He writes, "the enormous numbers of domestic
livestock are the most serious obstacle to both forest and wildlife management. Cattle and
buffalo are currently estimated to total 10 million, and sheep and goats 2.5 million, both
numbers increasing at an average rate of nearly two percent a year. Cattle, in particular,
are generally of inferior quality and largely unproductive, but cannot be slaughtered for
food, despite the chronic protein shortage in many areas, because the cow is sacred,
Nepal being a Hindu country. Increasing grazing pressure exacerbates erosion and
prevents forest regeneration so that even forest which is not deliberately cleared is
gradually replaced by grassland and worthless scrub" (Blower 1973, 276). He further
goes on to say the poaching of rhino for commercial purpose is "so severe" that it will be
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"likely to exterminate the rhino in Nepal within a very few years." In particular, he
reported that rhinoceros, which numbered 800 in 1950, had decreased to 120 and the
"killing by poachers still average about ten per year." He also reported poaching of tigers
and predicted that the Sal (Shorea robusta) forests would disappear in "20 or 30 years"
from Nepal if human pressure continued to grow (Blower 1973, 207-278).
Given the context, UNDP/FAO, DOF staffs, foreign experts such as John Blower,
and Nepali wildlife experts who had a close relationship with the royal palace lobbied for
the establishment of a national park in Chitwan and persuaded King Mahendra to take the
urgent consideration of conservation measures (Mishra 2007). At the end of 1970, King
Mahendra approved the plan to establish Royal Chitwan National Park (RCNP). More
importantly, the major wildlife management body at the time was the “Wildlife
Committee” chaired by prince Gyanendra. The committee located inside the royal palace
used to make all decision related to wildlife and national parks. The informal committee
was comprised of forest ministers, secretary of the department of forest and soil
conservation, director of the DNPWC, palace officials, and high ranking officers of the
government of Nepal. Essentially, the palace used to directly run or make all decisions
related to national park activities and wildlife management until 1990. The committee not
only helped to create the separate National Parks and Wildlife Conservation section under
the department of forest and a later separate office in 1972, but the committee also helped
to create rules or regulations related to wildlife and national parks. Although the HMG's
ministry of forests used to implement rules or activities, royal interests and the royal
families' role was direct and indirectly involved in all the wildlife and national parkrelated decision and practices. That means the role of the public or political leaders and a
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public bureaucrat was minimal until 1990.The direct role of the royal place also helped to
fast-track bureaucratic process or overcome bureaucratic red tape (Field Interview).
In addition to the sharing of knowledge and training from foreign experts and US
Peace Corps volunteers on the population census or surveys of wildlife, habitat, and
human population, the training and exposure of Nepali citizens at western universities
and organizations became one of the major methods of information sharing and
circulation. The DNPWC received financial and technical assistance from UN-FAO,
WWF, and U.S. Peace Crops. Moreover, the office staffs were provided with
conservation and wildlife-related training and fellowships in foreign countries. Several
forest department officials received training in wildlife management under FAO/UN
fellowships in different counties including in the USA and Europe. Many leading persons
who played a role in the establishment of Chitwan National Park have received his
training in India, Europe, and the USA through the fellowship (Mishra 2007; Blower
1973). For instance, describing the "awe-inspiring aesthetic beauty" of Yellowstone
National Park after his return from the US in 1972, Mishra, also an NP staff, described
how the conservation efforts of Americans inspired him. He writes, "I was struck by the
Americans' vision of legally protecting large areas of valuable land for the enjoyment and
benefits of future generations, mainly when there were still wide-open spaces in the Wild
West" (Mishra 2007, 65). He further writes, if the Americans could do it in the nineteenth
century, why we, the Nepalese, can’t do it in the twentieth century?" (Mishra 2007, 65).
He was inspired by the western vision of national parks and the ways Yellowstone
National Park has been managed and protected, and he came back in 1972 with a desire
to emulate the Yellowstone model in Chitwan Valley. The Government of Nepal
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formally enacted the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act in 1973 (discussed
below).

4.3.4. National parks and wildlife conservation
The extinction discourses continued to emerge and reemerge during early1970s
not only by foreign wildlife experts but also communicated by Nepali experts. For
instance, Mishra (1974) reported that in the past 20 years, rhino numbers have decreased
from 800 to 200. The wild buffalo population is only about 40 in number, the elephant
population is no more than 30, and the tiger number has reduced to 300 from a large
population. Consequently, the government of Nepal, with the financial and technical
support of the UNDP, the UN-FAO Technical Assistance Program, WWF and the US
Peace Corps, started the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Project in 1973
(Bolton 1975a; Mishra 1974). Under the project, Marvin Bolton, an ecologist, conducted
an ecological survey in the RCNP for several weeks in 1974 and 1975 to prepare the first
management plan of RCNP.
The plan represented the park as the "most important component," a "unique
example" of "ecological representation," and the "faunistically richest part" of the
country. More specifically, the report mentioned that the second largest population of the
"endangered" one-horned rhino of the world inhabits the park. He noted that the park also
has a large "endangered" tiger population, an "endangered" gangetic dolphin and a
"seriously-threatened" gharial crocodile population (Bolton 1975b, 7) (see also Mishra
1974), which were already in the endangered IUCN Red Data list by then ( Bolton 1975b,
7). Similarly, the report highlighted that the park was the “most pleasant and attractive
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parts of Nepal’s lowland” and could be the main sources of foreign exchange through a
healthy tourist industry. The report also praised the outstanding progress in suppressing
“poaching", maintaining boundaries and the establishment of office infrastructure after
the establishment of RCNP. The management plan predicted that “the most valuable
forest and wildlife” will be gone forever without further strict protection and management
from the onslaught of a growing human population. The population in Chitwan was
already 180,000 and was expected to double in 20 years (Bolton 1975b, 3-7).
The project aimed to effectively manage renowned wildlife habitat and to increase
“endangered” wild animal populations such as rhino, tiger, gharial and others (IUCN
1968, 1974; Mishra 1974). The report mentioned that in the case that the number of wild
animals increases so as to exceed the “carrying capacity of the park appropriate steps
should be taken to reduce the population to a safe level” (Bolton 1975, 29). In RCNP, he
demanded that “it must conform to the strict criteria of a national park, excluding all
human settlements” (Bolton 1975a, 176). In addition, surveillance strategies such as the
establishment of outposts for military guards, monitoring and foot and elephant patrolling
by park guards, and fines and punishments for law infraction were proposed. The report
also recommended the establishment of a park administration and mobile anti-poaching
force. Writing about high mountain parks, Bolton not only mentioned the importance of
legal and spatial strategies, but also emphasized the cooperation of people for the
protection of wild animals. He writes “there will have to be legal restrictions within the
parks, but hopefully much will be achieved by voluntary cooperation and planned
zonation of activities” (Bolton 1975a, 176).
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In addition to the emphasis on the development of the tourism industry and
allowing tourism concessionaires within the park for the economic development of the
country, the plan emphasized the importance of convincing, informing, and educating all
people including local people, public staffs, and leaders about the importance and value
of wildlife protection and management (Bolton 1975; Mishra 1974). The report proposed
diverse strategies to educate and regulate all peoples’ behavior and understanding. First,
the plan recommended "conservation education and publicity" for conservation and to
increase people’s awareness of "the value of their nature environment" (Mishra 1974). It
included a plan of communicating conservation ideas through radio, news media,
publications, books, essays, and films. The plan aimed "to acquaint the nation with the
country's conservation and environmental requirements and problems" (Bolton 1975, 7).
In addition, they emphasized conservation, wildlife, and forestry-related courses at
Tribhuvan University and affiliated campuses. The plan recognized the ways Peace Corps
volunteers and the US and the UK universities were helping conservation research and in
disseminating wildlife and conservation education. Major research was carried out by the
US institutions such as the Smithsonian, Michigan State University, USA and Cambridge
University, UK. (Bolton 1975, Mishra 1974). Second, it recommended that the national
park office maintain good relations with local people by helping to reduce wildlife
conflicts with farmers or by compensation for crop depredation for instance. Third, it
recommended relaxing resource collection and national park access rules. It suggested
relaxing rules for gathering forest resources such as annual thatch grass collection from
the park but recommended high vigilance by military guards to reduce people’s impact
on wild animals. It also recommended that local people should not be needlessly
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antagonized when livestock encroached the park area because local support is very
important. However, he suggested setting fines for cattle entering the NP boundary as it
will reduce the livestock encroachment inside the park. Fourth, he recommended the
sharing of park proceeds with local panchayats to gain local support and forming a local
coordinating committee (Bolton 1975b, 1975a).

4.3.5. The Nepal tiger ecology project
After five years of unsuccessful attempts to launch a Tiger project in India, the
Smithsonian Institution/WFF-US introduced a Nepal Tiger Ecology Project in Sauraha,
Chitwan in November 1973. Dr. S. Dillion Ripley, a bird scholar and a former field
operative of the Office of Strategic Service (predecessor of the CIA) and a secretary of
the Smithsonian Institution, pushed for the project in India but was unsuccessful because
of the political and economic context of the post-World War II and the Cold War period
(Mishra 2009). In India, Dr. Ripley, however, was able to disseminate the “precarious
status” of the tiger population and its “extinction possibility” within twenty-five years in
India. He convinced Indian experts and officers about problems of habitat
encroachments, poaching, hunting for revenue and the lack of baseline data for scientific
conservation (Mishra 2009). More importantly, he was able to list tiger in the Red Data
Book as a “globally rare and endangered species” even without the baseline data of the
tiger population in 1969 at the IUCN general assembly held in India (Mishra 2009, 11).
This inscription in the IUCN list prompted the WWF-US to initiate the "operation tiger"
project to save the tiger and its habitat. Dr. Ripley who had visited Nepal before 1950 in
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the Rana regime pushed for the tiger project in Chitwan National Park 1972 (Dinerstein
2003; Mishra 2009).
Despite a working conflict between British and American scientists during the
formative stage of the project, which started in 1973 for a six-year period. Mishra
highlighted the difference in working style and priorities of British experts (who were
assigned under UN-FAO support and WWF) and the American Smithsonian Tiger
Ecology Project scientists (who were funded by WWF-USA), which shaped conservation
interventions in Nepal. Mishra noted that "the FAO assigned a team of advisors to Nepal,
all British-and all the old East African colonial kind. But they were seasoned experts who
had successfully developed a network of a wildlife reserve in Africa, without spending
any time or money on field research” (Mishra 2009, 20). In particular, one of the UNFAO's technical advisors’ comments on the conservation issue of the period; "what Nepal
needs now is a good management plan that combats poaching, and agriculture
encroachment…these are the two critical issues for developing national parks and
wildlife reserves to save tigers and other species" (Mishra 2009,16). He further writes
that Frank Popplenton, an FAO technical advisor, believed that wildlife "protection is 99
percent conservation" and it can be achieved with "guns, guards, and barbed wire."
Furthermore, Dinerstein (2003) documented the view of an East African game warden
who visited Nepal in 1975 to helped to establish Chitwan and Bardiya National Park, on
the study of natural history of rhinoceros: "If you are trying to save large mammals," why
not simply set aside the biggest area you can, walk the perimeter, gazette [establish] the
boundaries, and form a dedicated guard patrol to keep the poachers out? Who needs to
know how long a rhinoceros spends feeding or wallowing or where it goes during the
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monsoon?" (Dinerstein 2003, 110). In other words, Kollmair and Muller Boker wrote that
the FAO/UNDP experts with working experience in East Africa's national park "wished
to transfer Africa's strict nature conservation concepts to Nepal" (2003, 29).
In contrast, the Smithsonian Tiger Ecology Project scientists focused on gathering
baseline data and understanding the ecology of wildlife. That is, they were interested in
understanding more of the ecological knowledge about tiger and rhinoceros and their
habitats, generating baseline data, and providing training to Nepali personnel.
Smithsonian scientists focused more on the production of scientific knowledge of wild
animals generated through research in their natural habitat, which they believed was
important for making conservation decisions. For instance, after getting permission from
Nepal's authority (the royal palace) to conduct a tiger study for the first time in Asia, the
team of Nepali and American scientists fitted a radio transmitter collar on a tiger in
January 1974. They later fitted radio collars on five tigers to study tiger behavior,
movements, and habits (Sunquist and Sunquist 1988). The radio-telemetry technological
uses a handheld receiver that would detect the frequency communicated from a radiocollar device fitted in the neck of the tiger. This allowed scientists to find the location of a
tiger with a radio-collar device if it worked properly. Fitting a radio-collar needs three
primary steps. First, field staff with adequate experience and knowledge of tiger are
assigned to bait a tiger in a particular area with a domestic animal (goats or young calf).
Second, a person who is very skilled in hunting or using a dart gun is assigned to dart the
tiger. The right combination of anesthetic medicine is used to sedate a tiger. Third, once
the target tiger is captured, then the animal is fitted with a radio-collar device in the neck.
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This technology helps to understand tiger behavior, their preferred habitats and home
range, movement and migration route.
The scientists of the project found that the radio collar tigers “commonly use an
area of 40 km square in the north-east corner of the park. They "guesstimated" there were
25-30 tigers within the park (Bolton 1975, 478) and they further recorded the behavior of
wild tiger (Seidensticker 1976). Moreover, initial studies carried out about the
relationship between a tiger and its prey population. Seidensticker (1976) calculated
ungulate crude biomass increased from 2000kg/sq km in 1974-to 5000 kg/sq km in 1980.
In 1974, studies reported the quick recovery of tiger and rhino populations as the result of
the strict protection of habitat inside the park. For instance, scholars reported that the
tiger population rebounded from 25 to 60 within a few years (Poppleton and Mishra
1974). Andrew Laurie, a Cambridge zoologist with the support of the New York
Zoological Society, completed a rhino survey in 1975 and reported 250-300 in number
(Lauri 1979).
As a result, scholars and conservationists suggested that the current park habitat
needed to be extended both eastwards and westwards to accommodate more tiger
habitats. Following the studies, the park area was extended from 544 to 932 square km
with the support of the Frankfurt Zoological Society. The above findings from the
National park and wildlife project and conservation project also led to the recruitment of
the Royal Nepali Army for the protection of CNP in 1976. About 500 Royal Nepali Army
personnel were posted in 25 different posts in and around the CNP. In the mid-1980s,
DL Smith and Mishra further carried out tiger research, and their findings of tigers'
extended habitats further helped to expand RCNP to extend Parsa Wildlife Reserve.
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4.3.6. Boundary demarcation and a rhino sanctuary, 1964-1965
The government of Nepal published the first wildlife law, the 1957 Wildlife
Conservation Act, primarily to regulate wildlife hunting and to protect game wildlife
from rural people. In addition, a few months before the first rhino survey of Nepal in
March 1959, King Mahendra declared a 68 square mile Mahendra National Park (or
Mahendra Mriga Kunja - a Deer Park) in the north of the Rapti River. The Act also
established the Rhinoceros Protection Department under the District Forest Office of
Chitwan. The department had 41 security posts including 26 in the eastern Chitwan areas,
nine in the northern Reu area and seven in the western Nawalpur areas. Each post had
special rhino protection, or rhino patrol team called a Gaida Gasti. Gee also reported 122
armed rhino guards- Gaida Gasti- and other higher ranking staffs during his 1959 survey.
In response to the forest degradation and wildlife extinction narratives in the Rapti Valley
as discussed in previous sections, the monarchical government also established 210
square miles area as the Rhino Sanctuary58 In the South of the Rapti River (Willan 1965,
159). In 1964/1965 (2021 BS), the forest department carried out the demarcation of forest
boundaries (Ban Simana) of a proposed rhino sanctuary (current CNP) in places where
the Rapti River was not a boundary. The department pegged cemented "demarcation
pillars" and used barbed wire to demarcate and divide the previous undifferentiated land
into forestland, private land, and settlements. Moreover, the forest department considered
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King Mahendra, however, proposed the area as the rhino sanctuary only to be establish the areas as
shooting blocks after 10 years (Gee 1959). During the late 1960s, the monarchical government also
established seven hunting reserves in the Tarai region. Among them, three hunting reserves lie around
current CNP including Bagmara hunting reserve, Lothar hunting reserve, Meghauli hunting reserve (Spillet
and Tamang 1966, 559). These hunting reserves and rhino sanctuary later become "the forerunners of the
current national parks system" in Nepal (Mishra 2012, 67).
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rivers and ridges as effective and non-political boundaries. Particularly, the department
considered the Rapti River as the southern boundary of the rhino sanctuary. It divides the
Rapti Valley into a rhino sanctuary in the south and private and settlement in the north.
Likewise, the Narayani River and Reu Rive serve as the western and southern border of
the current CNP respectively.
The dynamic rivers, which recede in winter months and swell in summer months,
have become the persistent problem of CNP management and a source of conflict
between park administration and people. For instance, a Kumal man in his 60s and an
elephant driver shared his story on why he got involved in the Maoist movement. He lost
his all land and a house because the flooding of 1977/1978 (2033-2034 Sal) shifted the
Rapti River in the northern side and took away his land. His land is now inside the CNP,
and he was not able to get his land back as it is inside the river which is the boundary of
CNP, nor he has received any compensation after two years of struggle. He became
landless and started working as an elephant driver in Sauraha. He had to struggle while he
shifted from one public land to another and got involved in party politics and also
frustrated with parties because of labor exploitation and oppression of poor people by
local elites. He finally joined the Maoist movement while the movement was at a peak in
2002-2003. With a lot of struggle and conflict in Sauraha related to land and labor rights
during his involvement in the movement, he was able to secure a small space (1 biga)59
which now provides shelter for twenty landless families in the Bagmara buffer zone area.

59

1 Biga land area = 20 Katta (1Katta = 0.034 ha)

175

4.3.7. Eviction from the rhino sanctuary
More importantly, after the fact-finding high level land Commission completed
their forest encroachment survey in 1963 and after five months of the second rhino
survey (discussed above), in 1964/1965, the monarchical government, with the help of
the rhino patrol team (Gaida Gasti) evicted 18,000 “newly arrived squatters” from the
Mahendra National park area in the north of the Rapti river. The government evicted
4,000 Tharu people in the name of "illegal settlers" from the "main rhinoceros area," i.e.,
the rhino sanctuary. The government, however, did not remove an "old Tharu village"
called Padampur from the rhino habitat. Although the Padampur village was in the prime
rhino habitat and had a population of ten thousand farmers and 16 villages, it was not
relocated for a number of different reason (discussed below) (Willan 1965, 159; Spillett
and Tamang 1966; Gurung 1988). Similarly, the people from Bodreni area (a settlement
of my research site – Bagmara CF area) which has a majority of hill Tamang population
and was in the middle of the forest was not evicted. Most Tharu inhabitants and others
inhabitants from south of the Rapti River were forcefully relocated along the Indo-Nepal
border in the Madi and Thori region, and about 600 families were relocated by the
northern side of the Rapti river (Tamang 1982). The commission recovered 10,200 ha of
"encroached land" and granted about 1012 ha of land to Army ex-servicemen.
Although some publications claim that there were only a few Tharu villages and
populations south of the Rapti river, many claimed that the number of people residing
and later evicted from the area was large. For instance, an old Tharu man who was a
Jamindar of one of the evicted areas described the scale of eviction of Tharu and other
people –
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The whole south of the Rapti River area was mostly settled in the past.
Settlements were not only in Chure hills on the southern border, but other places
were mostly settled from east to the western Kasara area. In 1964, the forest
department evicted all Tharu settlements including Katiwa, Aamiliya, Dumeriya1,
Bahapur, Basbari, Jarnali, Kachuwani, Khorser and many other villages. In our
Khorser area, we had 60 households. All were evicted (uthayo) and relocated to
Madi. All evicted were Tharu people. But my family (2 households) were given
space in this place because we had so many things to transport. We had about 200
cows, 30 buffalos and 16 pairs of oxen and other household materials.60
Many respondents including non-state personnel, national park personnel and
locals told me about Gaida Gasti61 violence during the time of eviction. Shrestha (2002,
264) writes that the Gaida Gasti was "the principal organ of the state's eviction forces."
For instance, as one Tharu man shared his personal story of Gaida Gasti presences in his
villageMy brother told us that we should go and clear the forest and settle in this area
[Bodreni] because we did not have enough land to feed our family. We cleared
and prepared this agricultural land day and night. All other hill people including
Derai and Tamang people came after the land was prepared. We only had three
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Interview with a former Tharu landlord of Khorser settlement, September 15, 2016

61

Gaida Gasti (rhino patrol) is a special team of armed forest guards which was formed during the Rana
regime to safeguard rhinoceroses from general people so that rulers have sufficient rhinoceroses to hunt.
Their work might also have been to locate rhinoceroses in the deep jungle for rhino hunting as they were
recruited under the department of a Hunting Management Office (Sikari Adda). But the modern form of
Gaida Gasti is a rhino patrol team most of which consist of ex-Army personal. They work under the
Department of Forest; they were replaced by Nepali Army personnel after 1976. During the eviction, Gaida
Gasti were involved in massive violence.
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families staying here initially. Later, an Army major called Nar Bahadur (Bhalu
Bhutte major) Gaida Gasti used to come and physically torture people and ordered
us to leave this place. He violently evicted and physically tortured people. Gaida
Gasti people also torched houses and property and used elephants to destroy
houses and property. We never stayed in the village during daylight, and we used
to hide inside the forest. Although the government tried to evict us, my father and
brother did not obey the order. Most people from other places were removed to
Thori and Madi area, but since some leaders from this place knew powerful
people, this village was not evicted62.
Another Tamang man in his 60s also shared similar stories. He told me that:
The army [Gaida Gasti] did not allow us to farm and males could not stay home
during the day, the army [Gaida Gasti] used to come daily to evacuate people.
They used to destroy crops and sometimes take corn and millet. They used to
gather all livestock and take it to the Takauli head office. A man from Bodreni
helped to convince government people. He could speak Nepali language and was
"the-batho"- clever. He also knew how to read and write. He also used to take the
best quality corn and millet to army [Gaida Gasti] personnel. He saved us from
evacuation from this place63.
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Interview with a Tharu man of Bodreni settlement, July 2, 2017

63

Interview with a Tamang man of Bodreni settlement,
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4.3.8. Discrimination during eviction
Some residents described to me the wide discrimination in the 1964 eviction
between different ethnic groups and within Tharu people. For instance, most poor Tharu
residents were relocated in the southern border (the northern border of India), whereas
many rich Tharu, such as rich Tharu households and landlords and their close household
workers, were allowed to resettle by the north of the Rapti river (field observation). More
importantly, among all Tharu settlements, only Padampur village64 was not evicted at the
time. It was primarily because some local leaders had a good relationship with powerful
people (Dhakal 2011). The settlement of Padampur village was only completely resettled
in another location in 2005. The claim that the connection with powerful people helped to
retain Padampur village is plausible because one of my study site settlements that lies just
in the middle of the forest and lies outside of the Rapti river boundary was not removed
after repeated attempts by Gaida Gasti only because some local leaders of the village had
connections with a powerful Army lieutenant. An 81-year old respondent Derai65 man
who ran a local Village Panchayat office for many years and also claimed to have played
a role to stop the eviction of the Bodreni settlement. He told me that:
The government tried to remove this settlement too. The government used
elephants and destroyed all houses and crops. A Kaji- who is a Chetri was a nice
man. He told me to go and talk with the Rapti Valley Project people. He told me
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Although many, opposed the people of Padampur were forced to choose the resettlement in 19xx because
of the systematic neglect of government and the flooding. The government did not provide any facilitiesUsing the pretext that, people had to face the difficulty of flooding.
65

These indigenous groups of Sauraha Chitwan are culturally and linguistically similar to Tharu people.
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to be very humble and say greet with Namaste with both hands as soon as I see
them. I went there, and I knew how to speak Nepali, so that helped me too. This
was two villages. The northern area was called Laxmipur, and the southern area
was called Bodreni. I went and requested them. I told them they were right
between Buda Rapti river and Thulo Rapti River. I showed them this place in
maps (naksa/saksa). They told me to go, and after few days they came and
prepared a village map. I also helped to conduct the land survey of 26 Sal
[1970]66.
The old Derai man was selling bananas to tourists when I first met him on the way
to the elephant breeding center. He was sitting on open ground and had about 10-20
dozen bananas in a basket in front of him. With every passing foreign-looking people, he
used to say, "good banana, good banana." I would have never have asked the question of
how the Bodreni village came to exist in the middle of the forest because the current
village does not seem to be in the middle of the forest; past floodings in the Rapti river
have cut part of the village's southern border. The person who helped me to connect with
the 81-year-old Derai man insisted a few times that I ask the question to the old man, why
did the Bodreni village and (similarly Padampur) exist and not other nearby settlements?
He was a staunch Maoist party supporter and was involved in the Maoist movement. I
later found out that his family was also violently evicted from the current CNP in 1964
without any compensation. His family also lost a large land area north of the Rapti River
during the demarcation of forest which is now the part of community forest boundary. He
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Interview with an old Derai of Bodreni, September 6, 2016.
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refused to consider his family as a Jamindar67 (landlord), although they had large herds of
cows (350), buffalos (250) and 20 pairs of oxen. He considered his family a rich peasant
household. He used to frequently tell me the ways the government violently evicted
Tharu people and discriminated against only the Tharu, as follows:
The government evicted all Tharu settlements from south of the Rapti river in
1964/65. Gaida Gasti people violently evicted and physically tortured people.
Gaida Gasti people also torched houses and property and used elephants to
destroy houses and property. They used to cut Halo-Juwa (oxen power tool used
in plowing which is made of wood). Tharu people were repeatedly exploited by
the state. After we moved to this place, we had to pay land taxes to both
government and the local Newar Jamindar. Besides, fourteen Tharu households
did not get their previously surveyed and registered land which now falls under
the current Bagmara Community Forest. The Rapti dun project [RDVP] gave us
that land and later when government survey people came they did not survey the
land and classified it with the forest demarcation (Ban Simana). The Bodreni area
people who have the majority of hill Tamang people and in the middle of the
forest were not evicted, and the Tharu peoples were dispossessed from their
land68.
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As Jamindar is a government chosen person who must collect land taxes. Although 1964 land reform
abolished Jamindar system, de facto jamindar system continued until very late. The land reform also
privatized all land under Jamindari system under the private ownership of the Jamindar.
68
Interview with a Tharu man of Odra settlement. September 6, 2016
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A Tharu man in his early 60s, from a Jamindar69 family of the Khorser area
(which was located west of the Bodreni village) shared his story on how his father was
not able to save their settlements and property:
Bodreni people had a connection with some powerful people at that time, and that
is how they were able to secure their whole area. My dad also had a connection
with a Gaida Gasti officer who is still alive, but he asked for half of the land we
owned just for helping us. My father refused to give up half of his land because
my father worked hard to expand and clear the forest for agriculture. That is why
we were not able to save the Khorse area70.
As some land of Bodreni area still belongs to Hasta Bahadur Tamang- a Gaida
Gasti lieutenant who was involved in evicting people in 1964, it can be assumed that the
Bodreni was not removed in part because the Gaida Gasti people received land in the
area. For instance, a Tamang respondent of mid-60s told me that "during the mid-1960s,
a Tamang lieutenant – Gaida Gasti man was able to register lots of lands—flood plains—
of the Bodreni area and other people who were powerful also registered the flood plain at
that time. Some register ten biga, some eight biga, and some five biga and some were
able to get a land ownership certificate."
Some experts rationalized the eviction by describing that "rhinoceros have been
seen on numerous occasions" in the rhino sanctuary area where in the nine-month period
35 rhino calves were sighted (Willian 1965). Others have claimed that people were
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There is a wide variation in amount and quality of land ownership, cattle holding, property and power in
general possessed by Jamindar (land lords).
70

Interview with a former Tharu landlord of Khorser settlement, September 16, 2016
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resettled to "more fertile lands devoid of wild herbivores" (Milton and Binney 1980).
However, local people informed me that relocated people had to suffer extreme hardship
and violence. Since most were resettled in Madi and Thori areas of the southern Indian
border by the jungle, newly settled people had to face the wild animal problem and the
violence of Indian dacoit. One respondent who was also evicted but did not go to the
areas and has his family member returned from the Madi area after extreme difficulty. He
told me that his maternal uncle returned from the place because his family had to suffer
not only from the extreme impact of wild animals, but Indian dacoit used to regularly
come in there and take their crops and rape women. Another Tamang man who returned
in 1971/1972 from Thori areas after relocation in 1964 told me that his family had to
suffer from the looting of crops and animals by Indian people, and the area was
unsuitable for farming. He further told me that they worked hard for two to three years to
clear the forest, but had a hard time because of fewer working bodies- ("man" power).

4.4. Surveying, classifying, and legislating
The period between the late 1950s and early 1960s was also the time when
numerous laws were enacted to restructure rights of land and resources. For instance, the
government enacted the Private Forest (Nationalization) Act 1957 to nationalize all
privately owned, tax-exempted forests and land greater than the prescribed limit.
Similarly, The Government of Nepal enacted the Survey and Measurement Act of 1963,
where it categorizes lands into government land (which includes forest, shrubs, jungle,
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river, streams, lakes, roads, "Ailani71, Parti or other types of land”) and public land
(which includes roads, wells, ponds, river banks, pasture lands, temples, shrines, sports
sites and others). More importantly, the practices of government officials including land
surveys and classification primarily shaped the rights on land and subsequent conflict
over land and resources. Many old and politically active Thaur people during my
interview told me about how the government discriminated and disregarded Tharu
people’s land practices and ownership of land. A Tharu respondent in his mid-60s told
me during an informal conversation the following:
In the past, all Tharu people used to live very closely in a tight and elongated
settlement because of the fear of Indian dacoit, malaria, and fear of theft. The
government land survey72 team in the Chitwan Valley in 1970 classified such
Tharu settlements as a "Gaau Block Land" or "Block Land." For instance, the
whole settlement in the Bacchauli VDC and every Tharu settlements in this area
are represented as a "Block Land," and they are non-surveyed Ailani land. In
addition, the survey team marked the Tharu land as a "fallow land" or "unfarmed
land" as forest land which is an "Ailani land" that belongs to the government. The
land along the river bank and "Ghol" (water bodies or areas that have stagnant
water during the survey period) were also represented as Ailani land. They also
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Non-surveyed land

72

Other people informed me about the land survey carried out by the RDVP project and the land
registration in 1964.
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did not survey the land under the water and land area covered by the flood
plains.73
The survey team did not know or disregarded the Tharu people shifting
cultivation. Tharu people clear forest and farm for two to three years in one area and
leave the area because the productivity is reduced. They then take their livestock to the
area and use the land for grazing. After two to three years, they will again come back and
farm. Many Tharu people not only lost land after eviction from the south of the Rapti
river, but they were dispossessed from land through further classification of land. The
farmed land was further gradually captured by local landlords.

4.4.1. Conservation legislation
The monarchal government enacted the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation
Act (NPWC) Act in 1973 to manage the national park, protect wildlife habitat, regulate
hunting, protect, conserve and develop places of natural beauty to maintain the welfare
and moral behavior of people. The act defined the national park as "an area reserved for
the protection, management, and use of wildlife, vegetation, and landscape, along with
the natural environment" (NPWC Act 1973). The Act provides power to the government
of Nepal to declare any areas as national parks or wildlife reserves or conservation areas
if it so deems necessary by notification in the Nepal Gazette indicating the boundaries of
the declared area. In addition, the government may alienate or transfer the ownership, or
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Field conversation with a Tharu man of Odra settlement
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alter the boundaries of any area, which has been already declared as a national park or
wildlife reserve, or conservation area.
The Act provided greater power and authority to a warden to impose strict
protection of wild animals and forest inside a national park. The department prohibits
people from entering or using the park without a permit. An entry permit or written
permission (with appropriate fees) from an authorized official is required to enter the
park or reserve (except for government employees and those who have the privilege of
right-of-way). The Act also permits an officer to "open fire, aiming as far as possible
below the knee" if an offender resorts to violence or accomplice attempts to escape, or
prevent his/her arrest, or he/she escapes while being arrested, or after he/she is arrested,
or in case the life of the person making the arrest appears to be in danger, or in case he
has no alternative but to resort to the use of arms. In any person dies as a result of such
firing, it shall not be deemed at to be an offense.
It classified species into "protected wildlife" including mammals, birds, and
reptiles in Schedule 1 and the species were restricted from hunting. They can be killed,
captured or chased with the permission from the prescribed officers (warden or subwarden) provided that they are "rogue wild elephant," "man-eating tiger," "diseaseinfected animals" or they cause "considerable loss to human beings." The species were
inscribed in the Schedule 1 as "protected wildlife" despite "little is known about the
distribution and abundance of many species listed" (Heinen and Yonzon 1994, 62). Every
human activity is prohibited inside the national park including hunting, construction of
structures, cultivation, grazing, removal or collection of resources, carrying arms, etc.
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The Act imposed severe fines and punishment to people who kill or harm or trade
in selected "protected wildlife" such as rhinoceros, tiger, elephant, musk deer, clouded
leopard, snow leopard or bison. The fifth amendment has increased fines to 500,0001,000,000 Rs or imprisonment between 5 years to 15 years or both. Any accomplices
involved in harming or killing of rhino, elephant, tiger or musk deer get the equivalent
punishment as the offender. Furthermore, after getting a search warrant the officer can
search anything at any time, and arrest if "there is a "reasonable ground to believe" that a
person has committed any wrongdoing about the act. Moreover, the act provided the
power of investigation by a ranger or non-Gazette first class or sub-inspector of the police
force. He/she files the case before the adjudicating officer in the name of the national
park office or reserve office or conservation office. The prescribed court or authority has
the power to hear and dispose of cases.

4.4.2. Early militarization of parks
In 1976 (32 Sal), the monarchical government further handed over the
responsibility of protecting wild animals inside RCNP to the Royal Nepal Army, and the
Gaida Gasti74 were recruited to maintain the boundary and to protect wildlife outside of
the park. About 500 army personnel were posted in 25 different posts of the park. This
has been increased to 1000 army and in 51 posts in CNP (Wells and Sharma 1998).
Authors have reported the downside of using the army and the militarization of the park.
First, the use of the army’s service in protecting national parks is highly costly. It

74

Although some reported that Gaida Gasti (Rhino Patrol) was created at the beginning of the 1960s
(Budhathoki 2012), the establishment has a long history. PM Judda Samsar Rana had employed around 100
Gaida Gasti personnel during this rule.

187

incurred 75-80 percent of the total national park running cost (Müller-Böker 1998; Wells
and Sharma 1998). Second, many have reported the army’s involvement in physical
violence including beating and rape of rural residents. For instance, in 1979, Gaida Gasti
and the army used extreme violence, "beating and chasing" to drive away landless forest
settlers from Chitwan area. One of the settlers died because of extreme beating, and
another was seriously injured. About 400 houses, although built in an area that was not
commercially valuable, were destroyed and burned. All the settlements were evicted from
the land under forest department jurisdiction within a few weeks. In another round of
eviction, the settlers were warned about the removal and given ten days' notice, but in
five days Gaida Gasti personnel and the army came in jeeps, trucks, and elephants and
they "burned down all the dwellings and destroyed settlers' belongings" and all the crops
were destroyed with the help of elephants (Shrestha 2002, 256). Third, army battalions
frequently move from one place to another within two to three years, they have less
knowledge of the place, and fewer incentives to work for conservation compared to
designated forest guards (Wells and Sharma 1998). I have observed the same in the
Sauraha Army post where the chief of the army frequently changes or transfers within a
six-month period. Besides, an army commander is less likely to work under the
supervision or guidance of the national park warden; there may actually be no cases of
army commanders working under the warden (see Kunwar 2013). Therefore, the
coordination between army and national park staff is difficult.
The loss of customary land use practices such as shifting cultivation and the
customary and spatial demarcation added enduring violence and hardship to local people.
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In response to the boundary maintaining violence, long-time resident Tharu respondents
told me that:
A Gaida Gasti Army major used to tell us not to enter the “Ban Simana” – the
demarcation line. He used to threaten people and tell them not to cross the line.
He used to tell all people and in front of local representatives to farm and
construct house only outside of the “Ban Simana”. He used to command local
representatives to look after the line and people’s practices. People used to uproot
poles and encroach on forest areas as soon as the Gaida Gasti people left the
village. Although we have different types of people and local representatives, no
one used to inform the government or Gaida Gasti of destroying poles and
boundaries75.

4.5. Conclusion
In addition to the representation of nature and society, and associated spatial and
legal strategies including violence for the strict protection of wild animals inside strictly
bounded territory (discussed in a separate section below), the protection of wild animals
in strictly bounded spaces was further produced and reproduced through continuous
processes and strategies of conservation and development. For instance, in 1984, the
UNESCO declared the CNP as the world heritage site (WHS). The worlds' natural
property: UNESCO represented the CNP as the "unique" and the “last undisturbed
habitat” (UNESCO 1984). For instance, the UNESCO’s advisory body evaluation

75

Interview with a Tharu man of Bodreni settlement, July 2, 2017
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report76 of 1984 portrayed the park as “an outstanding example of geological processes
and biological evolution as the last major surviving example of the natural ecosystems of
the Tarai region" (UNESCO 1984). The Padampur settlement (now completely relocated
outside the current CNP boundary) was represented as the “last remaining habitat" for
wild animals such as tiger, rhinoceros, and gharial crocodile (UNESCO 1984). After the
1980s, conservation priorities started to shift from the strict protection of wild animals
through guns, guards and fences towards more participatory conservation, however, the
fortress-style conservation model did not fizzle out and continued to shape the wildlife
conservation in Nepal. The practices and processes related to fortress style conservation,
participatory conservation, and landscape-level conservation continued to exist in Nepal.

76

UNESCO 1984. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/284/documents/ United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization, June 17, 2018
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Chapter Five: Community Based Conservation in the Bagmara Buffer Zone
Community Forest

"In the past, Tharu people were the major problem and there were a lot of them.
Now, the state has sufficiently controlled Tharu people, and the remaining problem of
Chitwan is wild animals and roads."77
(Tharu Welfare Council office, Chitwan April 27, 2017)

The overall purpose of the study was to contribute to two areas of investigation
with political ecology. One is focused on the political-ecological effects resulting from
the rapid increase in territorialized community-based conservation (CBCs), such as buffer
zones that seek to integrate socio-economic development goals with biodiversity
protection. The other addresses the complex interrelations of conservation territories,
subject formation, and state goals for governing people and nature. My contribution is
partly derived from the fieldwork I conducted in Chitwan’s buffer zone in the former
Bacchauli Village Development Committee (VDC) of Chitwan District. The next two
chapters address these two areas of investigation using Bacchuali VDC as the case study.
The current chapter will address first, the political-ecological effects, and the following
chapter, Chapter Six, will address the second, the interrelations of conservation,
subjectivity, and state governance. Both investigations are informed by environmentality,
and territoriality.

77

I went to the Tharu Kalyankari Sabha office of Chitwan (Tharu Welfare Council) to talk with the
president. Before a meeting with the president, I was listening to the conversation between a former
president of the organization, and another Bahun man. The activists shared an incident that occurred
between him and Chitwan District's Local Development Officer (LDO). He stopped the LDO who
denigrated Tharu people in a live television speech. He shared what LDO's said in his speech.
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5.1. Study site description
The exact study site, Bagmara Buffer Zone Community Forest (Bagmara CF or
CF) of Chitwan National Park (CNP) is located in wards 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the former
Bacchauli Village Development Committee (VDC) of Chitwan District. The former
Bacchauli VDC is now the current ward 17 (formerly wards 1, 3 and 4) and ward 18
(formerly ward 2) of the Ratnanagar Municipality. These wards form part of the buffer
zone of the CNP. The forest users are distributed into nine settlements. For heuristic
purposes, I have categorized nine settlements in three large settlements- Sauraha, Odra,
and Malpur settlements as the "tourism area," Bodreni, Bagmara and Laukhani
settlements as the "forest fringe area’ and Sisuwar, Mainaha and Paderiya settlements as
“distant settlements.”

Figure 5.4- Community forest and settlements (Map by Yogesh Dongol)
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Table78: Information in the table are based on the management plan of Bagmara CF
2002/03-2006/07

2011/12- 2016/17

Household size

780

1017

Population size

4546

5163

Male population

2316

2557

Female population

2230

2606

Indigenous groups

58

52

Janajati groups

18

24

Bahun-Chetri groups

19

19

“untouchables” and others

6

5

Cow, buffalo, Ox,

1575

1107

Sheep, Goat,

1362

1223

Firewood

71

72

LPG

13

21

Biogas

16

3

Rich

10

14

Medium

64

24

Poor

26

56

Gender

Population by ethnic groups

Total livestock’s

HH Energy use in percent

HH by class

Very poor

6

78

Data are from the management plan of Bagmara BZCF. Population by ethnic groups, household energy
use and class are in percent. Population divided into three class categories in 2002/03-2006/07 and four
class categories in 2012-2016 management plans.
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Table: Information in the table are based on the random sample of HHs
Indigenous
Group

Janajati
group

BahunChetri

"untouchable
" caste

Sample size (HHs)

51

27

14

4

Average land ownership (in
Katta)

9.8

5.1

14.2

0.75

HHs with livestocks (in
percent)

60

63

64

25

Farming households (in
percent)

78

81

71

0

HHs in tourism sector (in
percent)

17

26

29

25

Foreign employment HHs
(in percent)

29

37

57

0

HHs with Biogas plant (in
percent)

20

11

21

0

5.1.1. Demographics and ethnic makeup
A household survey from the early 1990s recorded 532 households and a total
population of 3218 in Bagmara79. In 2002, the constitution of Bagmara BZCF recorded
780 households with a total population of 4520. By 2012, the household survey noted
1017 households and a population of 516380. According to local CF leaders, currently
there are more than 1200 households. In the 2012 survey, the total population below 16

79

Author collected archives located at NTNC office, 2017

80

Bagmara BZCF Management Plan, 2012- 2016).
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years was about 27 percent. There was 67 percent of people between age group 17-60 and
7 percent are above 60 years of age. About 79 percent of the population is categorized as
Hindu. The Buddhist and Christian communities are 18 and 4 percent respectively. The
male and female population are almost equal in number. The Bagmara CF management
plan has broadly categorized total households into different ethnic groups. The
indigenous group has 52 percent of households which includes Tharu, Derai, Kumal and
Bote groups. Janajati group has 24 percent households, which includes hill ethnic groups
such as Gurung, Magar, Newar, Rai, Tamang. Bahun-Chetri group has 19 percent
households. Similarly, "untouchable" caste groups such as Pariyar, Musher, and
Bishwokarma make up about five percent of households. There are also other ethnic
groups in the area. Although Tharu people are from all over the settlement, the more
distant settlements have the highest percentage of Tharu households. For instance,
Mainaha settlement has 99 percent, versus the Bagmara settlement, which only has 3
percentage of Tharu households. The tourism area has the highest percentage of BahunChetri households. For example, Sauraha settlement has 47 percent of Bahun-Chetri
households. The majority of Tamang households are in forest fringe areas. My random
sample households (96 HHs) included 31 percent from distant settlement areas, 43
percent from tourism area and 26 percent from forest fringe areas. The sample included
53 percent of indigenous groups, 28 percent of Janajati group, 15 percent of BahunChetri group and four percent of “untouchable” groups.
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5.1.2. Community socio-economics
The latest management plan of the Bagmara CF has categorized forest users into
four different classes81 including very poor (6 percent), poor (56 percent), medium (24
percent) and rich (14 percent). More than 80 percent of the tourism-related businesses,
from hotels to small retail shops are located in the area of the Sauraha, Odra, and Malpur
settlements (tourism area). About 15 percent of tourism-related business is located in
Bodreni, Bagmara and Laukhani settlements (forest fringe area) and the remaining five
percent are located in Sisuwar, Mainaha and Paderiya (distant settlements). Although
2012-2016 management plan noted that about 10 percent of age group between 16-60 are
in foreign countries for employment, my survey findings show that about 35 percent of
households have one or more than one member of a household in foreign countries for
employment, the majority of which are in the Middle East and East Asian countries. At
least 18 percent of respondent's households have any one member directly involved in
tourism-related work including driving, guards, tour guides, kitchen helpers, small shops
owners, restaurant owners, and small and big hotel owners. However, most people are
involved in tourism as labors. Most workers in hotels and restaurants are outside of the
former Bacchauli Buffer zone village. One reason for not working in the tourism sector is
the heavy labor exploitation. Although some big hotels pay government minimum salary,

81

Very poor category is defined as the landless people and those who do not have sources of cash income.
People of poor category have a house in private land, but only sufficient to only feed 6 months to their
family. Medium category people are those who have 5 Katta land in Sauraha or sources of cash income or
that household that have 10 Katta of land in other settlements and sources of cash income. Rich households
have more land and sources of income. Although the categories are based on two defining economic factors
(landholding and cash income), those two factors do not necessarily define the poor or very poor. I have
found that Tharu people who had large land holdings more than 15 Katta of land, for instance, and
additional sources of income, still categorize themselves as poor people.
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most offer less. After visiting more than 20 hotels and restaurants and interviewing
supervisors and employees, I found that kitchen helpers and waiters get an average of
6000-7000 Rs 82 per month. A cook gets an average of 10000 Rs. Only hotels that have
labor unions pay the government minimum salary, which is around 9700 Rs and most
others provide salary of around 5000-6000 Rs. As one cook of a popular hotel told me,
“If you go at 6 am morning, you have to work until a minimum of 10, 11 pm depending
on guests, which is more than 16 hours. They pay only 8 thousand to the lowest post –
kitchen helper.”
My survey shows that more than 73 percent of forest users households still
practice some farming. They usually plant paddy, maize, mustard, and vegetables. The
majority of the rich households who have large land holdings and extra cash income
sources do not farm. They often own hotels and rent out their lands to others. Many
people who do not have land and near landless people do not farm but they primarily
depend on wage labor. Some landless people also farm by sharecropping or renting land.
There is a high variation among people who farm in terms of landholding size. It ranges
from 2 Katta83 to 40 Katta. Many people farm but the size of their landholding is very
small, although people with a family size of 4 and have 2-3 Katta of land can produce
enough rice (2 times cropping of paddy) for a year. The farming households are much
fewer in places where the tourism is high such as in "tourism area," as many people have
sold their land. The number of farming household has therefore been rapidly decreasing
in Bagmara BZ area. The most noticeable change is in the tourism areas and forest fringe

82

(100 Rs Nepali Rupee = 1 USD approx.)

83

1 Katta land = 0.034 ha
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areas. Many have stopped farming not because they do not want to, but because most
lands have been purchased by wealthy locals and outsiders. Some people make cash
income by selling farm products. Most people who farm told me that farming is not
profitable anymore if one counts the daily labor costs the farmer invests in the production
of crops. Farmers face a classic situation of declining terms of trade. Crop prices are
declining relative to the rising costs of fertilizer, labor, insecticides, and machinery.
The Bagmara CF residents also keep livestock such as cows and buffalos, goats,
sheep and pigs and, chickens and ducks. About 50 percent of livestock are in the forest
fringe area. Far settlements have 37 percent of livestock. The total livestock number has
significantly decreased compared to past. In the 1990s, the total livestock number was
about 9706 and 2002 data indicated only 2486 in total84. About 63 percent of households
have livestock. Most houses with smaller landholdings keep smaller livestock such as
goats, ducks, and chickens. Most people have no more than two large livestock (such as
cow and buffalo). About 17 percent have few goats. Although livestock rearing is
generally decreasing, many houses located very near to the forest and who live very far
from the forest still rear livestock. As a Laukhani woman told me,
In the past, each household used to have 12-15 buffalos. I used to have 4-5
buffalos in the past. I sold all of them because of the shortage of grasses. You
cannot go to CNP and CF does not have grass because they have planted trees all
over the place. Getting paddy straw – Paral - is also difficult because I have less

84

Bagmara BZCF Management Plan 2002-2006
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land and buying paddy straw is very expensive because of their private
elephants.85
One of the major changes is the use of livestock for cash income. People
primarily used to keep livestock because of the need of manure in the crop fields. Now
many people either rear livestock to produce milk for sale or to sell live animals. Many
people also rear goats, ducks and chickens to sell in the market or for household
consumption.

5.1.3. Forest resources for household consumption and market sales
According to the Bagmara CF management plan, about 21 percent of households
use LPG (liquid petroleum gas) for cooking. Three percent of the household have
installed biogas, and about 72 percent depend on firewood. About 29 percent of Sauraha
settlement use firewood, which is the lowest and about 65 percent of Sisuwar forest users
depend on firewood, which is the highest. Sauraha, Odra, and Malpur have only 8 percent
of biogas plants, whereas Bodreni, Bagmara, and Laukhani in combine have 42 percent
and Sisuwar, Mainaha and Paderiya have the highest 49 percent of biogas plants.
According to the forest inventory in the management plan of Bagmara CF, the CF can
provide 19 percent of total firewood demand (37582 loads), 65 percent of fodder demand
(13089 loads) and 19 percent of grasses (89178 loads).
Most Tamang people (mostly women) of Bodreni and Laukhani prefer to go to
the national park and Khorser buffer zone forest to bring large loads (30-50 Kg load) of
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Author Interview with Laukhani Tamang woman, September 24, 2016
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firewood and grass. Each load which has as many as 2-3 sellable loads costs 500 Rs.
Hoteliers come with their vehicles to get firewood from houses. They primarily use it for
campfires and BBQs. In addition, many Tamang people prepare alcohol to sell it in the
market, which also requires a large quantity of firewood. One Tamang man of the
Laukhani said, "every house prepares alcohol and sell in the market here86." Many
women of the forest fringe areas also collect vegetable fern called Neuro from CNP,
Khorser, and CF forest and sell it. Most Fern collectors are older Tamang women of
forest fringe areas. Although Tharu women also collect neuro for occasional use as a
vegetable, most do not sell it. The recent boom in the collection and sale of the fern is the
growing demand by non-local people as an organic vegetable. People sell forest resources
for daily household needs and expenses such as education, grocery, and clothing. One
woman, to explain why they have heaps of firewood in front of her home, said, "parents
have to do dukkha87 for kids. If they ask money you have to fulfill their needs."88 Some
Indigenous people, Tharu, Bote, Darai, Musaher people like river resources such as fish
and snails. In the past, they use to live in a riverbank, and once they fish, they barter with
villagers for cash or food. Although fishing and collection of Ghugi (snail) are strictly
restricted, some people of ethnic groups have special access and permit and others do not.
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Informal interview with a former Bagmara CF member, October 2016
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Suffering for a family in a positive way

88

Interview with Tamang woman of Laukhani, September 2016
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5.1.4. Community politics
Party politics are most important in Bagmara CF area. There are three major
parties, the Nepali Congress, United Marxist-Leninist (UML) and Maoist party. The
Nepali Congress party controls the majority of the hotels, restaurants and small
businesses in the tourism area. Nepali Congress party members in the Sauraha area are
relatively rich compared to other residents. As one hotel worker expressed to me, “Dai89,
is it correct that once people become rich they become Nepali Congress party?" I said,
“why are you asking?” He replied, indicating a restaurant owner, "he was UML and now
he is a supporter of the Nepali Congress party.90" As most tourism activities are
controlled by Nepali Congress and mostly Bahun-Chetri and few Tharu people, the
access to the tourism business or any business related to tourists is shaped by the
affiliation to a party. One active person told me that a Tharu man who runs a tourism
business converted into Nepali Congress because he did not receive guest referals from
hoteliers belonging to the Nepali Congress.
In addition, although most local people do not like to work in hotels and
restaurants because of the extremely low pay and long hours of work, those who wish to
get a job also depend on party affiliation and caste/ethnic categories. Party politics and
access to benefits and opportunities have been primarily shaped by the affiliation to a
certain party and ethnic identity at the local level, which is no different than the national
level. Although all parties and ethnic groups have strategically used caste/ethnic
identities, many Bahun-Chetri people at the local do not want other ethnic/caste groups to
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Older brother.

90

Field note- conversation with a restaurant worker (cook, helper, cleaner) from western CNP buffer zone
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talk or practice identity-based politics. As a result, Tharu and Tamang political leaders do
not openly talk about or are not currently involved in identity politics because of the fear
of alienation from the national political leaders and parties. As one Tharu Nepali
Congress leader said in a conversation,
"many people left the party because they thought that despite their contribution to
the party, their voices were not represented in the party. Some are involved in
Tharuhat, and another identity-based party. In the Tharuhat movement, Kamal
Chaudhary died in the protest from our village. Although we had some identitybased protest, all belong to major political parties and we have to follow party
directives or party leader's directives. They may threaten to dismiss from party
membership and some were dismissed at the time.91"

5.2 Reterritorialization in rural Nepal: the Chitwan NP bufferzone
After the mid-1990s, the state with the support of non-state agencies formally
created new categories of land around the immediate villages bordering the CNP. The
broad category of such legally designated and demarcated land is known as a "buffer"
zone. According to NPWC Act 1993, fourth amendment, the buffer zone is "a peripheral
area of a national park or reserve prescribed…. to provide facilities in use forest
resources on a regular and beneficial basis for the local people." The zoning of land use
was based on the idea of "impact zone." The areas and settlements affected by the
establishment of CNP, including use and access of park resources, access to grazing
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Informal Interview with Tharu Nepal Congress leader of Sisuwar settlement, November 30, 2016
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space and impact by park wild animals. However, according to buffer zone policies, the
demarcation of buffer zone boundary was largely based on social, natural features and
natural resources rather than actual "impact" or park-people conflict on settlements and
populations.
The 1973 NPWC Act, the 1996 Buffer Zone Management Regulations and the
1999 Buffer Zone Management Guidelines have legally expanded the authority of CNP
warden with the redefinition surrounding villages of CNP as a buffer zone. In addition to
the legal jurisdiction of CNP warden to administer bodies in the bounded space and
control the spatial activities and movement, the warden also has the power to change the
buffer zone boundary by inscribing the change in the Nepal Gazette (see Heinen and
Mehta 2002). Buffer Zone regulations, 1996 prohibited "any activities" damaging forest
resources or wildlife or "any action" having a negative impact on natural environment,
and land use health. In addition, local users need an approval from CNP to start "any
industries" including any removal of earth, gravel or any material from the buffer zone
space. Moreover, state and park authorities’ power rest on the decades of strict wildlife
conservation and related “scientific” classification of wild animals. That is, some wildlife
such as rhino, tiger and elephants and others have been nationally classified as a
protected species and globally classified in various categories of IUCN red list (see
previous chapter).

5.2.1. Surveillance, inspection, and correction in the buffer zone
Although the designation of the buffer zone and the establishment of buffer zone
under park authority did not transfer the private ownership of land, the shift in the new
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definition of land and authority have affected property rights including some effect on the
use and access of resources on the privately owned land. Within the buffer zone, certain
activities, uses, practices or movements of local people that can potentially affect
conservation are considered an infringement of park laws and regulations. For instance,
In Bagmara CF area, Nepal Army arrested a Tharu man for hitting a rhino92, a legally
protected species, with a piece of brick in an attempt to save his paddy from deprivation.
Nepal Army soldiers questioned and threatened a Bote man and another Kumal man in a
separate incident for fishing in the Rapti and Khagari Rivers, respectively. Nepal Army
soldiers also frequently threaten and arrest local people in the settlement for collecting
forest resources from the community forest, buffer zone forest or CNP forest. In the
tourism area, the Nepal Army along with NTNC and CNP, controlled nature guides and
guests from entering a public sightseeing area in the buffer zone for "polluting" the area.
These are few examples of the spatial limitation of what people can and cannot do on and
with their private land and the forested land of buffer zone areas.
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Interview with Hareram Mahato, September 30, 2016
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Figure.5. 5- Two Nepal army men in a security post at Sauraha settlement. (Photo by
Yogesh Dongol)
However, what people can and cannot do on their private land depends on
individual authority. Power relations shape what is allowed or allowable. For example, a
Tharu man had to go through legal proceedings for cutting a (Dalbergia sisso) Sisso tree
from his private land and taking it to a sawmill to make it usable without the prior
approval from CNP authority. In this case, state authority spatially freezes how his
particular resource from private land can be used and made it conditional on the approval
of CNP authority. In another case, the CNP did not protest when a powerful leader and
hotelier used an excavator in the river to construct a levee to make or reclaim land.
However, the CNP arrested people for fishing for subsistence needs. A hotel owner and
Bagmara CF president appropriated land as private property by constructing a levee or
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dike on the Rapti River boundary of CNP. The shifting river boundary has enclosed the
privately-owned land of people. Those who do not have power must tolerate the loss of
land or take nominal compensation (if provided). People with political and economic
influence, through "connections" with external power sources including national
politicians or the CNP warden, have reclaimed part of their new land and extended the
boundary93. I put the local people's concern to CNP warden and he said he had to allow it
because people might say the NP is "anti-development." More importantly, he said "I
don't know it if is right or wrong to construct 4-5 story building right by the river. The
state has not been able to stop or do anything, how can I stop that. We have said not to
construct the wall right by the river, but they constructed. What can you do? katipaya
kura ..chalcha .yesti ho!94" (expression of helplessness or disregard of questions or
comments). He further elaborated on the issue and said that "they again said that they
needed to construct drainage to pass from the settlement to the Rapti River. I threatened
to jail an engineer who developed the plan." He acknowledges helplessness to impose
rules when it comes to powerful local people, who might have used political connections
to construct a wall in the name of the “tourism development95” in Sauraha.
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Informed by many local users, also mentioned in Informal conversation with a member of Bagmara
BZCF
94

Interview with Ram Chandra Kadel (CNP warden), April 29, 2017
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The president of the buffer zone user’s committee and local political leader encroached the CNP river
boundary by constructing the levee in the river. The construction of levee on the stretch of his land was a
project funded by the Nepal Tourism Board in the name of tourism development in Sauraha. In addition to
that, he constructed a restaurant on the land disregarding not only parks laws and regulation, but the
Municipality rule and local understanding that the people are required to construct a house 10 meters away
from the road (or dam here). The issue became complicated when there was no outlet of water collected
from the Sauraha settlement because of the construction of the restaurant. Another UML supporter and a
hotel owner of the areas angrily put his view on the encroachment of the Rapti River although he has also
constructed as strong boundary by the Rapti river. He said, “now Basu Dhungana is a president of buffer
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Figure 5.6- Showing the extension of private land by the construction of levee or dyke in
Sauraha settlement. (Photo by Yogesh Dongol
5.2.2. Mapping, zoning and claiming by plantation establishment
The Bagmara BZ96 has different land use categories including the Khorser buffer
zone forest (Khorser forest) and the Bagmara buffer zone community forest (Bagmara
CF). Nine settlements are spread in different distance from CNP, and water bodies such
as the Rapti River bordering CNP. The Khagari River between Bagmara CF and Khorser
forest and Budhi Rapti bordering nearby Chitrasen buffer zone area (Chitrasen BZ) and

zone. We, along with the Dahal ji (Balram Dahal is a Nepali Congress leader and recently won the local
election representing the Sauraha area), discussed and signed an agreement that the dike or the levee along
the river will be considered as a road. Despite the agreement, he is constructing a house/restaurant, [not
leaving 10 meter from the road] encroaching the dike or road. What will happen with the water collected in
all Sauraha settlement now?” Sauraha settlement meeting, November 14, 2017.
96

Buffer zone area that includes only the forest users of Bagmara buffer zone community forest (BZCF)
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Bagmara BZ. During the initial establishment of Bagmara CF, NTNC officers surveyed
the Bagmara CF space. They constructed the CF boundaries and divided the CF into
different blocks for plantation. In each block, the NTNC with the help of local residents,
made plantations in different blocks with fast-growing species such as Sisso (Dalbergia
sisso), Teak (Tectona grandis) and Khair (Acacica catechu). The NTNC with help from a
local committee of leaders did the first plantation in the "open space" of Bagmara CF area
in 1993-1994 on 20 ha of land. In 1995-1996, with the initiation of NTNC, two big plots
of 20 and 22 ha were planted, both on the northern side. Local residents opposed the
plantation in the southern open plot because they demanded the land for grazing space.
For villagers, the chaur, or open space, was their grassland grazing space to support
livestock primarily for farming purposes. The tree seedling plantation of the "open space"
and fencing with barbed wire to save seedlings was the initial mechanism by which the
NTNC controlled the space. The fast-growing foreign species were planted in the hope of
generating quick economic benefits and to provide resources to local people. As one
NTNC staff told me, "that space was all ‘Chaur,’ nothing was there, and now after the
plantation, it looks like a natural forest."97
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NTNC forest ranger, December 17, 2016
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Figure 5.7- Initial survey of current Bagmara CF and that mapping of plantation plots.
(Achieves from NTNT office)

5.3. Management of the Bagmara CF
Bagmara CF - (Baag means a tiger and mara means to kill) - as the name suggests
is a place where Rana hunting parties used to camp during their hunts. Rana rulers used
to hunt and dry tiger skins in Bagmara’s open grasslands, which is quite extensive,
attracting people from other regions to graze livestock. The existing Bagmara CF area is
about 215 ha. The CF is also a part of Bharandabar (Khorser) wildlife corridor. The
Khagari River forms it border in the west and Budhi Rapti River marks its northern
boundary. At the southern border is the private land of Bodreni settlements. Similarly, the
eastern border of the forest is the private land of Malpur and Bagmara settlements. It has
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wild animals such as rhinos and others. It was under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Forest but came under the authority of CNP after the introduction of buffer zone
management. Tharu people started to farm by clearing the forested land only after the
mid-1950s in the eastern half of the current Bagmara CF. Fourteen Tharu households
used to practice shifting cultivation in the area. The Rapti Valley Development Project
(RVDP) surveyed the newly claimed land and provided the provisional landownership
certificate to the fourteen Tharu households in 1958/1959. The land commission of
1964-1965 evicted most Tharu settlers in nearby Khorser area to provide habitat for
rhinos. Although Tharu people had ownership of the land and they were paying land tax
to the government, the 1970 land survey carried out by the state did not recognize Tharu
people’s private ownership of the land and their customary cultivation practices. The
survey team formally labeled the land as the forested land because only the cultivated
areas were considered as private land.
As Tharu people had land registration or ownership of the land and they had been
paying land tax to the government and as they were not allowed to farm their land, a few
“land Mafia”98 members convinced the local landholders that they will help them get
back their land if they agreed to give them 50 percent of the land. The “land Mafia” won
legal proceedings from the Supreme Court as they included politically powerful people,
including a minister related to land. After winning the case, they refused to give back 50
percent but only agreed to give some marginal land by the river and forest. The Cabinet-
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Land Mafia- A local label for people who tried to control part of Bagmara CF land. The land Mafia
included powerful local leaders including Tharu elites, Tamang and Bahun-Chetri people, and more
powerful people from outside area including then Minister of land reform. Most local "land Mafia" later
became the CF's uses committee leaders.
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level decision reversed the private ownership of the land and redesignated it as forest
belong to the state. Prime Minister BP Koirala directly played a role in helping to make
the land through the cabinet-level decision. Then prince Gynandra may have played the
more important role because he was also the chair of the NTNC, which initiated the
wildlife tourism in Bagmara CF area.
The state formally handed over the Bagmara forest to communities as a
community forest in 1994 under the authority of Department of Forest. It was declared as
buffer zone community forest after 1996 with the initiation of the buffer zones around
national parks in Nepal. In the past, the forest area was degraded before it was managed
as the CF. Only a few strands of old Simal (Bombax ciba) trees remained because of the
demand of firewood for Sauraha tourism. Sauraha tourism started around 1979 when the
Sauraha park entrance gate was open for tourism purposes. By 1985-1986, Sauraha
already had more than 10 hotels. After tourism started to grow in Sauraha, the demand
for firewood from the Bagmara forest started to grow for the purposes of heating water
for showers and for firewood for tourists. During that time, the primary profession of
Tamang people of the Bodreni settlement was to sell firewood in Sauraha hotels. They
used to supply about 500-700 loads (bhari) of firewood to Sauraha every day. In addition
to the continuous supply of firewood to Sauraha market, the forest was a grazing space
for nearby people. Bagmara CF was the only source of firewood and grazing space
because CNP was strictly closed. Firewood demands continued to grow with the growth
of hotels.
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5.3.1 Household use of the Bagmara CF
Only households of wards 17 and 18 of the Ratnanager Municipality are legally
designated users of the Bagmara CF. Many other residents formally requested and tried to
become members of the Bagmara CF claiming that they had helped in establishing the
forest and had historically used it, but they were denied. Qualified ward residents not yet
included as user households can get a free new membership upon application. Inmigrants are awarded membership if they meet following criteria; if they apply with valid
permanent migration certificate; if they are permanently living and have land in wards 17
or 18 and if they pay certain membership fees. In addition, although individuals have to
present government migration certificates, hotel owners can get a membership without
them. For instance, if anyone established a hotel in Bagmara BZ, then he/she can be a
member of Bagmara CF although her/his primary residence is outside the wards, or even,
for instance, in Kathmandu. There is a nearby "new settlement" of 20 households of
landless people. The majority of landless people (Sukumbasi) are not members of
Bagmara CF because "that is a new settlement.”99 Maoist Party-affiliated leaders helped
to establish the landless settlement in the ailani land 100 by the river. CF users are highly
heterogeneous according to class, ethnicity/caste, place of original migration, current
settlements, political party, and gender.
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Bagmara CF user committee member, December 17, 2016
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Non-surveyed land such as river banks, floodplains, Tharu settlements, water bodies.
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5.3.2. Bagmara CF Forest Users Committee
The Bagmara buffer zone community forest users group committee (hereafter
forest users' committee) is the local institution that has the responsibility and rights to
manage the community forest commons. It is one of many sub-user groups of a
Migrakunja buffer zone users' committee (hereafter Migrakunja BZUC). There is a
provision that 9-13 members are selected through some process – unanimous decision,
democratic election or any other means from the local residents. The current forest users'
committee (2012-2017) has 19 committee members. Each committee has a five-year
tenure. The Bagmara CF has a second tier sub-committee (Parisad), members for which
are selected from nine settlements. Each settlement has a five-member sub-committee.
There are altogether 45 council members. The sub-committee selects nineteen members
as the umbrella forest users committee. The forest user's committee are selected through
majority or unanimous decision. If a decision cannot be made, the committee is formed
through voting by forest users, but the current forest user's committee was selected
bypassing the constitution of the Bagmara CF. The current committee comprised of the
representatives of different political parties. For five years before the current committee,
the Bagmara had no user committee 2006/2007- 20011/2012. Parties ran the committee
turn by turn which resulted in the high misappropriation of CF revenue.
The current Bagmara CF committee has a high representation of local Tharu
people in major position including president and vice-president. About 63 percent are
from non-Bahun-Chetri groups. Tharu indigenous people are 26 percent out of 19
members committee, but their role in decision-making is negligible. As one of my Tharu
respondent who is also a member of the committee told me that, "There is a good
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representation of Tharu people in current committee but when it comes to decision
making one or two make all the decisions and other just say yes, yes.101" The Tharu
people's representation was the result of the work of national and local levels of the Tharu
people's movement, known as the Tharuhat movement. In the Bagmara CF bylaws, the
committee should ensure the participation of two women from every four wards. Some
woman Tharu Parisad members, however, do not even want to be in the committee and
never sought an appointment. Their names were just put forward by someone else.
National political parties have a key role in governing the Bagmara CF. Seven
political parties’ representatives formed the current committee when the committee’s
elected members were not able to form a new committee. Political parties divided the
posts among themselves. All sub-committee and committee members are, therefore,
representatives from Nepal’s seven major political parties including Nepali Congress
party (NC), United Marxist and Leninist (UML) party, Maoist party and others. The most
powerful parties such as Nepali Congress, UML, and Maoist parties controlled the most
important positions on the committee.

5.3.3. Rights and responsibilities of user’s committee
The management plan details the responsibilities of the CF committee in
conservation and development activities, including the control of use and access of
resources, monitoring, fine and punishment, boundary making and maintenance,
management of forest and income and expenditure, rulemaking and rule modifying and
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Interview with a Tharu Bagmara CF committee member of Sisuwar settlement, August 26, 2016
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conservation education. Fines and punishment for illegal activities inside the CF have
been inscribed in CF constitutions and in the management plan. In the management plan,
there is a graduated punishment and education for first time offenders such as livestock
grazing inside the forest. Second-time offenders are fined for 100 Rs for each cow or
buffalo and 50 Rs for each goat and sheep. And multiple offenders' fines will be double
and their livestock confiscated. Similarly, there is a graduated fine and punishment for
illegal collection of forest resources such as collecting grasses, fodder, and firewood.
People destroying boundary poles has a fine of 500 Rs. People are also arrested and
submitted to CNP authorities for harming any wild animals.
The management plan further mentioned that all activities of CF committee
including conservation, development, rulemaking, and rule modifying has to be passed
through or granted from the CNP authority. CF management plan also includes the
provision that the CF provides 25 percent of expenses for forest and wildlife
conservation, management and development. Its social development expenses must
ensure inclusion and participation of poor, women, “untouchable”, indigenous, Janajati,
while promoting the conservation of wildlife. Under the plan and in the CF’s constitution
there is a lot of confusion and overlap between the role, rights, and responsibilities of
forest users and forest user's committee. Both bodies have been confusingly used in the
constitution. For instance, the constitution has mentioned that role of "forest users" is to
appoint an auditor and prescribe the wage of the auditor. There is another provision
which provides "forest users" in collaboration with the park officials, can dispose the
forest user’s committee if the committee or committee members are found guilty of
wrongdoing under the constitution.
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5.3.4. Community-based resource management in actual implementation
Bagmara forest user's committee has a responsibility to conduct a general
assembly once a year and has the right to make changes in the constitution and
management plan if deemed necessary after getting approval from the general meeting.
During my fieldwork, I attended the Bagmara CF’s general assembly. Many people
informed me that the general assembly does not happen regularly every year. When the
final question and answer session started in the general assembly more than 99 percent of
users had already left. There were 10 users in the session and only two were actively
questioning the CF committee members. While the general assembly has a primary role
to approve many past activities and future agendas, these were never discussed publically
and were actually prepared before the general assembly. The committee members
requested that any four users to provide a signature on the general assembly minutes.
Many users left after the distribution of free lunch and many others left because the
committee’s guest speakers mostly represented different political parties or were public
officers. Their speech also left less time for the Q and A session. My impression of
staying there from beginning to the end and talking with many people is that many users
were not satisfied with the CF Committee people and their activities because many did
not listen and mostly avoided questions that people asked.
I was excited to meet with all BZCF committee members on the day of the
meeting. I had been in contact with the president of BZCF for the past few days and had
requested that I be able to sit in their monthly meeting and observe. The Bagmara CF
president told me he would allow me in and introduce me to the committee. I went there
at 10 am because they were scheduled to meet at 11 am. I met with various people,
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including president, in their offices. All were busy writing meeting minutes. I could not
understand why they had to write meeting minutes even before they held a meeting and
had agreed on agendas. After finishing writing the minutes, one member who said he
would not be able to come to the meeting signed off on the minutes and left. Afterward
the remaining office officials went home for lunch. I waited outside the building for
about an hour. One Tharu man came and entered the office. I knew he must be a
committee member. I went into the office and introduced myself to him. After around 10
minutes other committee members arrived including the president. He started to call the
committee members to participate in the meeting, because at least ten members needed to
present to pass the agenda. They started to count members.
The way the Bagmara CF functions has a lot to do with the larger problems of
democratic governances in Nepal. The national Maoists party has strong influence on the
ways institutions function including its local membership structure. All committee
members were selected based on party affiliation. There was no election. Democratic
decision making must be an uphill task now. The president who was from a major
political party and who told me that he would let me in the meeting, just a few minutes
later had to change his decision, probably because after another Maoist party member
told him that I should not be allowed in their "private" meeting. Just before the meeting I
met with other committee members outside the building and I told all that I was there to
meet with them and sit in meeting to see the processes and what takes place inside the
meeting. One Maoist committee member said, “it will be difficult to let you in because
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we talk so much about finance and budget and we won't even let our forest users attend
the meeting102.

5.3.5. State oversight of community forests
One of the major ways that state agencies control local institutions is through
national legislation and the administrative process. The community forests and associated
local institutions fall under the jurisdiction of the Chitwan NP buffer zone regulations as
prescribed by the NPWC Act 1973. The CNP warden and other park agencies have the
power to approve the management plan of the community forests. One of the major ways
that CNP administration has imposed is to require CNP warden’s approval in every
activity within the buffer zone. The forest user committee has to conduct the general
assembly in the presence of CNP representatives, NTNC representatives, and Migrakunja
BZUC representatives. More importantly, the CNP warden has a final say in the removal
and inscription of a provision in the management plan or operational place of the
community forest. For instance, as one of the active member of the CF said in an
interview, "if we want to distribute timber in logs or firewood then the size of the logs
should be no more than 2 feet. CNP stopped the distribution of logs to forest users and
we had to make it in small pieces before distribution. They try to control such small
issues too103." The management plan has to be passed through the park office and its
every provision is checked and passed through the warden’s approval. The CNP warden
can select and discard any agenda item. Issues that are pertinent to the warden have to be
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Informal conversation with Maoist committee member. September 1, 2016
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Interview with a Tharu Bagmara CF committee member of Sisuwar settlement, August 26, 2016
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included in the plan. Although the CF is more independent compared to Buffer zone
user's committee, all activities of CF have to go to the park office. The CF is required to
submit a copy of yearly and monthly meeting minutes to the BZ and CNP. The CF is
required to pass yearly income and expenditure through “users” and submit a copy to the
BZ and CNP. It needs to be audited by state recognized auditor. Finally, the CNP, based
on NPWC Act and BZ regulations can confiscate the community forest if the committee
does not follow the management plan.
Forest users committee can make a rule and implement the rule, but it can be done
only after getting a suggestion from CNP and NTNC experts and after getting approval
from the "users" meeting. The changes have to be finally approved by CNP authorities.
The approval of the management plan is also contingent on agreeing to the necessity of
“helping” national park authorities. “We have to provide ‘help’ to CNP and Army to
make our relationship better. So when we need help or approval of something we can ask
them for a favor104," a member of Bagmara CF told me. In addition, CF committee also
has to provide reports to NTNC, park and buffer zone offices.

5.4. The creation of a tourism sector in Bagmara CF
After years of forest planting and strict restriction of grazing inside the forest,
private elephant/hotel owners started elephant-back safaris within the Bagmara CF. The
elephant safari which started with 4-5 elephants now has expanded to more than 60
elephants. Elephants in the forest eat and trample vegetation. As a result, elephants
impact the regeneration of new shrubs and trees. A forest committee member said that the
104

Informal conversation with a member of the Bagmara CF committee
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two-third income of the Bagmara CF depends on elephant safaris. The revenue from
elephant safaris has expanded many times since its initial years. In the early years of
tourism, with the financial support of a British philanthropist and tourist, the CF
committee constructed a viewing tower to cater to tourists who wishes to spend a night
inside the community forest. Then prince Gyanendra (last Shah King of Nepal and then
chair of NTNC) inaugurated the tower. As tourism activities are primarily based on the
wildlife sighting inside the CF, the CF committee has been increasingly regulating
activities of local forest users. Moreover, the Bagmara CF committee has been
conducting various management activities of the forest, including grassland management,
supply of water sources through groundwater extraction (wetland management), the
clearance of bushes and scrubs, and the maintenance of "elephant tracks" to facilitate
elephant safaris. Another major tourist activity is canoeing in the Khagari River
bordering the Khorser buffer zone forest. King Birendra previously released Magara
crocodile in the river, which had none in the past, and the crocodiles have expanded in
numbers. Crocodile sighting is the main attraction of canoeing. As a consequence, local
use and access fishing have been completely curtailed, with forest guards and Nepal
Army soldiers used for the protection of crocodiles.
The elephant safari in CF is considered a "non-extractive" activity. It is also
considered an ecotourism activity because elephants are required to walk in the
"designated trace" and are not allowed to eat vegetation inside the forest. However, the
Bagmara CF management plan, some CF members, almost all forest guards and most
local residents who have visited the CF forest told me that the elephant safaris had
degraded the condition of the forest. Nonetheless, the CF management plan has prepared
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an elephant route map where only elephants are allowed for the purpose of wildlife
viewing. Local use and dependency on firewood and extraction of forest resources is
considered as extractive and more impactful on forest ecological conditions than elephant
safaris. Most of the forest resources that locals bring from CF are primarily for household
use because the firewood that comes from CF is not for sale in the market. Thus,
families’ access to a subsistence resource is being curtailed with questionable ecological
benefits. Following the Bagmara CF success in tourism, the CNP authorities have
allowed the committee to begin elephant safaris and other tourism activities inside the
Khorser "wildlife corridor", which was initially allocated for elephant breeding. About 60
Tharu households were forcefully evicted during the establishment of Korser forest and
after five decades it has been handed over for the expansion of ecotourism. Now, as the
elephant's safari has opened in in Khorser forest, which is primarily controlled by
Sauraha elites at present, the Bagmara CF has no power to make any decision without the
consent of local elites.
The CNP warden imposed a rule that only 50 elephants can enter the CF during
four period of the day. Hoteliers have used loopholes in the rule by incorporating the
neighboring Chitrasen CF so that they can expand up to 100 elephants. Even though the
Chitrasen CF is not suitable for elephant safaris—primarily because Chitrasen CF is a Sal
(Shorea robusta) forest where the occurrence and visibility of wild animals are lower and
elephants have a hard time walking in the uneven surfaces of Sal forest—the forest has
been included as an elephant safari area. This inclusion has helped local hoteliers legally
expand their elephant business as needed. In addition, since elephants have to cross the
river to go to the Chitrasen CF, the practice has also promoted the false idea that tourists
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are entering into CNP. This allows hoteliers, who in the past avoided the high CNP
entrance fees, to tell their clients that they are paying for a safari in a national park. Many
nature/tour guides and some hoteliers have told me that they have done that and some
have been caught in the lie by their clients105.

Figure 5.8Elephant trails
indicated in the
management plan
of the Bagmara
CF.

Figure 5.9- Actual
elephant trails
inside the
community forest
(Photo by Yogesh
Dognol)
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For instance, Interview with a hotel owner of Odra settlement. December 05, 2016
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5.4.1. Local socio-economic effects from tourism
Conservation will be challenging in future because people have started to speak
about distribution – President of Nature Guide Association, April 12, 2017

Many people had lots of lands and used to farm in the past and now people have
already sold all their land and the only thing that we have is these animals. – A
forest guard and local resident of Bagmara CF area

Although the wildlife tourism and the benefits of tourism at the CNP and buffer
zone scale are negligible in the majority of villages of CNP buffer zone villages, it would
be wrong to say that tourism has not generated income and benefits to the state and its
citizens. Sauraha, for example, is the major tourist destination on the eastern CNP.
Similar to many local entrepreneurs at Sauraha, CNP warden told me, "tourism has
employed a lot of people. Their land values have skyrocketed; people have benefitted
from selling vegetables and they are also selling grasses to elephant owners.106" These
statements are true. But the question is who are these "people" getting benefits from
conservation and tourism in Bagmara CF and Sauraha? How widely are benefits
distributed? How are the benefits controlled? And what are the socio-economic effects of
distribution and benefit sharing in the Bagmara CF? This section aims to look at what
CNP warden, with more than 20 years of experience in CBC, refers to as the “stupid
social issues107” of the distribution of cost and benefits from the CNP and its buffer zone.
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Interview with Ram Chandra Kadel (CNP warden), April 29, 2017
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Interview with Ram Chandra Kadel (CNP warden), April 29, 2017
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In studying these questions, I uncovered how ecotourism had highlighted conflicts over
wealth distribution, socio-economic inequality, and the elite capture of most benefits in
the Bagmara CF area. I argue that the outcomes of ecotourism are of a piece with
economic strategies that helped state officers indirectly control people and spaces by
producing and benefitting a local elite class. These strategies were made primarily
necessary as a part of the country’s economic liberalization and democratization
movement of the 1990s. In particular, the government’s park authority had limited
resources to control all activities in the context of growing ethnic and political tensions.
In the remainder of this section, I examine how all this has played out on the ground,
beginning with a look at the rise of a new labor sector.
One of the main arguments for the benefit of tourism is that it provides jobs to
local people. The respondents’ survey data show that only about ten percent of
households have some member employed at hotels and restaurants. Jobs include guards,
drivers, nature guides, cook helpers, ticket counter staff and front office management.
Most young men told me that they do not like to work because of the low salary and
heavy workloads in Sauraha tourism business. In addition, most women have extra
household roles and responsibilities. Nature guides employed by hotels, for instance,
have to perform other hotel duties when not guiding. They have to clean, garden, and
help in the kitchen. Sometimes hotel and restaurant owners will make their employee
work in their private house and paddy field. The CF and BZ in association with the hotel
association have provided cook, waiter and language training for employees. Regardless,
wage labor is not considered by locals to be an attractive option and the majority of
labors working in Sauraha hotels and restaurants are from outside the Bagmara CF area.
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When I put the question about employment and salary conditions to a hotel
owner, he referred to the supposed the laziness of local people, he said, "we have 23
people working in our hotel and we have to bring people from outside the village. People
from this village do not like to work. We provide food, clothes, shoes, and even they ask
for more money. People from this village do not have interest in working.108” Rather than
tourism producing an economic boon, I found tourism jobs functioned mainly as last
ditch alternatives for poor people such as the landless or near landless.
The sale of household surpluses is a popular alternative to wage labor for local
people. About 62 percent of the respondents who have some form of livestock including
buffalo, cows, goats, and ducks, sell their surplus. Some sell milk, some live ducks and
chickens, but these do not provide sufficient steady income that can fulfill household
needs. Fewer than 10 percent make some cash income by selling milk, which provides a
steady income. Some people said that they sell ducks or chickens occasionally, if
hoteliers or restaurant people come to their houses looking to buy. Tharu people, in
general, do not sell any surpluses. Most vegetables that are consumed in Sauraha are
brought in from distant urban markets. There are, in addition, a large number of local
people's small-scale grocery shops where people sell water, snacks, cigarettes and so
forth, which require less capital investment. Although CBC initiatives have been focused
on income generating, most indigenous people and hill janajati people still practice
traditional farming and livestock rearing, which are sources of both subsistence and cash
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Interview with hotel owner in Malpur (hotel in Bagmara settlemen), December 05, 2016
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income. About 25 percent of household residents regularly go to the forest to collect
grasses or firewood for subsistence.
In addition to the local resistance to wage labor, there is significant conflict
between hoteliers and nature guides. Hoteliers, for instance, want to pay a flat salary to
nature guides, no matter how experienced. More experienced nature guides demand
higher salaries. Consequently, hoteliers in association with NTNC are recruiting and
training new nature guides to keep wages suppressed. One of the entrepreneurs is a
person associated with both institutions. One experienced nature guide familiar with the
issue told me,
He controls everything. He provides guide license to his waiter and cooks helper
if he needs additional guides. He sends to them training and gives them a license,
so that he doesn't have to pay more to another nature guide. He will use those
guides for 500-600 per day. He is not going to pay 1000-1200 for the experienced
guide.109
In addition, the nature guide's job is a risky job as there is always the possibility of an
encounter with wild animals such as rhinos, bears, and tigers. However, nature guides do
not have any insurance. If something happens, then hoteliers who recruit them are not
liable for any expenses. “Hotel owners do not even keep a record of nature guide that are
recruited for daily guiding work,110" a president of nature guide association said. In
addition, hoteliers are also promoting activities of independent guides that stand by the
side of the road in their guide office or by the street to ask tourists coming to Sauraha if
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Interview with a Tharu nature guide. August last week, 2016
Interview with a President of Nature Guide Association, April 12, 2017
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they need free information of tourism activities are “bad” for Sauraha tourism. A person
critical on labor exploitation said that Sauraha had one good effort of Maoist where they
disturb tourism to impose a minimum standard of pay to labor. And said another
movement is needed to fight against hotelier monopoly.
In broader terms, the continuous promotion and uncontrolled expansion of
elephant safaris inside the Bagmara CF are shaped by the idea of development or bikas.
Every local leader and many residents told me that the increasing use of elephant safaris
is important because it generates capital for development. “Development” in this local
discourse primarily refers to the construction of infrastructure. One CF member said,
"without the CF and tourism income this place would not have blacktopped road because
the state has not invested and will not invest in this Tharu majority place.111" One
resident told me,
“We used to have knee deep mud road. We used to have difficulty crossing this
road. People have the benefit of conservation and protection of CF and tourism
here. During rainy months, you could hardly walk on this road. Mud used to up to
the knees. I used to put my bicycle on my shoulder from Malpur Chowk
(intersection) and bring it to home or most of the time I used to keep the bicycle
in that Malpur area.112”
Development as infrastructure resonated locally as people believed their lives
would be made easier, though it did not always play out as touted. The blacktop road as
the marker to development of village and settlement has hijacked the minds of most
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Interview with a Tharu Mahal Hotel owner, December 5, 2016
Interview with Tamang man (compensation sub-committee member), May 15, 2016
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people, but poorer people's version of bikas is different. Some are more critical of the
ways CF is spending money on road construction without directly helping forest users
fulfill their version of bikas, which involves directly helping people meet their
subsistence and cash needs.

Figure 5.10-Red blocks show the land which are either sold or have hotels (Map by
Yogesh Dongol)
A final noteworthy effect of tourism is skyrocketing land values in Sauraha. Many
residents say that the Tharu people have benefitted from the tourism because their land
values have reached an unexpected height. A former warden remembered that the land
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which used to cost 4 thousand per Biga113 has now reached one million114. However, not
all land has as high a price as many people claimed. When Hareram Mahato115 was
arrested by the Nepal army from his house for hitting a rhino to save his crop, a hotelier
and a local political leader who were at the arrest commented that the land value has
increased to 1 million a khatta and "these people" still complain about rhino eating crops.
The accused replied that he would sell him his land for half a million if one of them was
willing to buy it. More importantly, not all Tharu people have large land holdings which
they can sell. A Tharu man who still has 9 Katta of land told me, "That does not mean
anything to us because we do not have much to sell and we cannot buy it or we cannot do
business on it. We have less land we cannot buy or sell. Increase or decrease in price does
not make any difference to us"116. Responding to the comment of increasing land value, a
former Tharu Jamindar of Khorser who had 13 Biga of land and sold most of it told me,
"yes land value has skyrocketed, but we have not been able to save land. Most Tharu
people have sold land117." That is true. Most Tharu people have sold majority of their
land and many Tharu people did not even have large plots of land because of the
historical landlord system. I stayed in a Thaur house during my fieldwork whose owner
lost most of his land when the family was evicted from during the establishment of the
park. His family also lost 14 Biga of land during the demarcation of forest boundary and
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20 Katta = 1Biga (1 katta = 0.034 ha)
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Interview with Ram Pret Yadav in Chitwan, 2016
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Mahato and Chaudhary are Tharu caste.
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Interview with a Tharu man (Tractor driver) of Mainaha, November 30, 2016
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Interview with a Tharu man (former jimindar of Khorser forest), September 16, 2016
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establishment of current Bagmara CF. He and his family sold almost 4 Biga of land (now
the site of a popular hotel) due to the shifting park boundary. He now owns 7-8 Katta of
land, which is still a large land to produce enough crops for his family and earn some
cash income. Some who sold have moved from the place but most people are still in
Sauraha. Those who are on the main street have rented property and most Tharu people
have moved to near (inside) the road area, which is a marginal place in terms of doing
tourism business.

5.4.2 Explaining the distribution of tourism costs and benefits
Local hoteliers and political elites who have economic and political power shaped
and defined the rules and regulations. In Bagmara, for example, a CF committee member
affiliated with Maoist party, who had been involved in the Maoist-inspired insurgency,
boasted of a disproportionately large role in decision making. He told me that “the
president only makes a decision after consulting with me.”118 In addition, Maoist party
leaders and individuals had directly and indirectly, mostly through violence, controlled
most local and national level institutions in Nepal after 2006, which were previously
controlled by other parties. Their national-level influence slowly decreased only after
2014-2015. Nevertheless, since 2010 Maoist party members have the main influence over
most decision making in the CF. Committee members who are representative of or
selected by political parties, are more accountable to the party and to high ranking party
leaders, who are also the hotel owners and "conservationists". These local party and
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Informal conversation with Treasurer of the Bagmara CF committee. September 1, 2016
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business elites are well-connected beyond the CF. For instance, hoteliers lobbied the
government to decrease the rate of entrance fee inside the park and to make a park permit
valid for more than one day. During the public functions in Sauraha, representatives of
the Ministry of Forest and Social Conservation and Ministry of Culture, Tourism and
Civil aviation and many other high-level national politicians from powerful political
parties have expressed that they would assist in lobbying the government.
The primary way the Sauraha hotel owners have controlled the flow of benefits
from CBC projects is through the control and ownership of the means of production
(tourism infrastructure such as hotels, tourism skills, organization, and industry
knowledge). As a Tamang man who is very familiar with Sauraha tourism said, "Sauraha
elites get most benefits from tourism because they have hotels, they manage programs to
tourists, they have boat tender, elephants belong to them, jeeps belong to them,
restaurants belong to them, food and rooms all belong to them. So they are the ones who
get the most benefits.119" For instance, privately owned elephants are one of the ways that
the benefit of wildlife tourism is maximized and extracted. Elephant owners do not own
the community forest. The community forest is owned by the “state” and “managed and
protected by the “local people”. But hotel owners have controlled the way that benefits
are extracted from it, in this case through the formation of a regulatory association, the
Sauraha United Elephant Association. The association has a rule that only people owning
a hotel in Sauraha are eligible to conduct elephant safaris. That is, the members of the
association control both the hotel and elephant businesses.
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Interview with a Tamang Jeep driver of Malpur settlement, December 6, 2016

231

Figure 5.11- Expansion of elephant safari tourism in Khorser “corridor” forest. (Photo by
Yogesh Dongol)

Nearly all private elephants belong to local hotel owners of Sauraha and are
regulated by the United Elephant Association. The association has about 60-65 active
elephants which provide elephant safaris mostly in Bagmara CF, with a bit in the Khorser
wildlife corridor and the Kumroj CF. For each elephant entrance, Bagmara CF makes 308
Rs, which includes a 13 percent state tax, with elephant owners retaining approximately
90 percent of the total tourist fee. Since elephant safaris generate two-thirds of Bagmara
CF’s total revenue, elephant owners/hotel owners have a large say in most decisions
related to the CF. For instance, on one occasion when Bagmara CF increased the entrance
price of elephant safari from 100, which is a small portion of what owners get, the owners
of hotels and elephants halted all elephant safari in the CF for about three months.
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Who benefits from tourism depends on who has legal access to park resources and
how much they can have. For instance, there are now 30 vehicles that provide “Jeep
safaris” inside the CNP and numerous others providing Jeep safaris inside the Bharandara
"wildlife corridor". Local business people of Sauraha mostly operate the park safaris,
aided by the influence of political parties and in coordination with CNP authorities. For
instance, there are three different Jeep safari committees. A committee affiliated with the
Maoist party recently received permission to start five jeeps inside CNP. The two older
committees are associated with two other political parties and have 10 and 15 jeeps,
respectively. Park authorities have granted rights to only a fixed number of vehicles.
Local elites who have a special relationship with park authorities have been granted
rights to start the safaris. In addition, local economic elites have maintained a monopoly
on whose vehicle can get access. A person familiar with the situation inside the park told
me,
Although the park entrance permit shows that we can take different vehicles
inside the park, Jeep safari people have started syndicate and now no other
vehicles are allowed to enter. I took a Jeep but they did not allow me to enter.
They asked for documents and they did not allow me. If you have rules, then
anyone who follows the rules should have rights to enter. I think these park
people are more communists than the Maoists. They make their own rules and
they allowed some and didn't allow others.
People who do not own hotels and other means are at a competitive disadvantage.
The established hoteliers do not have to pay land rent or hotel rent while smaller-scale
entrepreneurs wishing to enter the industry must borrow money. In addition, most tourists
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in Sauraha come through a tour operator. They buy a package program for few days. In
the past, package guests were less common and most tourists were independent travelers.
Some say that the package tourist program has hampered local and small-scale
restaurants and shops and that the system tends only to benefit big hoteliers and tour
operators. Package tourists do not spend much outside of the hotel because their meals,
transportation and most other expenses are included in the package. Independent tourism
is much better at distributing the benefits of CBCs because small businesses are more
readily included. In contrast, package tourism has linked the tourism industry of Sauraha
into the global marketing system. The typical package is booked from a website, which
takes a cut for the service they provide, then the large tour agents and operators, both
foreign and national, take a cut for mediating between tourists and the service provider.
In most cases, many small hoteliers say that have difficulty surviving in the current
package tourism business because their business depends on tour operators, who often do
not pay them in a timely manner.
In hindsight, the attempts by CBC experts to produce new market subjects and
economic benefits for local communities have failed through a naïve faith in the
neoliberalism. Experts did not take into account that the potential benefits from a tourism
industry would not invite savvy people from all over Nepal and from other countries. As
a result, local elites, national and foreign entrepreneurs and recent migrants have captured
most of the benefits from tourism opportunities, which were purported to benefit local
people and the nation's economy. As the community forest is the major source of income,
local hotel owners have used various conservation and development discourses, strategies
and representation of spaces, people and practices to strictly control the community forest
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institutions, resources, and economic potential. In sum, I observed the ways through
which the spatial practices of CBC management enabled the commodification of the
community forest and its wildlife and subsequently provided opportunities for private
capital accumulation by elites at various levels.

5.5 Human-wildlife conflicts
We had the Tharu people's traditional way of saving crops and driving rhinos and
wildlife, but later all these buddiman people – ("experts" in this context)- came to
Nepal. An Australian joker was in CNP when a wild elephant damage property
and killed a private female elephant in Sauraha area. He shared the technique of
electric fence, which was used in Australia to save sheep in an enclosure from
foxes. The electric fences were started to safeguard private elephants in Sauraha,
and the state and NGOs have spent millions in this electric fence. Later we were
able to control some impact of rhinos, but people started saying that deer enter
crop field jumping from the fence. Then they put chicken net. After that, people
again started saying that wild pigs enter field-digging holes in the ground, and
then they say that they will construct a concrete wall. Look how unnatural the
wall is. I stop suggesting anything now. When I talk, local leaders ask me what is
important humans or wild animals. They are spending so much money. I asked the
buffer zone president that they put barbed wire, mesh net, electric fences and now
they are constructing a concrete wall to stop different wild animals, and will they
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again construct nets in the sky to stop birds? Wardens are giving permission and
local leaders are doing activities, what can you say?- Former CNP warden120
Initially, they demarcated forest boundaries with a series of vertical trenches and
installed barbed wire and poles. We never felt so much problem of wild animals
at that time, but they said that they have to stop wild animals coming into
settlements. They put wooden poles and electric fences. Initially, rhino got scared,
but rhino are habituated now and they know about the fence. They are not scared
now. Later wild pigs and deer started to enter here and they put up those chicken
nets. Wild pigs can dig below the surface. So that did not work. Now they are
constructing a concrete wall. CF has spent a lot on this, which is not really a
problem for us. Even when there were no fences wild animals used to come and
go. That is very obvious because we live right in front of the forest. Wild animals
used to destroy crops and we had to save our crops.
Resident of Bagmara settlement121

Two major shifts in the nature conservation discourses in Bagmara CF area are
the extreme care of particular non-humans such as rhinos and elephants on the one hand,
and the extreme care of humans on the other hand. Although park officers talked about
the participation of "local people," they are consistently guided by the strict protection of
wildlife despite the decades of their involvement in participatory conservation. In this
section, I ask why local leaders show so much care about local people when talking about
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Interview with Ram Pret Yadav in Chitwan, 2016
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Interview with a Bagmara resident (handicraft maker), September 19, 2016
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the human-wildlife conflict and at the same time disregard local subsistence needs. That
is, local leaders, in particular, have been using animal rights and human rights
strategically according to the context and situation. I argue that the human-wildlife
conflict and subsequent interventions are particular discursive and bio-political strategies
to control people and space.

5.5.1. Walling off wildlife
One of the most significant human-wildlife conflicts that has shaped the
participatory conservation and buffer zone initiative is the damage of crops and livestock
and loss of human life from wild animals coming from CNP. During a local elephant
festival, the Migrakunja buffer zone president said in the program that the human-wildlife
conflict had become a "Kahalilagdo” (shocking) conflict122. He went on to say that about
15 people die every year and huge property losses accrue because of wildlife in the buffer
zone. When I asked about the ongoing construction of the concrete wall (see opening
quotes) and its purpose, many respondents told me that the primary purpose of the wall is
to reduce the conflicts resulting from the depredation of crops from park animals. “Rhino
come here every night, and it has damaged crops. Some people have died due to rhino
attacks. We have a big conflict with wild animals here. We have to minimize the
conflicts. Wild animals have to stay where they belong, “a former president of the
Migrakunja buffer zone told me.
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Speech in Sauraha Elephant Festival by the president of Migrakunja BZUC, December 25, 2016
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Figure 5.12- Ongoing constructio of concrete wall in buffer zone and aournd Bagmara CF
(Photo by Yogesh Dongol)
The buffer zone committee president in a public forum and in a personal
interview stated that the construction of the wall is necessary to reduce the ongoing
conflicts between humans and wildlife. The wall will separate wild animals from human
settlements so that the impact of wild animals will be reduced. When wild elephants
killed a 15-year old tourist on a walk with her family around an elephant breeding area
inside the Khorser forest, Migrakunja BZUC convened an immediate meeting with
hoteliers, tour guides and local leaders. In the meeting, the president said,
We have to expand and construct the concrete wall rapidly. The concrete wall is
not only to reduce conflicts related wild elephants, but also to address the impacts
of rhinos and the potential impacts of soon to be translocated Arna (wild buffalo).
Wild buffalo have a bad reputation of extensive crop damage in Koshi Tappu
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Wildlife Reserve. So to be more prepared to safeguard our settlements, people,
and their crops we have to complete this project of the concrete wall as soon as
possible.123
A park official also shared a similar view about the ongoing construction of the
concrete wall. A sub-warden of CNP told me that existing electric fences are not effective
because of poor maintenance. In particular, electric fences are not effective where there is
a heavy occurrence of wild elephants. These places where electric fences do not work
will be more effectively protected by the concrete wall.
The fixed, impassible boundary of the concrete wall will restrict the possible
access and encroachment of public land. It is the primary reason why CNP warden, who
claimed to be guided by the “science,” allowed the construction of the wall without any
study of its possible impact. The “human-wildlife conflict” discourse simplified the
spatial complexity of interactions and heterogeneous behaviors of wild animals. Most
importantly, it essentialized the complex relationship between park administration,
people and wild animals. The relationship between human-nonhuman was never the
wildlife impacting the people and people impacting the wildlife. There are complex
relationships between heterogeneous people and diversity of wild animals. The above
discussion suggests that the wall represents a simplified understanding of nature or wild
animals, supported by the idea that they can be controlled through technical solution that
establishes on the ground of a Western-derived binary between nature and society. As
one local Tharu man explained to me,
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Meeting at Migrakunja BZUC office, January 10, 2017
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We used to wake up all night sometimes to save our crops and we were okay with
that. But later white foreigners started to come and they say do this and do that.
They told us that we need to bound the space and use fences. After that we had
electric fences. In the past, we used to drive away by any means, but later we have
all these bikas (development) and other things, and then we started to have a
problem124.
This idea of conflict and the subsequent interventions are part of a bio-political strategy
currently employed by the state, non-state and local authorities and leaders to govern
rural people and places. In the next section, I will further develop the argument of the
discourse of human-wildlife conflicts and interventions as a bio-political strategy.

5.5.2. Deaths from wildlife: real or exaggerated?
Many people have lost their lives and many more have been injured by park wild
animals in the CNP buffer zone. A recent publication shows that average number of
fatalities due to rhino over five years (2010-2014) is about 3 people per year and the
average number of injuries due to rhinos is about 21 per year. Rhinos are more likely to
attack inside the forest. Death and injury due to elephants are on average about 18 and 34
people per year respectively. Wild elephants are more likely to attack outside the forest
(Acharya et al. 2016). The question at hand is how many people died and how many were
injured in the portion of the buffer zone where a series of interventions were carried out
for the "security" of people and property. There is less evidence, for example, of people
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Interview with a Tharu man of Malpur (hotel driver), December 5, 2016
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killed in rhino and wild elephant attacks in the buffer zone settlements in the Bagmara CF
area. Two local women died in 2015 and 2016 from a tiger and a rhino attack,
respectively, and both occurred inside the forest. A tourist also died due to a wild
elephant attack inside the forest. In short, deaths from wild animal attacks were inside the
forest, so the fences built to prevent animals moving outside the forest boundary are
ineffective. Therefore, there is little relationship between conflict mitigation and the
construction of the concrete wall (detailed further in the next section). The common claim
that about 15 people per year die from wild animal attacks in the CNP buffer zone
appears to be an exaggeration of the problem, or at least an overgeneralization. Not all of
the buffer zones are subject to fatal human-wildlife conflicts as most leaders and
conservationists portray. Leaders are extrapolating the death of people in the buffer zone
and telling buffer zone leaders and residents to support the building of the wall in the
Bagmara area, where there is not a single death from wildlife. More importantly, leaders
neglect to mention the death and injury of people from privately owned elephants, which
are widespread all over the Bagmara settlement area. One experienced guide told me,
“about 15 people have died or injured in Sauraha because of privately owned
elephants.125”
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A nature guide (also affiliated with Bird Education Society), 2017

241

Figure 5.13- Private elephants returning from work (Photo by Yogesh Dongol)
5.5.3. Actual crop losses
The wildlife crop damage is relatively high in the Bagmara settlement, mostly
from wild pigs, deer, and parakeets. Rhinos are not the primary wild animals degrading
the crops. People told me that only major crop loss problem around the forest fringe areas
is from wild pigs. The wall area is not where the problem is, yet officials argue that they
are constructing the wall to reduce conflict. Criticizing the ongoing wall in the eastern
border of the Bagmara CF, the vice president of Boderni BZ told me that he thought a
concrete wall is being constructed in a place where there is not a problem because most
of the nearby land areas are owned by tourist hotels. Very few people farm there. The
concrete wall is not being constructed in the places where people are demanding some
kind of fence protection from the crop deprivations of deer, wild pigs, monkeys and other
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wild animals. Some local people told me that authorities are not listening to their requests
and that the wall is not residents’ major priority.
Crop loss is a complex issue, and it does not impact all equally. Some areas either
have few occurrences of crop loss or the impact is concentrated on only a few
households. Crop loss is a non-issue for those who do not farm, whether landless wage
laborers or wealthy business people. Crop loss is also a non-issue for people who farm,
but have land holdings away from the forest or are in the centers of cultivated areas. This
does not mean that crop loss due to wild animals is insignificant. Some locals who also
live close to the forest have suffered crop damages. Some people who lost crops from
wild animals told me that the loss of crops is higher now than in the past because in the
past wild animals used to take a bit in lentil season, some in paddy season, and some in
corn. There was less damage by wild pigs and other wild animals in a single plot. At
present, when wild animals enter crop fields, they destroy everything, because fewer
people are engaged in farming, as most lands near the forest have hotels or fenced
fallows. Indicating a mustard plot near where we were sitting, a local respondent told me,
"they had mustard all on a large plot, but they have only a few mustard plants left. In the
past, wild animals used to eat a little bit of everyone's.126" He said that there are only 8-10
houses who are still farming in Bagmara settlement right next to the Bagmara CF because
rich people from other places have bought most of the land.127 One respondent from
Bodreni said-
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Interview with a Bagmara resident (handicraft maker), September 19, 2016
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They should have constructed the wall here if they were so concerned about
protecting people from wild elephants. The BZ and CF did not want to put money
to construct a wall here, but started building a wall in Janakauli and Bagmara
area, which do have not really have wildlife crop damage issues. Although the
CF, BZ, and NP make money from the Bodreni area from tourism, they refused to
invest in the area.128
In Bagmara buffer zone area, the existing conflict between humans and wildlife
has been normalized by representing the area as tourists’ space. Many state officials,
conservationists, and local business people consider Sauraha to be the “tourist place” or
"wildlife city", and reason that wild animals in the "tourist place" should be cherished and
welcomed, rather than considered as a source of conflict. They think that people should
let rhinos and wild animals come to the settlements. People should not be offensive
toward rhinos in particular because people are making money from tourists coming to
view rhinos in Sauraha. Rhinos and wild animals in settlements and forest are good for
tourism business as wildlife tourism depends on wild animals. Wild animals coming into
the settlement is considered as a good sign because it gives the hint of wilderness. In
essence, Sauraha has been discursively constructed as a space for wildlife tourism, where
crop cultivation is out of place and therefore not worthy of protection from wild animals.
One hotel owner whose house has been destroyed six times by wild elephants over the
course of time said, “rather than trying to obstruct with the different types of fences, local
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people should create suitable habitat by planting fruit trees and vegetables such as banana
so the wild animals can come and be safe.129”

5.5.4. Compensating losses
One of the major incentive-based activities that buffer zone and community
forests committees are doing is compensating the loss of buffer zone users’ property,
crops, livestock and lives from wild animals coming out from the park and forest. In
2016, Bagmara CF distributed crop loss compensation for 67 houses mostly in the
Bodreni and Bagmara settlements. Bagmara CF claims that they give 70 percent
compensation for the crop losses, but those who lost crops said that they would be happy
to take 70 percent if they fairly calculated the losses. Some people are not satisfied with
the compensation committee’s work because they say that it is not fair and they do not
consider the complexity of crop losses. As one respondent explained to me,
If some people have a small plot of land, the loss of crops for them is a big thing
compared to some who have large land holdings. Small landholders usually work
hard and invest more in their land, such as the use of manure and planning crops
to produce good harvests, compared to the large landholders. If you provide
compensation based on the area of damage rather than the quality of the crop and
potential harvest, then that is not fair.130
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Interview with a hotel owner (Chilax house), December 15, 2016
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Interview with a Tamang man of Bagmara settlement. Also a staff of Bagmara CF office. September 08,
2016
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That is, people were not satisfied with compensation based on the area of crop loss rather
than the actual crop loss. When a committee member at a general assembly meeting said
he was glad that no one was asking compensation questions, because people are getting
70 percent compensation for crop loss, a local forest user replied, "people are not asking
the question because many, many people are frustrated with the compensation. people are
not satisfied with the monitoring and evaluation process of compensation." A Tharu man
of the Bodreni area was also dissatisfied with the slow response of monitoring and
evaluation by CF and BZ staff. He said,
the evaluation people only come after a week of application of crop loss and the
damage and the impact of the damage after 7 days will be less visible. If the
affected person is not their "favorable" person, they will refuse to record the
actual impact. If we say the affected area is 3 Katta, they will record 10 Dhur131.
Again they will calculate that 10 Dhur will produce 1 quintal corn and then we
will receive 40 percent of a quintal as a compensation… committee people who
come to evaluate act and behave as if there is no damage to crops132.
Clearly, evaluation is a difficult and subjective process and it is challenging work
because everyone wants to get more for their losses. I had a long conversation with one
of the compensation committee members. He told me that not all local forest users who
demand compensation are honest. Some people want to get full compensation of crop
loss even if their crops are not of good quality and they have not invested much labor,
manure and other needed inputs. All want to benefit from compensation and sometimes
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20 Dhur land = 1 Katta (20 Katta land =1 Biga)
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Interview with a Tharu man of Bodreni, October 1, 2016
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there are 30-35 applications pending. A committee member also told me that the buffer
zone committee told the community forest office not to give compensation for the loss of
“bigger things” such as the loss of livestock and loss of human life even though Bagmara
CF has the resources to provide compensation. The CF officers usually divert their users
to the buffer zone user committee office, because through it people can get compensation
from the state. In such cases, the state requires an enormous amount of paperwork to
make sure the request for compensation is valid. According to wildlife damage relief
guidelines of 2009, an impacted person should provide the following documents to claim
compensation; 1. Application form, 2. photographic evidence, 3. monitoring and
evaluation report, 4. letter from buffer zone 5. letter from municipality or VDC, 6.
evaluation from the forest or livestock experts report, and additional land and house
ownership certificates.

5.6. Conclusion
Socioeconomic mobility, as related to the distribution of costs and benefits of the
CBC initiatives, are shaped by power relations structured by social and cultural identities.
Most development activities have rarely benefited local users who are poor and from
“backward” groups. Instead, CBC has added hardship to many local poor people, such as
declining access to forest resources from the CF. It has also negatively impacted
traditional livelihood practices such as farming, fishing and livestock rearing. The social
impacts of mass tourism in Sauraha include the exploitation of hotel labor and tourist
guides, conflicts between hotel owners and tourist guides, and the high inflation of daily
household products due to tourism. The representation of Sauraha and the community
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forest as the “tourist place” and “wildlife city” have suppressed the local livelihood
practices and way of life. The improvement projects produced a new class of local
authorities and local leaders, who are loyal to the state and business interests and took
over decision making on behalf of local people. Business people who are recent
immigrants have purchased the majority of land suitable for tourism development. The
expansion of tourism in the areas has been associated with the loss of indigenous people
land and further marginalization of most indigenous people. Many agriculture plots have
been transformed into built-up areas or are fenced for future development.
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Chapter Six: Reterritorializing Rural Nepal, Producing Environmental Subjects
This chapter addresses the dissertation’s second area of investigation, the complex
interrelations of conservation territories, subject formation, and state goals for governing
people and nature. The establishment of national parks, buffer zones, and other
conservation territories and their associated CBC initiatives have been central to the
production of rural subjectivities in Nepal. In this chapter, I examine common CBC
social initiatives, such as law enforcement, conservation education, and local
participation, as disciplinary mechanisms for producing a population of environmental
subjects in the CNP buffer zone. In addition, I review the patterns of state violence and
threatened violence and their roles in both producing environmental subjects and
reproducing ethnic, caste, and gender stereotypes. Throughout I highlight the discursive
practices that produce conservation territories, subjectivities, and normalize state
violence.

6.1 Discursively constructing the CNP buffer zone
Certain interlinked discourses have helped normalize militarization and different
forms of violence related to conservation within the CNP buffer zone. These discourses,
which I identify as tourism, criminality, and security have operated together to shift the
meaning of the Bagmara CF from a commons space to a militarized space for tourists. At
a broader level, the representations of tourism as the major sources of foreign exchange
for economic development in Nepal and rhino as national property/national heritage have
supported the use of new forms of state violence in the Bagmara CF. Many people
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believe that the strict security of state property is important to reduce the possible risk of
loss due to poaching.
In the Sauraha area, most local elites and park officials characterized the area as a
"tourist space" and a "tourist hub". Most tourism activities in CNP are carried out in or
from Sauraha. In the community forest, tourists participate in "non-exploitative" or
"sustainable" ecotourism. Tourists can view rhinos in the community forest while sitting
on the back of an "endangered elephant". More importantly, many tour guides informed
me that Western people’s desire to see “natural forests” or “wilderness” have shaped
what types of activities and practices are allowed and restricted within the bounded
territory of the community forest. This "tourist gaze" has thus come to operate as a
regulatory practice. For instance, a nature guide told me about a tour group that pointed
to a tall hotel in Sauraha and commented, "What an ugly building". Others told me that
their guests thought that the Bagmara CF "looks like a zoo," rather than a natural forest.
Another related that their foreign and Nepali tourists question them on whether the rhinos
inside the CF "are not actually domesticated rhino." Many BZ residents now think that
tourism inside the community forest is important to the local economy and that tourists
who come to Sauraha should have an opportunity to see wild animals, especially rhinos.
A Tamang woman who lives by the side of Bagmara CF and whose husband is a nature
guide, said, regarding the restrictions on access, "That rule is good because if we go
inside the forest wild animals will get scared and run away. Guests who go will not be
able to see them, and that will be bad for guests. People need to go only in at certain
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times.133” But the idea of using forest resources and the presence of bodies inside the
forest contradicts tourists’ expectations of “wilderness,” that the CF committee and
tourism entrepreneurs are trying to maintain. Such tourist sensibilities and expectations
work to push CF management more toward a wilderness model.

Figure 6.14- Wildlife tourism activities (such as elephant safari and canoeing in Bagmara
BZCF area (Photo by Yogesh Dongol)

The community forest, however, is also a space that some local forest users still
depend on for forest resources such as firewood, fodder, grasses, and some vegetables.
For these people, the “tourist space” is a place of subsistence. Spatial practices have
restructured local peoples use and access of what was considered as the “commons”.
Some say that the community forest has become the “private property of the Sauraha

133

Interview with a young Tamang woman of Laukhani, September 24, 2016
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people” because local people do not have a means to benefit from the forest and do not
have legal access. Increasingly, the Bagmara CF is trying to control access for such
subsistence resources because many foreign tourists have complained that they saw
people cutting trees and branches. As one guide told me, "Sauraha hoteliers used to take
their guests inside the community forest to avoid paying park entrance fee. That way they
can keep a larger cut by using the Bagmara CF. After visiting the CF, many white tourists
would complain that they saw rhino, but that people were all around.134" Local leaders
and park people tend to represent resource-dependent users, such as Tamang women
living by and depending on the community forest, as backward, stupid, and unruly, and
who lack an understanding of the value and idea of conservation. Since the community
forest is a major source of income for local elites and business people, community forest
leaders have increasingly used the military to control local user's movement and activities
related to forest resources collection.

Figure 6.15- Rhino in
the street of Sauraha
settlement (Photo by
Yogesh Dongol)
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Interview with a former nature guide of Sauraha, December 15, 2016
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Figure 6.16 – Tamang women are crossing river to get forest resoruces from Khorser
corridor forest in Bodreni settlement. (Photo by Yogesh Dongol)

As local people continue to use and sell forest resources from the CF and CNP,
leaders of the community forest increasingly rely on the Nepal Army rather than local
forest guards. Many leaders considered local forest guards to be incapable of controlling
resource exploitation by their local neighbors and families, whereas the army is
considered as more capable, "disciplined," and "organized". Some local leaders also
claim that the once "Royal Nepal Army" has become the "Nepal Army" in support of all
citizens. Others explain that the army is different now, that they are the new
"conservation army". Army soldiers are now oriented towards conservation of wildlife
and are more committed to conservation. Accompanying and supporting this shift to the
army is a discourse of criminality. An army in Sauraha told me that they had to increase
patrolling in buffer zone because of the growing population of diverse people, and
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because the buffer zone has "a large number of ethnic, backward Matwali people (alcohol
drinkers) who do not understand conservation.135” Similarly, Army Colonel said, “we
must produce fear among people so that they will stop doing criminal activities.136" This
labeling of certain ethnic groups as backward people who do not understand conservation
and are criminals living illegally in the CNP buffer zone space further justifies
militarization and violence. The militarization targets a particular group of people and at
the same time constructs their identities as criminals.
The representation of a buffer zone as a criminal and dangerous space where
rhino poaching frequently occurs supports the idea that increased security is necessary
beyond the park’s boundaries. Some scholars have claimed that rhinos are ten times more
likely to be poached outside the park than inside the park (Martin et al. 2008; Martin and
Martin 2008-2009). Similarly, a former park warden wrote a piece where he claimed that
the buffer zone functioned as a potential hideout of poachers. He wrote, "access to rhinos
is easy because the national highway runs around the park and there are 590 settlements
between them. Every settlement is a potential shelter for rhino poachers, and all rhino
habitats lie adjacent to settlements" (Adhikari 2002, 3). On one occasion, I asked two
army personal why they are increasing patrols in the buffer zone area. One of them
replied in a condescending tone, "all rhinos are here in buffer zones and patrolling in
Chure hills [southern hills of the park] makes no sense.137" Another argument that is
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Interview with Army Major in Sauraha, Chitwan on 2017
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Conversation with Army Colonel in Kasara, Chitwan on April 29, 2017
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Sauraha dam area clean-up program organized by BES, 2017
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frequently used to justify the presence of military is that the buffer zone is rhino habitat
extended from the park. The CNP warden characterized the space as the "external habitat
of rhinos." Park people and experts also claim that the rhino population is expanding in a
national park and they came out to buffer zone and damaged life and property of people.
As a result of the losses, it is said that local people are involved in "retaliatory killing" of
rhinos (Budhathoki 2012).
This local criminality discourse is supported by national and international
discourses. National and international publications have portrayed Nepal as an
"international hub," "hotspot," and the "transit point" of the illegal wildlife trade (MSFC
2016, 79). For instance, the New York Times138, following the arrest of primate
smugglers, framed Nepal as an emerging and "a major hub” of the wildlife trade network.
England’s Independent139 represented Nepal as a "poachers' paradise, a paradise where
poachers used sophisticated weapon, including automatic guns and hi-tech weapons, to
kill rhinos. In 2017, after poachers killed a rhino in the CF, the CNP warden explained
that poachers used "sophisticated weapons"140 to kill it. These characterizations posed
greater challenges for and a looming threat to the protection of rhino in the national park
and buffer zone. Hence, intensified military style monitoring and enforcement of laws are
considered inevitable.
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Bhadra Sharma And Kai Schultz, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/asia/nepalchimpanzees-trafficking.html, New York Times, December 20, 2017
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Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nepal-emerges-as-poachers-paradise1819110.html. Independent, November 12, 2009
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Dipendra Baduwal. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-04-09/poachers-kill-one-hornedrhino-in-chitwan.html, The Kathmandu Post, April 9, 2017
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Some people claim that those involved in the poaching of rhino possess a criminal
attitude. "Poaching is primarily because of the greedy and the criminal behavior of some
local people. It is not primarily because of the poverty per se.” An environmental
journalist said during an interview141, "Poachers are criminals first and poor second.
Poaching is the result of personal greed and a criminal attitude". Although these quotes
suggest that poaching is the result of the criminal attitudes of people and a product of
organized crime, other portrayals do tend to target the poor of particular ethnic groups.
Major government documents and other publications portray poor and local ethnic people
such as Bote, Majhi, Tharu, Tamang, and Chepang as poachers and criminals (Bhuju et
al. 2009; MFSC 2015). This framing of certain ethnic groups as the poachers not only
justifies violence, it has worked to produce new subject categories for certain sections of
the population.

6.2 Conservation as territorial securitization
The interlocking discourses of tourism, criminality, and security have helped to
reorient the management of the buffer zone and associated community forests toward an
emphasis on anti-poaching. Nepal’s rhino population began to increase after the 1990s, a
trend enhanced when the poaching of rhinos significantly decreased after Nepal
embraced the goal of "zero poaching" in 2010. Global and national conservationists
claimed that the zero poaching year of 2011 was a "significant and historic achievement"
and "a landmark in Nepal's conservation history" (Acharya 2016, II). Encouraged by the
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Interview with an environmental journalist of the Kantipur Daily, June , 2010
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results, the Nepal state, aided by international institutions has introduced a range of
military equipment, techniques, and personnel to further securitize the buffer zone
territory.

6.2.1. Zero poaching year in Nepal
Nepal achieved "four zero poaching years" for rhinos in 2011, 2013, 2014 and
2015142 (Acharya 2016; Aryal et al. 2017). Referring to the four years of zero poaching,
the Director General of the DNPWC defines “zero poaching year” as something that
“refers no evidence of killing of animal or trade concerns for 365 days or more.”
“Achieving Zero poaching for four years is a remarkable achievement at a time of
worldwide threat from illegal wildlife trade,” he added (Acharya 2016, II). "Zero
poaching" in Nepal "will be achieved by ensuring a secure buffer zone" and "sanitizing
the core of the national park of any threats," the current Army Colonel stated (DNPWC
2017, 15).
The zero poaching program framed poaching as something that can be achieved
through a technological fix. The mission statement and a so-called “zero poaching
toolkit143” state that the poaching threat of iconic animals can be addressed through "the
tools and methods" developed by experts. The toolkit was developed by WWF as an antipoaching framework that includes: 1) regular assessment of law enforcement
(Assessment); 2) the use of up-to-date technologies to increase monitoring and
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Post Report, http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-01-27/cnp-marks-1000-days-of-zero-rhinopoaching.html, The Kathmandu Post, January 27, 2017
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enforcement (Technology); 3) increased field staff (Capacity); 4) engagement with "local
communities" (Community); 5) improved prosecution- (Prosecution); and 4) national and
regional information sharing (Cooperation). Following anti-poaching success, Nepali
park authorities and non-state agencies uncritically accepted and supported the goal of
zero poaching year and have adopted the toolkits despite the widespread understanding
that poaching is a complex socio-economic problem that transcends Nepal’s national
boundaries.

Figure 6.17- Zero poaching year celebration board in the compound of CNP office
Kasara, Chitwan. (Photo by Yogesh Dongol)
As a result of the adoption of the toolkits, most national and foreign
"conservationists" claimed that new technologies are one of the major changes that have
helped to achieve the "zero poaching" in Nepal. As one of the high-ranking staffs - the
Director General of DNPWC - writes in the foreword of the Rhinoceros Conservation
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Action Plan 2017-2022, that the incorporation of "SMART patrolling" system and
"successful" community-based conservation led to "4 years of zero poaching of rhinos"
(DNPWC 2017; Aryal et al. 2016). Although there could be a relationship between the
introduction of modern technologies in monitoring and surveillance and the achievement
of zero poaching, the history of poaching and my findings show more complexity in what
shapes poaching. For instance, most park officials mentioned that the terrain of the park,
dense vegetation, and weather always hinder monitoring and enforcement work inside the
park. As a CNP warden told me, "we do not have a year-round road inside the park.
Patrolling inside the monsoon season is impossible, and visibility is very low because of
weather and tall vegetation which gets up to eight meters in height where anyone can
hide easily inside." Additionally, poaching at the international level is related to the high
demand from wealthier countries in East Asia, Europe, and North America. Moreover,
there is plenty of evidence and understanding that the increasing trends in poaching were
primarily driven by an alliance of rich and powerful politicians, royals, judges, and
international smugglers.144 The majority of those arrested, convicted, and jailed, however,
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For instance, until 1990, royal palace used to take all horns and hooves collected by park or the army.
The record in CNP office in Kasara shows that park officials submitted nearly 400 rhino horns to royal
palace between 1950 to 1990. Kamal J. Kunwar writes that ‘the Royal family and its close associates were
directly involved in every type of smuggling. After the thorough investigation of poaching in rhino cases,
he claims that it was the royal palace that arranged to free two traders that were arrested with five horns at
Aaptari, Chitwan" (Kunwar 2013, 248). Later, two of the arrested people were released because they were
"college students" and two were put in army custody for 40 days and later released on bail by the district
forest office of Kathmandu disregarding jail terms or fines or both provision of NPWC Act. In addition,
Kuwar writes, most top-level smugglers are "Tibetan refugees" and Nepali of "Tibetan origin". They are
highly protected by high profile people such as "royal family members, political leaders, high-ranking
officers, police and army officials" and other high-class people (Kunwar 2013, 240). The case was
reviewed by the district forest office of Chitwan after the scandal become bigger. The DFO of Chitwan also
released the two poachers with just a small fine. In another case, national park officials convicted the
Yakche, a notorious wildlife trader with less jail term and later released. Kunwar also recounted how Chief
District Officer (CDO) of Chitwan advised Kamal Jung Kunwar not to go after or arrest Yakche, despite
that he himself has confessed of poaching more than 20 rhino horns, and the CNP have documented that he
has traded more than 100 rhino horns (Kunwar 2013, 243)
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are from ethnic groups. High profile traders145 are rarely arrested, and if arrested they
easily get out of the jail.
During 1998-2001, poachers killed 39 rhinos. By the end of the 1990s, about 800
army troops were stationed in four different sectors of the CNP, and 32 security posts
were established As the Maoist war peaked in early 2002, the Nepal Army adjusted their
presence146. During that time, the army merged twenty-four of the security posts into ten
for security reasons (Adhikari 2002). Poaching-related deaths between 2002 and 2006
surged to 102. In 2002 alone, poachers killed around 37-40 rhinos in CNP. Because of
increased poaching and the danger of Maoists inside the national park, the CNP staff,
with the help of the Army, concentrated anti-poaching outside of the park. NP staffs and
the army used the Maoist counter-insurgency tactics to inflict massive violence and
human right violation on suspected poaches (see Kunwar 2013). Park authorities carried
out search, arrest, torture and occasional killings during the period147). For instance, the
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Some are arrested for doing a lot of harm to wild animals. Ramesh Kumar Pokharel, a pilot, and a
political leader used to buy bullets from army personnel, and he was able to kill more than 15 rhinos but
later got less punishment. Gokul pant who worked with Ramesh Kumar Pokharel got a five-year’ jail term.
Yakche a notorious poacher who was involved in trading many rhino horns got only five years’ jail term.
Then director general of the DNPWC, Surya Bahadur Pandey gave him less only five-years jail term.
Kunwar writes, "People like Pilot Ramesh, Jhalendra Gurung, Anil Ghirsing, Gyamjo, Karma Lama,
Yakche, Tamling, Gokul Pant, Indra Bahadur Gurung, and Suman Bahadur were the ones who ran the real
show." (See page Fight with Poachers).
146

Nepal Army got involved in Maoist war from December 2001 to end of active Maoist war (mid-2005).
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Interview with wildlife Poachers in Bharatpur Jail. July 2010. Almost all (eleven) men in rhino and tiger
cases told me that they were severely beaten and punished until they confessed that they were engaging in
poaching. I present few incidents of physical violence on suspected poachers that were included in Kamal
Jung Kunwar’s book (Kunwar 2013). For instance, Devidutta Battalion of CNP arrested two right-hand
men (Anil Ghirsing and Jhalendra Gurung) of a smuggling leader (Gyamjo).
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Nepal Army killed many suspected poachers in field "encounters," and many were
arrested (DNPWC 2007, 11). (See examples of Shoot-an-Sight 148incidents in a footnote).
After the Maoists reached a peace agreement and entered mainstream politics,
poachers killed additional 43 rhinos between 2006 to 2010. Poaching related death,
however, decreased to “zero” for some years since 2011. More importantly, the idea of
“zero-poaching” and the celebration of “zero poaching year" started to take shape in
2010. From the experience of Nepal and international experts, WWF has defined "zero
poaching is achieved when there are no detectable traces of poaching activity in an area
over a set period and there is no discernible impact on a species to sustain a stable or
increasing population" (WWF 2018149). It is a global anti-poaching initiative with a
defined goal and a call to all countries to strive for zero poaching150 of wild animals by
adopting a "zero poaching toolkit” or face "zero wildlife" (WWF 2017151). WWF and
affiliated experts developed the "zero poaching toolkit," and urged all participating
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In 2010, UNHCR urged Nepal Army and national park authorities for the proper investigation by
civilian authorities after a shoot-an-sight incident in which Nepal Army killed three females including a 12year-old girl in Bardiya National Park and Chitwan Valley. In another incident, the army killed a Kumal
woman while she was cutting grasses inside the national park in Meghauli (Neupane and Musher 2016, 19).
Kunwar (2014) also recounts many incidents where they searched, arrested and interrogated without any
search warrant or arrest warrant or any concrete pieces of evidence. He has confessed in few instances and
writes- "we arrested people based merely on our convictions" instead of concrete and more evidence. As
the search or arrest team comprised of a large group of army soldiers with loaded firearms, there is always
a possibility of shoot-on-sight without the adequate gathering of information of suspected poacher. Kunwar
(2014) described an incident when six accompanying Nepal Army soldiers opened "more than 25 rounds
from their M16" targeting a suspected rhino poacher after he ran away with the fear of beating and random
arrest. He escaped death, Kunwar writes (Kunwar 2013).
149

Tigers.panda.org/reports/zero-poaching
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The idea started with TX22. All participating countries (especially 13 tigers ranging countries) were
encouraging to strive for zero poaching of endangered species such as tiger, rhinos, and elephants.
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Ecological.panda.org/2017/06/01/zero-poaching-zero-wildlife/
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countries to effectively implement all "pillars" of the toolkit to attain zero poaching of
tigers, elephants, and rhinos by 2020 (WWF 2015).
As part of zero poaching initiatives, the government of Nepal established a new
institutional arrangement to address wildlife poaching and illegal trade. In November
2010, Cabinet meetings chaired by the prime minister produced the Wildlife Crime
Control Committee at different levels of government. In particular, the National Tiger
Conservation Committee was formed at the prime minister level; Wildlife Crime Control
Coordination Committee chaired by the Ministry of Soil and Forest Conservation and
Crime Control Bureau with the representation of different enforcement agencies was
established at the district level. State agencies have also established international
coordination mechanisms such as SAWEN, the South Asian Wildlife Enforcement
Network. Additionally, Nepal has a working relationship with INTERPOL for smuggling
and anti-poaching. With the help of INTERPOL and the Nepal Police, a “kingpin” of
international criminal network was arrested in 2016 from Malaysia. I describe the case
below.
Moreover, the NPWC has been amended for the fifth time (Acharya 2016). The
amended act has further expanded the territorial control and legal powers of the CNP
warden. Now with the fifth amendment of the NPWC Act 1973 and fourth amendment of
NPWC regulation 2016, the buffer zone is now categorized as similar to a national park,
or wildlife reserve. The recent amendment of the NPWC Act is an effect of the "zero
poaching year," where the Assessment pillar of the toolkit advocates the regular
assessment of existing legal frameworks for effective enforcement activities and threat
analysis to control wildlife crime. Senior park administration has also claimed the
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"success" of zero poaching years is partly a result of the change in legislation framework
(Acharya 2016).
The zero-poaching toolkit also has “capacity” as another pillar of the antipoaching strategy, which is related to building the capacity and motivation of groundlevel staff, including incentives like paid sick leave, training, and insurance. Some of the
capacity strategy had been going on in Nepal since the use of army as security for
national parks. Nepal spends more than 80 percent of its national parks and wildlife
conservation budget on the security of protected areas. The most important professional
awards come here, motivating staff to continue to work in anti-poaching. For example,
WWF provides different awards to enforcement agencies and local leaders for their work.
Every year WWF-Nepal recognize people and organizations that have made "significant
contributions to ensuring Nepal's rich biodiversity." For instance, in 2009, WWF-Nepal
honored the Nepal Army stationed in CNP with the Abraham Conservation Award for its
role in anti-poaching. WWF-Nepal also awarded152 CNP warden Kamal Jung Kunwar
and other two army battalions located in different national parks. To put these awards
into the perspective of rising violence in the buffer zone, a soldier from the honored CNP
battalion was involved in the attempted rape case described in the earlier footnote and the
CNP warden was once jailed for killing a suspected poacher after interrogation.
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WWF-Nepal. http://www.wwfnepal.org/?174861/Conserveation-Heroes-remembered.
http://www.wwfnepal.org/?206267/Awarding-Conservation-Excellence-in-Nepa
http://www.wwfnepal.org/?217490/nine-organizations-in-nepal-honored-with-wwf-leaders-for-a-livingplanet-award, Accessed June 8, 2018
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6.2.2. Militarization of the conservation mission
In response to the mission of zero poaching and prescribed solutions of achieving
zero poaching, Nepal Army soldiers’ numbers and the numbers of security posts have
increased or are proposed to increase. There are now 53 permanent security posts in and
around CNP (Budathoki 2012, 143; Field interview). In the Sunachuri area, a new
permanent security post is being constructed in a community forest. Temporary security
posts are also constructed on strategic locations depending on the need. The recent Rhino
Action Plan (2017-2022) indicated that new ten additional security posts in strategic
location would be constructed in the near future (DNPWC 2017). The army has been
taking a growing share of parks’ operating budgets. In the 1982/1983 fiscal year, the
government of Nepal allocated 51 percent of the total national parks and wildlife
conservation (NPWC) budget153 to the Nepal Army for security. For the fiscal year
2016/2017, the government allocated 84 percent (about 29.5 million USD) of the total
NPWC budget to the Nepal Army154.
One of the primary pillars that the toolkit prescribes is the employment of
military-style monitoring and law enforcement technologies. The toolkit includes modern
technologies such as SMART, MIST, MStriPes, surveillance tools, a mobile phone
tracking system, sniffer dogs, UVAs (or drones), and deep-search metal detectors. With
the help of WWF, CNP and the Nepal Army introduced in 2012 an Android-based real-
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The security budget increased to 83 percent by the fiscal year 2003/2004. In the fiscal year 2010/2011,
the army used 88 percent of the total national park and wildlife conservation budget compared to 12 percent
for the management and administrative budget. The NPWC budget for the fiscal year was about 0.4
percent of the total annual state budget (about 2.95 billion USD).
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Ministry of Finance. n.d. http://mof.gov.np/en/archive-documents/budget-details--red-book28.html?lang=. Accessed June 8, 2018
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time SMART (Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool) patrolling system, which helps to
measure, evaluate and improve site-based enforcement activities (DNPWC 2015). This
new surveillance technology was introduced to increase efficiency and accountability in
army patrolling inside and outside of the park. They are involved in night patrolling,
sweeping patrols, camping activities and covert operations. Soldiers also carried out
patrolling by vehicle and elephant. Each army patrol team with the new SMART
patrolling system has a GPS-based tracking device which required them to travel certain
areas, certain routes and certain times. The real-time system continuously collects data
related to patrolling by the army including the route, the area of patrolling, the time spent
in each area, and distance covered and also it enables recording the location of wild
animals and illegal activities. Each army patrolling team are equipped with a GPS-based
mobile device and other recording devices such as cameras and record books. The
information collected increases legibility as it enables the mapping of the activities of
patrolling team and the mapping and surveillance of people, places, and wildlife. In 2016,
the army in 33 posts conducted 415 patrols and covered 36500 km in CNP. The patrol
teams conducted 75 percent of the patrolling by foot. (DNPWC 2016).
In addition, the Nepal army conducts special joint anti-poaching operations such
as "Operation Hunt" and "Operation Maha Hunt." The special operations were primarily
conducted with the target of ensuring a "zero poaching year." In special anti-poaching
operations, additional army soldiers are used along with trained dogs. Special patrolling
activities such as 24-hour patrolling have been increased, and temporary guard posts are
established in special locations (DNPWC 2016, 14). For instance, on December 30, 2017,
the army started the "Operation Mega-hunt" campaign to make the "zero poaching year"

265

successful for 1000 days. In the campaign, one-hundred additional army personnel were
added to an existing army team. The army mobilized military intelligence support, and
military-trained dogs were employed. In CNP, the army conducted 150 patrols on foot, in
vehicles, and on elephants on a daily basis. For the campaign, 550 army personnel and
park staffs and other were mobilized to patrol the 1500-km CNP and buffer zones
boundary (Kathmandu Post 2017155). In addition, the CCTV has been introduced inside
the park and strategic locations for better surveillance and supposedly monitored from the
park headquarters. CNP has ten CC cameras located in sensitive areas of the park. Also,
the army and the park administration have been using advanced technologies including
light unmanned aerial vehicles for patrolling and surveillance. A "conservation drone" is
a light aircraft with embedded cameras which can travel above difficult terrain and
transmit information in real-time through photos or videos. It guides other forms of
patrolling and surveillance. It was introduced in 2012 with the help of WWF as the part
of an experiment of new surveillance technologies to collect real-time poaching activities.
According to the highest-ranking park official, the Director General, the drone will "act
like ‘eyes in the sky' to track down poachers in remote and hard-to-reach places"
(Acharya 2016, 9). About ten "conservation drones" are being used in patrolling,
monitoring and law enforcement activities in CNP. Finally, trained sniffer dogs are being
used in patrolling, monitoring and law enforcement activities in the CNP (Kantipur
2017). They have been used to track poachers before and after any criminal activities.
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Figure 6.18- Nepal Army arrested group of Tharu women (Photo by Yogesh)

Figure 6.19- Nepal Army partrolling outside of the Bagmara CF (Photo by Yogesh
Dongol)
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With the increasing presence of the military in the buffer zone and CNP, studies
have been published that highlight the occurrence of military violence. Some incidents
such as rape and death in custody rarely get published, but those that do provide a look at
the dark side of militarization. (See footnote of rape cases156 by the army and how local
buffer zone and community leaders tried to hide incidents.) For instance, incidents of
sexual violence inside the park are so common that a study in eleven western buffer zone
villages of CNP have found that 116 women were "sexually exploited" by national park
security soldiers and as a result they have given birth to 173 children (Neupane and
Musher 2016, 19).
Authorities have also planned to prosecute more people to achieve the zero
poaching year. As a result, a large number of alleged wildlife criminals have been
arrested and prosecuted. It has been laid out in the Rhino Action Plan (2017-2022) which
says that the department aims to increase prosecution to maintain the rhino population
and achieve zero poaching year (DNPWC 2017). More importantly, the idea to make the

156

One of the major forms of violence that hardly even gets discussed publicly is the accounts of sexual
harassment or sexual assault or violent rape of girls and women. These incidents usually happen when the
women crossed the forest or park boundary to collect forest resources. For instance, in May 2012, the army
head of a security post tried to violently rape a 45 year old, landless Tharu women of Patihani village inside
Belser buffer zone community forest; she had entered the community forest to collect grass for goats. One
soldier forcefully made her remove her cloths, then severely beaten her with a bamboo stick on legs and
back, punched her and hit with a boot on her chest when she refused. The army officer left her when all
several people shouted. Despite the horrific nature of these acts, buffer zone people and community forest
leaders tried to quell her, as well as others who demanded an investigation, saying that "if the issue come
forward, then it will harm forest conservation and will negatively impact the relationship between buffer
zone uses committee, community forest and the army". In addition, army soldiers threatened to take the
life of the local organization's people for delving into the issue. They threatened not to examine incident
connected with the army. In January 2016, the army arrested two women for fishing (using a DUWAtraditional fishing basket) in Rewa river in Madi. The army confiscated fish, and they told women to have
sex with them to get back their fish. They physical harassed and verbally abused them and also took away
their fish. Although no one openly discussed this particular incident during my 2016 research, many males
in Sunachuri area were fearful about the ongoing construction of new security posts of the army in their
community forest and the possibility of "anything" happening inside the forest.
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zero poaching year successful has encouraged certain forms of state violence, such as the
deprivation of subsistence resources. For example, although the government prosecuted
2677 people in different wildlife criminal cases, many were for wood extraction, fishing,
fodder/fuelwood collection, and sand/stone quarrying. Only about 7.5 percent of
indictments were related to rhino and tiger cases (DNPWC 2016, 11). The state’s legal
actions also disproportionately involve ethnic minorities. There was a disproportionate
number of ethnic minorities in jail in the rhino and tiger poaching cases. A Chitwanbased organization (Prabhat Kiran Sewa Samaj) documented that as of early 2015 there
are 151 people in Bharatpur district in prison for wildlife-related crimes. In 2014 alone,
DNPWC arrested 142 people in wildlife-related crimes. Among the 142 people arrested
for wildlife offense, 64 were Chepang people and most others were from Bote, Kumal
and Tharu minority ethnic groups (Neupane and Musher 2016). Poachers of particular
ethnic groups were more likely to get harsh punishment than rich and other powerful
wildlife criminals. Most were charged with 15 years of imprisonment and fines. Many
local people told me that those convicted of major wildlife crimes (tiger, rhino) are in jail
because they are poor and cannot hire a lawyer or afford bail. Many cases never make it
to trail as a consequence (Field interview 2010, 2016 -2017).
Moreover, the Nepali Army and park authorities have violated the legal rights of
detained people to have due legal process. Many people jailed in Bharatpur told me in
interviews that CNP authorities delay or obstruct trials in court. Other studies have
supported these claims. Many told me that they were detained in custody in Kasara, CNP
headquarters, without legal proceedings. Many people crossing the national park and
buffer zone forests boundaries to illegally or legally collect forest resources for household
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consumption or sale have been arrested and prosecuted as criminals. In 2015-2016,
Prabhat Kiran Sewa Samaj and Action Nepal conducted a detailed study in 11 buffer
zone villages of western CNP. They documented that national park authorities have
inhumanly treated, punished and criminalized 227 women who had entered national park
forest for the collection of firewood, fish, and ferns (Neupane and Musher 2016).

6.3 Disciplining buffer zone residents, producing docile subjects
While the militarization of conservation creates a context of constant threatened
violence in the buffer zone as a strategy to control territory and bodies, it is not the only
or even principal method of creating docile subjects. The management of the park and
buffer zone includes a range of bio-political projects and programs. These include
increasing levels of individual documentation, education, and participation, some of
which I detail below.
6.3.1. Monitoring and documenting
As part of its ongoing resource management practices, Bagmara CF continuously
monitors movement across the forest boundaries. To aid that effort, local authorities have
constructed a permanent road marking the entire forest boundary. It is considered to be
the permanent boundary separating the forest community land from settlements,
primarily to reduce the problem of gradual encroachment of forested areas by landless
people. In addition to spatially regulating the movement of people through the use of
barbed wire fences, Bagmara CF has also constructed electric fences to regulate the
bodies of wild animals. More recently the Bagmara CF is spending significant funds for
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the construction of a concrete wall primarily aimed to fix the boundary and regulate the
movement of people permanently.
Accompanying the efforts to secure the forest boundaries and restrict entry are
techniques of monitoring and documentation. Bagmara CF users can receive a legal
permit to access the CF after providing information at the CF office. People must provide
their name and the name of the household head, their settlement name, time of visit, the
purpose of the visit at the main entry point. One of the main purposes of the free entrance
ticket is to monitor the movement of people by keeping the record of who goes in, who
does what, and who comes out. Some people obtain take permits and some do not,
suggesting an early phase of this new disciplinary tactic. Many Tharu people from distant
areas told me, for example, that they get a permit before they enter the CF. They say that
they are fearful of doing anything wrong or going to the park for fear of harm or arrest.
However, most users do not enter through the main gate but by crossing barbed wired
boundaries. Even if they use the gate, they do not get permit. On one occasion I sat with
CF staff when three women entered the forest gate without requesting a permit. As they
were walking, a newly recruited forest guard shouted at them to come and get the entry
permit. They stopped and two out of the three came back to the gate for the entry permit.
When they arrived, the forest guard started telling them that he was calling them to enter
their name and take the permit with them. He said to them that if they take a permit it will
be beneficial to them if anything happens or if army stops them to check permit. In
addition, he told them that if you do not come outside on time then we will have the
opportunity to know and go and look for you. Two women just listened, gave their
nformation, took the permit, and left.
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Figure 6.20- Forest users
asking for entrance permit at
Bagmara CF office (up) (Photo
by Yogesh Dongol)

Permits help not only to monitor the comings and goings across the boundary, but
to regulate activities inside. The Bagmara CF committee has designated the time and
space of entrance inside the CF for the collection of specific types of forest resources.
Times of forest resources collection has been designated as well as the places of
collection. In particular, resource collectors are especially told not to go to or be visible
to the elephant safari area. As elephant safaris take place between 6:30 and 11:00 am and
1:00 and 5:00 pm, the time between 11 am -1 pm are only allowable hours for resource
collectors. As one Kumal woman in her mid-50's who live in the Bagmara Community
forest explain me about her difficulty in getting forest access: "They tell us only to go
between 10 am – 2 pm to get some specific forest resources because they say that they
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don't want tourists to see many people when they are there to see wild animals in jungle.
They tell us to hide in bushes when we see elephants and tourists. Why are we going to
hide for an hour in the forest? We have so much work at home.157” Elephant safaris also
dictate certain resource use restrictions. Collectors have legal access only to "ground
grass" and are not allowed to take tree fodder. The control of fodder collection, especially
valor (Trewia nudiflora) grasses, is related to the safaris’ needs for elephant feeding
while they are inside the forest. As ground grasses can rapidly grow in short time within a
couple of days and as herbivores such as rhino like to feed on new shoots, users are
allowed to cut "ground grasses."
The permits not only make users legible to local authorities, permits also help to
classify people as either “permitted” or “illegal.” It imparts an idea of illegality and
wrongdoing in users’ minds. Their offenses are also documented in the CF office which
is occasionally used by CF staff to as court evidence. Like the new recording practices
used by the army, forest guards in the CF have started to make documentation of any
wrongdoing by taking pictures, notetaking of names, dates, and offences. The CF retains
records use them as a tool to restrict the distribution of benefits such as the occasional
firewood and timber distributions. One woman of Laukhani said that her name was
recorded and her firewood was confiscated by forest guards. Six months later during the
firewood distribution time, CF staff publicly humiliated her for being caught stealing
firewood. As a result of recording keeping, CF leaders know who are dependent on the
forest, how many, and how frequently the go to collect. According to the president of
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Interview with a Kumal woman of Laukhani, September 2016.
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Bagmara CF, about 65 people go inside the community forest regularly. They also have
information about how many people enter CNP forest and the Khorser forest.

Figure 6.21 – Forest guard with women carrying forest resoruces (down) (Photo by
Yogesh Dongol

Currently, Bagmara CF has 15 forest guards who are stationed at one of several
posts and regularly patrol the forest. I participated with forest two guards patrolling the
forest. When we meet four women carrying firewood, they used the occasion to subtly
discipline them by suggesting them not to come too frequently and not to cut big
branches. The CF guards primarily respond to illegal resource collection by confiscating
cutting (Hasiya or Aasi) and carrying tools (Namlo). Usually, when forest guards arrest,
they confiscate tools and destroy the firewood load. Forest users who are arrested for
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illegally collecting forest resources are required to come to the CF office to get their tools
back. This moment is used as an opportunity for guards and CF leaders to teach and
educate people about rules of the CF and about the importance and value of forest and
wildlife conservation. Education is a key bio-political strategy for producing
environmental subjects, a point I will elaborate upon in the next section.

6.3.2. Educating

It is not possible to guard all of the forest boundary. I think we will not be able to
control people entering the forest, but we can teach them not to take green
branches and trees. - Bagmara CF guard

In the initial years of the establishment of the CF, NTNC conducted an education
program to convince people for the plantation initiatives. Since the Bodreni Tamang
people, according to a Bahun officer of NTNC, are “Kura nabhujhni jaati” (an ethnic
group that does not understand), they opposed the plantation program. NTNC selected a
few influential leaders of the settlements and took them on a free excursion visit to
Annapurna demonstration sites. A NTNC ranger involved in the program told me, “We
took them to Ghadruk and showed the agroforestry activities and the model of ACAP and
taught them how local people are doing conservation and growing forest resources. After
returning from the tour, those who opposed were very convinced and they helped to
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convince other people too.158" Such past experiences have influenced the implementation
of a multi-pronged education program in the buffer zone.
Education, for example, is incorporated into patrolling. Although forest guards in
the CF are assigned to control the movement of local people by regular patrolling,
monitoring and enforcement of rules, most are also involved in education and in
communicating “normal” conservation behavior to local residents. When providing
entrance permits, guards usually remind users of the importance of leaving on time and
provide some bit of instruction on the importance of forest conservation. Education may
sometimes substitute for enforcement. I have observed the activities and performances of
forest guards a number of times and saw some version of this. When on patrol with
guards we met four women with their load of “fodder” – firewood wrapped inside the
fodder-, for example, I was curious what forest guards would say. One of them merely
said, “it is already 1:30 PM and you guys are still here. You should be outside the forest
by this time. Starting tomorrow don’t do it again and don’t take big firewood.” Such
admonitions are supported by other forms of instruction. The boundary of the community
forest areas have information on green and yellow boards communicating the need for
conservation of the forest and wild animals and rules and regulations of forest access in
English and Nepali. For instance, some yellow boards have information about the time of
entrance and the time local users have to come out of the forest. Boards remind users that
they are allowed to collect only “bhui ghas” – ground grasses. Other green and yellow
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Interview with a NTNC staff, December 17, 2016
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boards instruct all households to plant at least two trees on their private land to help
conservation.

Figure 6.22-Board with resource access information at Bagmara CF (Photo by Yogesh
Dongol)

Conservation organizations including CNP, the BZ and CF and the NTNC are
regularly conducting education programs to targeted population. One target group of the
conservation awareness programs is the Tamang women from the forest fringe area.
These women are particularly dependent on forest resources. Conservation education
programs attempt to make them "aware" about conservation. Talking about the 2015
conservation program launched by the CF in collaboration with WWF and NTNC, an
active member of the CF told me that there were 91 Tamang women participated in a
three-days program in 2015. (Although he said, he was not satisfied with the program
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because nothing had changed in their behavior and action.) In another example, every
first week of the Nepali New Year, Sauraha “conservationists” celebrate conservation
week with different types of activities. In 2016, there was a conservation rally, with
hundreds of people participating in conservation education events. The Bird Education
Society (BES) of Sauraha, with the financial support of the Bagmara CF, is actively
involved in teaching students and youth about conservation and the importance of wild
animals. They organize conservation quizzes for local kids, bird watching, and power
point presentations and occasionally show conservation related videos.

Figure 6.23- School kids and other participant in conservation rally to mourn the death of
rhino in 2017 at Sauraha (Photo by Yogesh Dongol)

When education fails to alter behavior, officials and conservation advocates tend
to fall back on caste, ethnic, and gender stereotypes for explanation. For instance, many
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Tamang women of Laukhani, Malpur, and Bagmara have received conservation
awareness training, are beneficiaries of development programs, and know that taking
firewood from the CF and NP is illegal. Despite the CF committee’s efforts at controlling
their behavior through education and other methods, Tamang women have not changed.
As the result of the failure to improve their behavior, CF officials and guards label
Tamang women who frequently steal or illegally cross the boundaries as "greedy",
"illiterate," "unruly," and like "sheep". They are "stupid Tamang women". As it happens,
they have continued to steal from the forest primarily because of the continued demand
and high profit from selling firewood and forest resources to Sauraha Hotels. In Bagmara
BZ, most people of all identities know what is good and bad conservation behavior.
Whether they practice good conservation behavior is largely because of many factors,
such as landlessness and the need for cash income.

6.3.3. Promoting participation
In Bagmara, as is standard in CBC, various institutions encourage the
participation and inclusion of people of different identities in conservation and
development practices and decisions. In this section, I show how the participation of
"local people" is shaped by the different socioeconomic and political circumstances and
practices. I argue that the "participation" and "inclusion" of local uses is another biopolitical strategy to reduce opposing voices and to co-opt opponent by providing them
incentives.
I went to a public meeting of the Sauraha settlement, which was conducted
primarily to decide on how and on what to use the settlement budget so that it can be
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discussed and included in the general assembly. There were 21 people present including
three women. As soon as a meeting started a person sitting just a row back from me
expressed his view about how the meeting was conducted. He declared that the meeting
announcement was not circulated to all users and that he meeting was conducted without
the presence of a minimum number of forest users. "Bagmara CF has posted a notice
about the meeting at the corner in a pole and I just found out about this because someone
informed me just 20 minutes ago. I think there should be a minimum attendance to start a
meeting. It is a meeting of an organization and it should be guided by a rule.159" While he
was stating his views, other participants were deliberately trying to interrupt. It was a
result, I think, of the fact that the Sauraha settlement is primarily a Nepali Congress
dominated place and he was a Maoist affiliated person and of "untouchable" caste.
One of the major issues that many users expressed to me was that the forest user
committee does not share information. Not only small conservation and development
issues and benefits and opportunities, but the committee does not share information about
big development projects with local people. I found that the Bagmara CF never sought
the participation of local people or even considered informing local people on most
decisions. When I asked about how local people came up with the decision to put a
concrete wall with so much investment in the community forest areas, an elder and active
Tamang man told me
no one knew about the concrete wall. No villagers knew about the concrete wall.
No one consulted with locals about such a big project. Can you imagine that?
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Participant observation at Sauraha settlement meeting. December 11, 2016
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People now know that this is the work of national park and buffer zone. That all
people know. No one knows where the money comes from and how. No one has
discussed the budget requirement160.
Rather, it was discussed and decided upon at the level of local leaders.
Participation is about sharing some information and encouraging feedback from
local people, which involves a communication between people and questioning. In the
Bagmara CF, information sharing takes places only between people of who agree with
each other, a situation shaped by social networks. As a result, the majority of forest users
do not go to meetings other than the General Assembly. Participation at the family level
is shaped by the identities and social relationships. The idea is that all do not need to
participate or that the household head, such as the father or elder male, makes most of the
decisions. A Tharu man said, "I don't think all need to go. My uncle goes to the meeting,
so I don't go." In addition, many women, who are active in local organizations such as the
community forest, saving and credit organizations, and school council, told me that they
have difficulty going and attending meetings because of the workload and the role of
women in preparing food, looking after kids, farming and all other household work. Most
of the time women’s participation was not even considered as fit in a meeting room.
Some subcommittees have a high representation of women, but when there is a high
presence of women, their roles are relegated to stereotypical “women’s roles, such as
performing as “cheerleaders” or distributing drinks. For instance, in BES (Bird Education
Society) meeting, a woman secretary presented information about the annual report and
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Conversation with former member of Bagmara CF of Laukhani, October 23, 2016
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after few minutes she started distributing tea to all. Similarly, in general assembly of CF,
most women members were in matching dress and they performed in the welcoming of
guests.
Most importantly, caste and ethnic identities also shape whether or how someone
participates. I participated in a meeting in the Sisuwar settlement. The meeting was
organized inside the community clubhouse room. Although all forest users were invited
to the meeting, there were only about 30 forest users in total. Most people sitting in the
room were male and about five women were standing outside of the room and
occasionally watching through the window. Participation in the meeting by most men
inside the room, however, was very limited and most were listening. One man stood to
requested help to repair biogas plant. Local Tharu leaders and community forest leaders
presented the already prepared agenda. After few days, I asked with one participant about
the meeting. He told me that most were dissatisfied with the meeting and demanded more
resources when they gathered by themselves (only Tharu people were gathering). I asked
why they did not speak at the meeting. He said, "we Tharu people do not want to or are
scared of talking in formal gatherings." Similarly, the participation of many Tharu people
is limited by the ability to speak Nepali. A Tharu woman told me that she had difficulty
talking in Nepali when a forest committee officer told her to speak with the then King
Birendra. "A Bahun man, the vice president, told me what to say and how to speak. I was
so afraid to speak. Chaudhary people do not know how to speak,161" she said.
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Interview with a Tharu woman- the former CF member- of Sisuwar settlement. December 21, 2016
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Moreover, people refuse to participate when their demands, needs, and voices are
repeatedly disregarded. One person from Malpur said after a Bahun-majority area
controlled the settlement development budget every year. "there is no sense of debating
or speaking if they don't listen and value you. They say that they will take and spend
money where there is a majority. So it is better not to participate [if you don't have
majority].162" Many Tharu people also told me that they do not participate because their
participation and comments make no difference in the CF committee decisions, which are
primarily influenced by the interests of Sauraha people. As an “untouchable” man say,
“bhusunako kura Maurile kahile suncha, la bhannus? [Bees will not listen to what the
smallest flies (Gnat) say]. So why go. I do my work". I observed firsthand the way a CF
committee member's behavior silences participation. A local young man demanded that
CF members help to stop rhino coming from a Bodreni gate, which usually gets left open
because vehicles passing during the night often do not close the gate. The Bagmara CF
committee member, a Nepal Congress party leader and a president of the Restaurant
Association, replied in an authoritative tone, "we are going to construct a concrete wall,
and that will solve the problem." Hearing the dismissive reply of the CF representative,
the young man replied, "how will that solve the problem. We are asking for a person who
will open and close the gate. You will have to put a gate in the concrete wall too."
In addition to the importance of ethnic identities, poor people who have to earn
and work every day rarely participated. The loss of daily wage and difficulty of feeding
the family is a clear disincentive to participate, which only adds to the fact that they fell
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Interview with a Rai man of Malpur, a daily wage laborer, December 3, 2016
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like their participation will not influence the outcomes of the meeting. In addition, many
people do not want to participate because they do not want to damage their existing
relationship with the local leader. People refuse to participate to avoid confrontation and
debate that might harm the social relationship. As one Tamang man said, "when I hear all
this corruption. It annoys me. That is why I don't like to participate in those kinds of
meetings and gatherings. If I hear something fishy, I have to speak and complain. I have
to talk against someone. That will harm a social relationship. That is why I don't go and
don't listen"163.

Figure 6.24- Q and A session of the general assembly of the Bagmara CF. (Photo by
Yogesh Dongol)
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Interview with a Tamang Jeep Driver of Malpur settlement. December 6, 2016

284

6.4. Conclusion
The representation of certain groups of people as a criminal and poachers and certain
spaces as “illegal” or restricted not only strengthens the power of the state over
criminality and expands and deepens its territorial control, while reproducing the older
social hierarchy, in this case, the idea of caste or ethnic hierarchy in conservation. In
other words, labeling people as mindless, backward, and stupid and lacking in
understanding of the value of conservation reinforces hierarchies and long-standing
relations of power among groups. More importantly, the zero poaching discourses have
not only justified the territorial control of national park's core area but also it has
effectively, legally and militarily controlled the people and spaces of the buffer zone.
Increasing militarization in buffer zone spaces has gradually curtailed the movement of
people, their spatial practices, while producing the constant fear of violence. The
representation of the buffer zone as a risky place or dangerous place has further supported
militarization. The assumption that the "six pillars" of the "zero poaching toolkit" are the
solution to the poaching problem is an apolitical, technical fix resulting from a narrow
analysis (Ferguson 1990). The analysis has grossly simplified and generalized different
types of poachers, the differences between them, and the conditions shaping poaching. I
argue that the analysis has led to the disproportionate arrest of poor and marginalized
groups. The zero poaching approach calls for the militarization of the park, with strong
monitoring and enforcement of laws without acknowledging the history of poaching and
the social and political consequences of militarization.
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Moreover, the adoption of the international discourse on poaching has justified
the state's internal territorialization and militarization of CNP and buffer zones through
the discursive spectacularization of conservation success. The celebration of success has
been accompanied by the strengthening of the authority of conservation organizations.
Nepali experts claim that the "zero poaching year" is a reflection of neo-liberalization of
conservation in Nepal, where conservation NGOs bring resources, dictate policies,
programs, celebrate and take ownership of their work. Some NGOs are, directly and
indirectly, involved in anti-poaching activities. Wildlife Conservation Nepal has recruited
anti-poaching staffs who negotiate, act as informants and arrest poachers who are
involved in Tiger poaching, in particular. WWF is directly involved in anti-poaching
activities by providing financial help or salaries to informants. I think one of the most
dangerous aspects of this conservation discourse is that it silences, or reduces the
possibilities for, the critical questioning authority and ideas. I repeatedly asked myself,
for example, how an idea that we should not harm a rhino with a stick or stone even for
self-defense or for saving crops became normalized. The answer, I found, lies with the
bio-politics of conservation with its integrated system of violence, surveillance,
education, and participation.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This dissertation provides a critical examination of the role of new conservation
territories in (re)producing or alleviating socioeconomic inequalities; state formation and
the construction of new subjectivities; and shaping rural property regimes and indigenous
territorial claims. In the space of the previous six chapters, I outlined the research project
and presented my research findings. In chapter one, I described the major research
problem, research design, and methods. In chapter two, I looked at the research problem
through the optics of particular political ecological scholarship including
environmentality and territoriality. These two interrelated concepts have allowed me to
question the issues of structural inequalities, property regimes, subject making, state
making, and identity politics within territorialized new nature conservation.
In Chapter three, I provided a brief socioeconomic and historical context to help
understand current and ongoing conservation and development initiatives. Subsequently,
in Chapter four, I looked at the material and discursive practices and processes that have
shaped the production of the Chitwan Valley landscape and Chitwan National Park. The
historical document analysis and interviews on the creation of Chitwan National Park
provided several important insights. First, wildlife experts, in particular, represented the
population status of selected wild animals as “bleak.” The experts carried out rhino and
tiger population surveys through various scientific techniques and produced new
knowledge about their status and nature. They reported the “near extinction” of
endangered rhino and tiger populations in Nepal. Second, the identification of Chitwan
National Park as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1984 and the representation of
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national parks as major tourism spaces that are important sources of foreign exchange for
local and national economic development have also factored into the strict controls and
the establishment of the park. The production of new scientific knowledge on wild
animals and discursive representation of place as important habitat led to the violent
eviction of people as “illegal encroachers” and curtailed local livelihood practices as
“destructive” to wildlife. State authorities, however, granted permission to some people
to start high-end tourism enterprises inside the enclosed spaces for the nation’s economic
development. The chapter argues that the international conservation organizations not
only claim authority through the production of knowledge and funding, but these ideas
and knowledge simultaneously strengthen state power through the production of abstract
spaces and docile subjects as people are made fearful through threats and violence. In
sum, the ways space is defined and controlled shaped the co-constitution of abstract state
spaces and categories of people such as illegals, poachers, and conservationists.
Some noticeable initial integrated conservation and development projects were
the enterprise-based approach of the Biodiversity Conservation Network (funded by
USAID), the park and people program (PPP), and the participatory conservation program
(PCP) of UNDP. Experts discovered the poverty of expanding populations and their
dependency on forest resources, the open access nature of forests outside the national
parks, the ignorance of people regarding the value of wildlife and the park, and the
difficulty of access to resources from the park due to the stringent nature of park
authorities and the wildlife law. These representations of complex relationships between
human and non-human as “conflicts” enabled a series of conservation and development
initiatives around the villages of CNP. In Chapter five and Chapter six, I explore these
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conservation and development initiatives in a surrounding buffer zone area of CNP.
These chapters contribute to the rapidly expanding literature on the political ecology of
nature conservation. In particular, they address the following two key areas of emerging
research in the field: first, the political-ecological effects resulting from the rapid increase
in territorialized CBCs, such as buffer zones, that seek to integrate socio-economic
development goals with biodiversity protection; and second, the critical approaches to
understanding the complex interrelations of conservation territories, subject formation,
and state goals for governing people and nature.
The dissertation research revealed the complex and diverse effects of CBC
initiatives and associated practices and discourses of state, non-state and local people,
which I will summarize below. First, a spatial area was legally demarcated as a buffer
zone space outside the park boundary. Within each buffer zones, park authorities legally
classified the land into forest and settlements. These spatial strategies imposed a
limitation on local users’ spatial activities, movements, and rights within the buffer zone.
The activities of local users, however, are shaped by social power relations. For instance,
some powerful local elites were allowed to excavate the Rapti River in Sauraha area,
whereas the Nepal Army arrested local poor people who fish for subsistence. Similarly,
local institutions and elites have controlled the community forest, a major economic
source, through spatial zoning and bounding, and further claimed it through diverse
spatial practices such as establishing seedling plantations and surveillance of the
community forest. Non-state and state agencies scientifically demarcated and mapped the
forest to distinguish it from private land. It has also been maintained through diverse
practices such as fencing and continuous surveillance by local authorities, forest guards,
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and the army. Furthermore, the discursive representation of buffer zone space as, on the
one hand an “extended wildlife habitat” and on the other, a “conflict zone”, a “dangerous
place” and a potential “poacher’s hideout” combined with concern for the “security” of
endangered megafauna such as rhinos have shaped the militarization of the buffer zone
spaces. In addition, the discourse of “risk” of loss and the “security” of rhinos and the
celebration of “zero poaching” has also rationalized the militarization and expansion of
state jurisdiction in the buffer zone spaces. In sum, the construction of legally bounded
buffer zones and community forests has imposed a spatial limitation on people’s
movement, activities, and practices. Alternatively, the legal demarcation of boundaries
not only produces a new category of land, a state space, that is under the jurisdiction of
the park authorities, but also the further demarcation and maintenance of the boundary of
Bagmara CF produces new extractive spaces for local and non-local elites.
Second, the major socioeconomic effect of CBC initiatives is the differential
distribution of costs and benefits from the Bagmara community forest and tourism among
heterogeneous people in the buffer zone area. The control of benefits from wildlife
tourism and the community forest is related to the control and access of the means of
production such as hotels, jeeps, tourists, elephants, tourism knowledge and social
capital. In addition, local elites have a connection with park authorities and national
political leaders to influence decisions related to the control of resources and
opportunities. In short, the attempts by CBC experts to produce new market subjects and
economic benefits for local communities have failed through a naïve faith in
neoliberalism. Experts did not take into account that the potential benefits from a tourism
industry would invite savvy people from all over Nepal and from other countries. As a

290

result, local elites, national and foreign entrepreneurs and recent migrants have captured
most of the benefits from tourism opportunities, which were purported to benefit local
people and the nation's economy. More importantly, the control of benefits is not only
achieved through economic means, but non-economic means also play a critical role.
The discourse of wildlife “tourism” as a major source of economic development and the
imperative of “wilderness space” have justified the strict control of the Bagmara CF
space. In addition, the discourses of development or Bikas and the representation of space
as a “tourist place” and the representation of elite’s tourism activities as “non-extractive”
ecotourism practice and local subsistence practices as “exploitative” have enabled the
commodification of community forest and wildlife and the elite capture of benefits.
Third, in the Bagmara CF area, development strategies have been the major
interventions carried out to change the behavior of local people and authorities or to
reduce the conflicts between park and people. That is, the major shifts in conservation
discourses in the Bagmara area are the strategic “care” of non-humans and humans. In the
Bagmara CF area, wildlife tourism has been promoted as the major enterprises to provide
sustainable economic resources for local development and to encourage biodiversity
conservation. The project includes socioeconomic development activities to improve the
habits and understanding of local people and authorities. However, local authorities have
controlled the local users’ access to subsistence resources from the CF to allow
undisturbed ecotourism activities inside the forest and river. Furthermore, local leaders
and park officials frequently invoked human-wildlife conflict as a major or shocking
conflict to assert their authority and power by “helping” or by providing “security” to
local people.
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Fourth, the effects of the CBC initiatives include the reproduction of caste/ethnic
and class hierarchies. For instance, local authorities have granted a special right for
Musaher people to collect firewood from the community forest once a week primarily
because they are “untouchable” caste. Some Musher and Bote people also have rights
because of their “culture” of living by the river, but many poor people from Tharu and
Derai have no legal rights. One old Derai woman told me, “We are poor people.
Sometimes we don’t have anything to eat. We like to eat fishes sometime but we don’t
have money. We do not work. They will arrest us if we fish. Only people who have
license can fish and they sell. We don’t have license. ...I don’t know why they got and we
did not get.164” The special access to collect forest and river resources based on their
cultural and caste identity have perpetuated the idea of caste and ethnic hierarchy.
Moreover, the failure of fines and punishment, spatial and bio-political strategies to
improve the habits of people or the unruly behavior of people have further reproduced the
preexisting social hierarchies. For instance, trustees have labelled the Musahar people as
“stupid”, “lazy”, and “dirty” and who do not have a habit of “saving” after they failed to
improve the lives of the Musaher people through social development initiatives.
Similarly, some people who live near forest fringe areas who continued to depend on
forest resources after the strict demarcation of land were considered not only criminals or
illegals or poachers, but also were labeled with new identities that were strictly based on
their ethnic/caste identities. For instance, many Tamang women of Laukhani, Malpur,
Bagmara have received conservation awareness training, they are a beneficiary of
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Interview with a Darai old woman of Odra settlement. December 11, 2016
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development programs, and they know that stealing firewood from CF and NP is illegal.
Despite CF committee’s repeated efforts at controlling their behavior through violent and
subtle methods, they have not changed their action. As the result of the failure to improve
their behavior, these Tamang women who frequently steal or cross the forest boundary of
CF and NP are labeled as "greedy", "illiterate" and "unruly" like a "sheep". They are
"stupid” Tamang women" of Laukhani, Malpur, Bagmara. They are considered
“backward” people.
Fifth, although the regulatory gaze of tourists, conservationists, nature guides,
local people, forest guards and the Nepal Army and the engagement and encounter with
the discourse and practices of conservation have shaped the particular environmental
subjectivities of many people, some people who continued to disregard or failed to
behave as “environmental subjects” are frequently labelled as criminals, poachers,
illegals and backward. The idea of "Matwali people” (alcohol drinker) and the labeling of
people as mindless, backward and stupid who do not understand the value of
conservation and the binary representation of Bahun-Chetri people as non-alcohol
drinkers who understand the value of conservation is primarily related to why hundreds
of Chepang people from a single village outside of the buffer zone are in jail for wildlife
crime and why most wildlife criminals are from ethnic minorities.
Finally, the issues of distribution of access, resources, and opportunities have
occasionally led to local resistance in the Bagmara CF area. Some scholars have related
the emergence of Tharu ethnic identity to the discrimination and marginalization of Tharu
elites by the state and state backed Hindu hill groups. Others have pointed out the ethnic
politics of Maoists related to the continuous marginalization and domination of ethnic
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groups by the state and Bahun-Chetri groups. In Bagmara CF, I show how the loss of
land and discrimination by the state prompted the Maoist violence and Tharuhat
movement, both charged with identity politics. More recently, the Tharu indigenous
movement has emerged in the Bagmara CF area to control the position in the Bagmara
CF users’ committee. In addition to these overt cultural politics, I show how the cultural
representation of people and practices by Others and self-representation have shaped the
control of access, benefits, and opportunities in the Bagmara CF area.
Therefore, I argue that these ongoing conservation and development initiatives
employed diverse spatial and bio-political strategies to control people and nature. The
control, however, is shaped by social power relations such as the legal access from park
authorities and social identities. In sum, I argue that community-based conservation
initiatives are modern ways of governing people and nature by controlling and producing
governable spaces and subject. It is the “meaning making machine”.
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